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ABSTRACT 
 
This research extends from a critique of surface as the under-acknowledged 
partner in the making and viewing of drawings. Within a practice-led approach I 
explore ways of responding to and engaging with the peculiar qualities of surface 
materials and through this creative inquiry, reveal a broader ethos of practice. 
The particular qualities of surface materials – paper, fabric, board – lie in their 
shallow extension, their detachment from any substantial form or depth, and, as 
such, their equal availability to ruin and expression. In any interaction with such 
materials a constant negotiation of these terms insists upon a kind of care that 
does not entail preservation so much as an enlivening of matter. In this thesis, I 
propose that care arises as a mode of being between the artist and work, the work 
and beholder, and even between the parts of the work. The thesis therefore 
proposes a mode of being that situates the art practice within an ethical 
framework, premised on an ontological equation, taken from Heidegger, of care 
with being.  
 
While care, as a theme in art practice has been explored explicitly through a 
range of contemporary practices, these have largely engaged the medium of 
performance or ritual. This current research seeks to show how care is operative 
in material practices, where the particular qualities of those materials generate 
the terms for care as a particular mode of engagement that is reciprocal and 
intransitive. 
 
Key words: surface materials; care 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Figure 1. My left hand with paper dust, September 12, 2013 
These hands, so central to the making that has guided this research, are the 
enactors of decisions made possible precisely because of the hands’ ability to act 
in particular ways. This simple chiasmus of practice manifests equally in the care 
taken in acts of making, and the force that comes with the decision of 
destruction. Like many other artists, I periodically purge my studio of old works 
that serve no longer to provide either the clarity of answers, or the thrall of 
ambiguity. Most of the time, they put up little or no resistance, neither accepting 
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nor disputing their redundancy. It is not usual that I would heed an ethical 
imperative given on the part of the object. But once, not long ago, I felt the sad 
submission of an old sculpture, a small thing, under my hand, as I brutishly 
shoved it in the waste, and immediately sensed the confusing shame of a 
repentant transgressor. It was a complex mix of emotions that can be summed up, 
partially, in a recognition of this: I had cared, and I cared no more. But now I saw 
that it was not just about me, and that it was too late to withdraw the care I had 
administered to that object, now deemed obsolete. The care I had given was no 
longer mine to take. The ethical sense was not one experienced from the 
perspective of ascribed values, but, in the terms defined by Levinas an ethics that 
arises  from “an access to exterior being” (1990, 293), to being beyond myself. 
This ethics is, then, more causal than theoretical, more material than emotional, 
and happens as things come into contact in the making of a world. 
 
This small incident was not one of those fortuitous epiphanies that can turn a 
research question around, and from which moment all becomes clear. It came, 
rather, toward the end of the research, when I had already been thinking about 
care as cause, a ground within which I could argue my practice emerged. It was 
precisely because I had been immersed in this speculative scholarship, that I was 
now viewing this object differently. Speculation does not give rise only to 
speculative outcomes but can function as a lens through which attention is tuned 
and the world experienced differently. Far from advocating mindless hoarding, I 
am suggesting through this research that care can be found in unlikely places, 
holding things together, and reaching out from objects and people alike, that have 
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been invested, and continue to be invested, with care that endures beyond its 
administering.   
 
What is important to this study as a material and practice-led one, is that the 
emphasis of care is founded upon the particular materials – that is, surface 
materials – and the processes and resolutions that have made these considerations 
about care possible. I do not intend to make claims about artworks or creative 
practices generally but to focus on the special qualities of surface materials both 
in my own work and within a range of other works that are otherwise 
considerably diverse. That is not to say this notion of care could not be extended 
to other modes of practice, since the investment of care is not confined to any 
single type of worldly stuff. However, what interested me in this research was 
how particular materials and approaches to them could lead to particular 
theoretical propositions. Rather than beginning with a theory of care and seeking 
to illustrate it through the work, the notion of care arose from an inquiry 
embedded in the material practice, from a responsive, empathic rather than 
functional way of working with materials such as paper, board and fabric. 
Through a responsive approach, despite their physical differences, they turned 
out to have much in common, whether suggestive of walls or blankets, and in 
turn came to offer a compelling image of subjectivity.  
 
From an initial study of the drawing surface as a partner to its markings, not 
merely a background, I came to regard these other sorts of surface objects as 
sharing a qualitative and functional genealogy. They are those materials or 
objects that are thin, extensive, that have area, but little or no depth; that merely 
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transition from one side to the other but do not develop or conceal subcutaneous 
systems – materials, as I have mentioned, like paper and fabric, but also objects 
like walls, curtains and blankets. As a special category of object, these things 
have also come under the ontological scrutiny of Michel Serres, who identifies 
their unique intermediary qualities: 
 
Veil, canvas, tissue, chiffon, fabric, goatskin and sheepskin... all the 
forms of planes or twists in space, bodily envelopes or writing 
supports, able to flutter like a curtain, neither liquid nor solid, to be 
sure, but participating in both conditions. Pliable, tearable, 
stretchable...topological (Serres in Connor 2004a).1  
 
It occurred to me, in the course of working with and thinking about these things, 
that they are a rarity in the natural world, but found everywhere in the 
manufactured, as if they were standing in for something from which the outer 
layer had been abstracted to act alone. Similarly, following Michel Serres, Steven 
Connor acknowledges that “membranes, borders and boundaries” are “abstracted 
forms of the skin, the skin emblazoned, stretched out, explicated” (Connor 
2004b, 40). The surfaces we most often encounter, with which we enfold, house 
and convenience ourselves – curtains, chairs, tables, benches as well as 
containers of all sorts – have entered our cultural worlds as abstractions of skin 
and the body, the earth and cave. For example, a chair or table might be thought 
of as a technology that has raised upward, the ground, to meet us half way; the 
blanket imitates a skin; cup, the hands; house, the hollow, one-sided space of the 
																																																								
1	Originally	in	Serres,	Atlas,	1994,	p.45.	Translation	is	Connor’s.	
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cave; paper issues from ground, skin, and rock. On this account, they could be 
said to be mediators, translators of earth into world. Bringing together this 
assortment of objects in a single conversation is possible, in one sense, by virtue 
of metaphor. But as Rebecca Solnit reminds us “nothing can be crossbred that 
doesn’t have a common ancestor” (Solnit 2003, 10).  
 
The relevance of surface objects to the theme of care lies in their very material 
qualities and their relationship to human sensibilities: surface materials wrap, 
enfold, protect, shelter, conceal and hold. In short, they are involved in acts of 
care with a particular sort of intimacy and efficiency that is qualitatively different 
to the type of care that might be said of objects of depth or bulk. Further to this 
affordance of care, because of their material nature as shallow and extensive, 
they often find themselves in places of exposure, and vulnerable to tearing, 
saturation, puncturing and wearing, without a body to back them up. Thus, in the 
business of care, they become casualties of the dangers and contingencies they 
absorb on our behalf, requiring a return of the gesture of care, in order to forestall 
their demise.  
 
In the artworks I look at in the exegesis, including and in addition to my own, the 
vulnerability of these materials is often exploited, though their rupture is 
sometimes revealed, counter-intuitively, to be a kind of responsiveness that 
might be considered as an act of care. For example, Lucio Fontana deliberately 
slashed and punctured his canvases, but he did so with the utmost consideration 
of the material qualities he was working with, and the strength and restraint of 
his own hand. Contemporary artist Elana Herzog frays the weave of fabric to 
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near dissolution, but with every rift comes an act of mending, until the rhythms 
of ruin and repair merge. It is, therefore, on account of the vulnerable nature of 
surfaces, that the forces applied are made with an understanding of and concern 
for the materials, such that the breech becomes an index of restraint as much as it 
is of force.  
 
Care is thus seen to have a dialectical constitution that does not merely imply 
preservation. Indeed, preservation may well be anathema to care, since the 
ultimate preservation for the artefact is the museum; for the infirm, life-support; 
for the idea, the doctrine. An argument could certainly be presented for the 
advantages of these encasements, and yet in this notion of care as preservation, 
life as continuity and dynamism is compromised. Care therefore might be said to 
be found in relations of mutual interest, where two materials, for example, draw 
each other forth, give issue to one another, such as ink and paper, stone and 
fabric. As a form of interest rather than preservation, care in the creative work 
and care as it is discussed here, will always entail some form of risk and thus a 
dialectic form.  
 
There are three levels of care documented in the work and in the exegesis. The 
first regards mostly the care that is enacted between artist and work, with the 
observation that the work and materials also administer actions of care, in a 
causal rather than emotionally responsive sense, and that the act of making is a 
dialogue, a collaboration, rather than an imposition of will. The second regards 
the forces that animate the assemblage that is the work of art, or, as I discuss 
specifically in this exegesis, the drawing. In this, I refer to the mechanisms of 
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figure and ground, of inscription and page. To the extent that figure and ground 
in certain drawings – for example, Kiki Smith’ Born series 2001; Dorothea 
Rockburne’s Locus series 1972 – appear within  a mutually negotiated 
presencing, they might be said to be involved in terms that are defined by mutual 
responsiveness, rather than struggle. Thus in the third chapter, I raise the 
possibility that the conflict in Heidegger’s Earth-World ontology, might be recast 
as a dynamic of care.   
 
The third level concerns what I call an intransitive care, where the one that cares, 
gives of itself as care, and thus I relate it to theories of giving. As the artwork 
and the discussion turn from what is more familiarly seen as drawing to more 
emphatically engage with surface materials, care is seen as an approach to the 
artwork, on the part of the artist and viewer – or, as I will call the one who cares 
to attend, the beholder.2 Here, care is discussed as a reciprocal operation in which 
the work is seen to extend or return the care that has shaped its own being. 
Beyond the making of the artwork, it is the possibility for this reciprocal care that 
endures. Much of the exegesis is given to providing examples of these 
mobilisations of care both in my own work and in a selection of others. The 
scope of the exegesis therefore is eclectic, though with the aim of presenting a 
cohesive document in its focus on the twin themes of surface materials and their 
involvement in functions of care, especially reciprocal care. 
* 
A foundational assumption from which the claims given throughout this research 
are presented, is that the material and formal decisions made within an art 
																																																								
2	While	 I	 do	 not	 elaborate	 at	 length	 on	 the	 role	 or	 activity	 of	 viewing,	 it	 becomes	 clear,	
particularly	in	chapter	four,	that	the	self‐giving	of	the	art	work,	after	the	making,	concerns	
the	attentive	viewer	/	beholder.		
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practice are somehow bound up with a broader sense of how knowledge and how 
being are enacted. In support of this active and generative relationship between 
artist and materials, Barbara Bolt has noted that materials both shape and are 
shaped by the artist, and alerts us to “the reflexivity of the work of art” (2011, 
154). Similarly, though in a more ontologically oriented tone, Gaston Bachelard 
in the words of Dennis Slattery holds that “the material imagination, whose 
function is to imagine beneath images of form…is called upon to discover deep 
aspects of the unconscious” (Slattery 2012, 117). Materials and being are deeply 
entwined, a reminder of the impossibility of imagining the creative act to be 
simply the imposition of subjective intention upon matter, or the reapplication of 
a tested method. The choice of these materials is, therefore, already a recognition 
of a familial connection, as if those materials already had some investment 
within my being, and is reflected in the ontological tone of much of the enquiry. 
To know something about these surface materials, is, I argue, to know something 
about care and equally about the self. In chapter two, I establish this ontological 
premise through Heidegger’s identification of being with Cura: care, or concern. 
Where Heidegger allocates this quality to human subjects alone, I argue that it is 
inherent to Being more broadly and it is through this argument that I support the 
assignation of care to the art object.  
 
This research takes as its method a practice-led approach, where the creative 
work both embodies and triggers theoretical claims and responses. Thus the 
function of this written document is twofold. On the one hand, it is expository, 
where I put the practical work into context – although that context is emergent 
rather than grounding. On the other it is elaborative, where the observations and 
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findings made within practice trigger an extension of theoretical speculation. Yet 
it is also cyclical, where intellectual and studio based findings excite each other 
to further investigation, opening the possibility for both studio and written work 
to be subject to curiosity and new ways of looking and doing, as suggested in the 
opening anecdote. Maintaining a balance here is critical to resisting the 
illustrative approach, where creative work adopts a supportive role for theory; or 
theory subjects the uncontainable in the artwork to a reductive framing. There are 
ample references in the literature to the problems of such encasements 
(O’Sullivan 2006; Durré 2008; Carter 2010; Bolt 2010), some of which I will 
discuss in the methodology chapter.  
 
The style of the writing frequently bridges the literary and the theoretical, an 
approach defended by writers such as Donna Haraway (2004) who observes the 
transformative and surprising potential of the  medium:  
 
Writing does things to the writer. Writing is a very particular and 
surprising process. When I am writing, I often try to learn something, 
and I may be using things I only partly understand…It is like a child 
in school learning to use a new word in a sentence (Haraway 2004, 
332-333). 
 
Further on Harraway writes: “My texts are full of arguments, it must be 
said…But my writing style is also intuitive” (2004, 333). These insights reflect 
the intention I establish for the writing in this thesis. It is not the objective 
partner to the subjective practice, but continues the generative processes that are 
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expected from the studio. What I like about Haraway’s writing on writing, is her 
particular attention to the medium. She attends as much to the sentence, the 
phrase, as she does to the concepts they endeavour to contain. The medium in 
this sense inflects, diffracts, deepens and layers the message. 
 
In the typically interconnected architecture of practice-led research in the 
creative arts, the aims, not just the art objects, have come about as a result of the 
practice, visual and written. Questions often arise in hindsight, in reflective  
practices, where the intuitive responses to materials and forms, can be seen to be 
generating patterns, repeated approaches and insistences. Equally, reflection 
reveals divergences, and diffractions (Barad 2007), movements away from the 
consistencies that would make for a smooth alliance between questions, methods 
and contexts. Yet where particular materials are seen to be permitted and others 
excluded; where, in the meticulous choices and decisions of practice, 
associations arise between works; where disparate materials appear to enter a 
conversation, one can begin to articulate a theme, which, short of being 
exhausted by practice, can be refashioned as a question. In this research, that 
question can best be articulated as follows: How might surface objects in a visual 
art practice reveal actions of care? 
 
The field of inquiry wherein I initially situated this study was contemporary 
drawing research, the foundational relevance of which is discussed in the third 
chapter. Drawing provided not so much the parameters against which the ideas 
could be tested, as the field in which they emerged. Thus the legacy of drawing, 
in an expanded field, is implied throughout the research, both in the exegesis and 
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in the creative work. All the works maintain a tension between, and an 
integration of surfaces and markings – such as tearing and creasing, sanding, 
grinding and stitching as well as graphic markings. However, as the question 
became more specific, so too did the field. A post-critical, aesthetic discourse 
became a platform for thinking the drawing beyond the binary terms of figure 
and ground, and instead came to consider its relations in the world and my mode 
of engagement with it. No longer defined by meaning making or symbolic 
figures, the drawing, through the elevation of surface as an articulate material 
voice, became an active force with real material weight. If meaning had to be 
read in the marks, it became clear that the reading could not ignore the surface.  
 
Likewise recognising the inherent forces and available relations within and given 
by an artwork, Gilles Deleuze, effectively replaces questions of art and 
signification with questions of “what a particular art object can do” (O’Sullivan 
2001, 130). Simon O’Sullivan, within a Deleuzian discourse, identifies a trend 
away from signifying strategies in some contemporary creative works and a turn 
to the “aesthetic potential of art” emphasising “art is more that just an object to 
be read” (O’Sullivan 2010, 190). He argues here that this release from 
signification increases our ability to act in the world and, indeed, that it builds 
positive affect. In her book Art Beyond Representation (2004), Barbara Bolt 
presents her findings through the notion that art does not merely represent, but 
performs (2004). Once the artwork is considered as active and motivated, rather 
than representational, the forces that animate it can then “act upon us from the 
outside” (Smith 2012, 143). Simon O’Sullivan contends that, by producing a 
situation for a different approach to an art work, "new ways and times of being 
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and acting in the world" (2010, 196) become apparent. Each one of these 
observations articulates the impetus by which my thesis developed, throughout 
which I explore the ways in which surface materials in creative practice can 
exhort us to enact and enjoy the empathic and reciprocal forces of care. 
 
Where is the gap, then, within this discourse, that I address in the current 
research? The question that remains for me in the critical and post-critical 
discourses of art is precisely at this level of modes of being with the artwork: 
what is it that circulates, in an encounter and in the process of making? How does 
an art work gain the autonomy to act back to the beholder? Simon O’Sullivan has 
suggested, and I would agree, that the art work gives back by producing positive 
affect, or materials designate something about subjectivity, or in a general sense, 
as Barbara Bolt so incisively recognises, the art work is reflexive, and acts upon 
us. So if my approach is one of care, what then happens to care, once it becomes 
part of the object that emerges from this special attention? Care begins as a 
meeting of an internal valorisation of matter and an imperative from that material 
as a singular and particular object, that causes me to respond in a singular and 
particular way. If the care that I enact is accompanied by an affect, that is not to 
say that affect or sentiment are necessary to care. I argue that it is also a 
materially responsive, or causal event that may be emotionally though not 
substantially disinterested, and therefore can be said of material artefacts. As the 
research is practice-led, what I aim to show is how my surface materials and 
objects operate aesthetically within the foundations of reciprocal care, and how it 
was that I arrived at this notion. What the hypothesis suggests is that foundations 
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– final causes – may be found not in solid ground at all, but in the ongoing 
reciprocity of care.  
* 
The exegesis is structured in the following way. In the first chapter I lay out the 
methodology. It seems inherent to the nature of practice-led research to develop 
method in the course of research, as, to some extent, one of its findings. Thus 
methodology requires attention to particularities as well as general principles of 
method. One of the questions I raise in this section concerns the boundaries of 
methodology. There seems to be nothing incidental, either in the materials, the 
temporal rhythms of practice, the studio or the environment beyond, that might 
be considered peripheral to an explanation for the particular: that which makes of 
a creative practice grounds for an original inquiry. This potentially unwieldy 
problem is resolved with the understanding that practice will always exceed any 
methodological system, and that the decisions to include or exclude details from 
an account of the practice, already begin to reveal a valorisation that spills over 
into the content of the work. In the end, methodology cannot be wrenched away 
from the business of making. In addition, I outline what I intend by a material 
practice, the relationship between practice and theory and how this is negotiated 
in the course of the study and synthesised in the outcomes.  
 
The second chapter is dedicated to the theme of care. I had thought to place this 
chapter at the end of the exegesis, since it came late in the research as a binding 
idea. However, it was only my recognition, not the care itself that lagged, and 
therefore I believe it frames the study more effectively, establishing it as a 
context, to place it at the outset. Care is discussed in terms of a material 
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responsiveness, as well as a condition of Being. Referring to Heidegger’s use of 
care as a key characteristic of Dasein (1962), I trace the origins of this 
association and, arguing for a slightly different reading of the Hyginius myth to 
which Heidegger refers his use of “care”, I  suggest that it might be re-imagined 
as applicable to Being more generally. This chapter also introduces Jean-Luc 
Marion’s phenomenology of the gift and giving, in which I find a parallel text to 
the ideas regarding reciprocal care. In the absence of a theoretical platform 
dealing with the notion of care, beyond the human administration of it, Marion’s 
theory of reciprocity in giving provides a compelling way for considering care as 
self-giving, or what I have called intransitive.   
 
In the third chapter I present a background to the study and the emergent themes 
where the emphasis is on the mechanism of figure and ground in drawing. In 
turning to a number of anecdotal accounts from both my early drawing education 
and witnessing a friend in the act of painting at twilight, I illustrate how ground, 
usually the silent, contextualising partner in drawing can be made explicit in 
moments of awkwardness or difficulty. At such times, the ground becomes 
active, agential and presents the possibility for difference. The artworks I explore 
in this section express themselves in such a way, where there is no longer a 
separation between figure and ground, but reciprocation in the form of an 
understanding and empathy between the two. My references here are taken from 
disparate sources, including Thomas Lamarre (2002), discussing the 
extraordinary papers that are central the Hein poetic form. I also discuss a 
number of modern and contemporary sources, including works by Kiki Smith, 
Dorothea Rockburne, Lucio Fontana and Judith Kentish. Reflecting again on 
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Heidegger, this time his Earth / World account of the work of art, where meaning 
and matter are given as conflictual, I propose that this dynamic be recast as one 
of care. Finally, in this chapter, I explore the congruencies between surface 
objects and subjectivity, finding in paper, fabric and walls, a map of the self that 
is traversed in ways that manifest notions of care. 
 
The fourth chapter is dedicated to a discussion of the works that emerged within 
this study. The appendix of images, particularly 1, 2 and 4, should be considered 
as an elaboration of the themes covered here. Throughout this chapter I trace the 
emergence of a recognition of care as a central motivation in the practice. To 
begin with I highlight my exploration of surface where, in the early part of the 
research, notebooks, oversized paper, and a horizontal inclination all contribute 
to an hypothesis that implicates surface objects with acts of care. I show that as 
surface becomes more explicit, through a range of movements and material 
intuitions, so too does this imperative to care. The realignment of the surface 
from the vertical to the horizontal is one such movement, where the differences 
in beholding are significant. Likewise, the choice to use fabric, in the later part of 
the study, facilitated the synthesis of different levels of care, since cloth is 
implicated most explicitly in acts of care, and is also most vulnerable to acts of 
neglect.  
 
The final chapter is brief and focused specifically on the exhibition, The murmur 
of surfaces, held at the Caboolture Regional Art Gallery from May 2 until June 
20, 2015. The context of the exhibition presents a set of considerations that do 
not arise in discussing the works within their site of production, and thus extend 
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the theme of care, particularly in relation to the beholder, in very different ways. 
Incorporating several works from prior to the research period affords the 
possibility to consider the current works within the context of an evolving 
practice and ethos. 
 
The form of the exegesis, explained in greater detail in the methodology, departs 
from the standard format, to disperse the contextual review throughout the text, 
since it was a constant partner in the research rather than a platform from which a 
single stream of argument developed. Rather than a weakness or compromise I 
see this as indicative of the strength of creative art practice to guide inquiry 
toward genuinely new ways of knowing. The research is presented in the form of 
an exhibition and this exegesis, including its attached appendices, with a 
weighting of fifty percent given to each. 
 
A note on the appendices: 
The seven appendices attached to this exegesis as a CD ROM may be used in the 
following way. Appendices 1 and 2 supplement the methodology chapter, in that 
they show the reflections, questioning and weaving of theory into reflective 
observations. They also supplement 4.1, where I discuss the notebooks more 
explicitly and refer to a particular sort of thinking that they invite. Appendix 3 
provides further images to accompany the garden drawings that are shown and 
discussed on pp. 135-139. Appendices 4, 5 and 6 document a large number of 
works that were part of the exploratory process, throughout the course of the 
study. Appendix 7 documents the exhibition, The murmur of surfaces.   
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CHAPTER 1 
METHODOLOGY 
The material imperative of practice-led research broadly defines the 
methodological approach in this inquiry. Barbara Bolt has described it as the 
“material nature of visual thinking…a knowing that arises through handling 
materials in practice” (Bolt 2010, 29). For artist Michel Elliot “(m)aking is a way 
of finding out, a working through and thinking in materials” (Elliot quoted in 
Bolt 2011, 154). The outcomes of this method of inquiry, for me, include a major 
exhibition of creative works, The murmur of surfaces, which represents both the 
findings and progression of the research in material form, and an exegesis which 
both contextualises the work and elaborates on findings arising from the creative 
work. This exegesis is accompanied by an extended appendix of a large number 
of works that were included in neither the exegesis nor the exhibition, but 
contributed to the progress of the research and so should be considered as 
evidence. There are a number of images in these documents that may seem to be 
at odds with the works discussed more fully. I see many of these little sketches, 
in words and pictures, as images of the mechanics of thought, rather than the 
content of the thoughts themselves. 
 
There are three main considerations within this general method of research that 
require clarification: how material handling constitutes a framework for 
knowledge; how the research question is defined and addressed, and how the 
written component relates to the practical work. Implicit here is the 
understanding that practice-led research differs substantially from both heuristic 
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and hermeneutic approaches most often associated with research in the sciences 
and humanities.  
 
One of the major differences that impacts on the approach to both the research as 
creative practice and its analysis, is the recognition of knowledge as particular to 
its processes of emergence so that, rather than producing abstract models and 
theories that can be generally applied to a specified field, a practice-led approach 
does not “dematerialise thought from its matrix of production” (Carter 2010, 16). 
Similarly, Isabelle Stengers has noted the problems of defining knowledge when 
materials are taken into account. As she has written, “the demands of materialism 
cannot be identified in terms of knowledge alone, scientific or other” (2011, 
369). Relating her argument to the Marxist class concept, she writes that 
“materialism loses its meaning when it is separated from its relations with 
struggle” (ibid). Both Stengers and Carter ascribe an ethical dimension to this 
primacy of materiality. Whether it is through struggle or care, materials make 
demands that often run counter to the theories into which we endeavour to enlist 
them, or interfere with theories that endeavour to exclude them.  
 
Caroline Durré champions the necessity for creative and mental freedom in 
creative practice research. While she recognises that artists work within their 
own systems – processes that maintain the creative impetus – they do not 
constitute methods that are transferable, “unlike the rigour which underwrites the 
probity of other disciplines” (Durré 2008, 37). She writes, “(f)olded into this 
‘system’ is the idea of personal vision, of the potential for originality, of the work 
having an autograph” (ibid). Robert Morris recognises within the creative 
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process, “a complex of interactions involving factors of bodily possibility, the 
nature of materials and physical laws, the temporal dimensions of process and 
perception as well as resultant static images” (Morris 1993, 75). These essential 
ingredients obviously pose problems in framing a research method, problems that 
I aim to address in what follows. 
 
The methods are given in some detail, for two reasons. First, as stated, the 
approach differs significantly from traditional methods and therefore needs 
clarification. Second, the methods constitute, in part, findings that emerge from 
the research. The expression of care in the working process, has become 
elaborated as a finding in terms of a wider approach and rationale of art practice, 
and can also be defined as integral to a working method. Yet, as I have expressed 
in the following section, it is only with some compromise that method or models 
are separated from the site and moment of material handling. 
 
1.1 Material handling as a framework for knowing 
This section is divided into three parts. The first surveys theoretical accounts of 
material practice, looking particularly at the importance of defamiliarisation, a 
movement away from knowledge, in the emergence of the new. Knowledge here 
is not seen as the discovery of new information that responds to a definable 
problem, but more, the release of new ways of thinking and doing. In the second 
part I will give an account of the studio practice as an engagement of the 
particular, in an environment that is not isolated from, but deeply immersed in 
the contingencies of being in the world. In the third part I will discuss the 
importance of maintaining indeterminacy in the practice. At every level there is 
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the opportunity to maintain a dimension of the unknown that can shift the 
practice to new registers, even where repetition and patterns are central to the 
working method. 
 
1.1.1 Breaking with the familiar 
In his essay, Interest, the ethics of invention, Paul Carter defines the premise 
from which a methodology for enquiry becomes emergent, recommending that 
the condition for invention is found in “the state of being that allows a state of 
becoming to emerge” (Carter 2010, 15). What is implied here is that invention is 
not prescribed by a defined need, or gap, but by the unknown conditions of 
being. In this sense, invention reveals not only new forms, but addresses new 
ways of being in the world. These conditions that give issue to invention begin, 
continues Carter, in “a perception or recognition, of the ambiguity of 
appearances” (ibid). In suggesting the known world be reducible to appearances, 
Carter shows that renewal, or invention, can arise from changed categorical 
thinking. Thus we understand that research, as an opening onto the new, begins 
from a firm knowledge of things. This is not strictly in order to build on that 
knowledge, but to question the models through which we claim our expertise, 
and, to a large extent, to “unknow” the categories by which sense is made. It is 
by this that we can clear a site for new ways of thinking about the world.  
 
This image of knowledge as a series of disruptions and reorganizations, removes 
the unitary stature from knowledge as an edifice of truth, and re-establishes it as 
a process that alters in the constant re-examination of the particular. Carter writes 
of a “double movement” of invention whereby, in “decontextualisation, found 
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elements are rendered strange, and of a recontextualisation, in which new 
families of association and structures of meaning are established” (2010, 15, 16). 
Carter’s eloquent formula is also found in Simon O’Sullivan’s analysis where 
deterritorialisation in the event of art practice is emphatically equated with the 
aesthetic. O’Sullivan writes of art that it “might be understood as the name for a 
function: a magical, an aesthetic, function of transformation” (O’Sullivan 2001, 
130). The alchemical insinuation in O’Sullivan’s definition recommends more 
than a mechanical approach to the business of art making, proposing a way of 
being, with transformation as its aim.  
 
Clearly this double movement defined my research early on when I moved from 
an established paradigm of drawing, to casting my attention to its material 
characteristic as a surface, though curiously, one that did not act as a surface to 
anything beyond. I then used this recognition to gather a new family of objects, 
under the general definition of “surface objects”. The important point to be made 
here is that this move happened in the course of the studio practice. Identifying 
the significance of the drawing as a surface object occurred, for instance, as it 
collapsed about me, in the process of removing it from the wall, a moment of 
struggle in which the paper asserted its materiality beyond my expectation of its 
behaviour. In light of this, it was impossible to think about surfaces generally. 
For example, surfaces that belong to other objects I saw as categorically 
different. These surfaces were ones that could crumple, tear, fold and permit the 
passage of light. They were not to be identified by their ability to recede as a 
background. Parallel to the material interest this recognition provoked, it also 
provided analogous bridges to subjectivity. Furthermore, to specify this spatial 
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object as a thing of interest, opened its relations to apparently unrelated things – 
walls, curtains, blankets, veils – by which I was then able to identify the 
enactment of reciprocal care as a key focus of interest.  
 
The integration of materials and thinking begins in the formative phases of 
inquiry, prior to isolating a distinct question, field or problem. These arise from 
the practice rather than the practice serving to address prescribed categories of 
knowledge. Material thinking thus establishes a sort of reverse order to the 
practice-led research. The isolation of the research question will be discussed 
further on. On the basis of this, I would agree with Barbara Bolt that the 
assignation of “project” to the inquiry is misplaced, since “the art project sets in 
place intentions and preconceives the outcome in such a way that we are no 
longer open to what could emerge in the process” (Bolt 2011, 61). The 
suggestion, here, of a kind of serendipity is given clear material responsibility in 
a separate text where Bolt recognises that “the materials and processes of 
production have their own intelligence that come into play in interaction with the 
artist’s creative intelligence” (Bolt 2010, 30), reflecting Carter’s notion of 
collaboration. The fact that materials exceed a mere use value, to enter into a 
dialogue with the artist, engenders the necessity for an attitude of respect, 
attentiveness and care.  
 
In support of creative research that is founded in material practices, Estelle 
Barrett argues that such approaches give rise to “multiplicity, ambiguity and 
indeterminacy” (Barrett 2012, 63). Similar to Paul Carter’s claim that new 
families of meaning begin with decontextualising that which is known, Barrett 
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speaks of what amounts to an excess in meanings, which “fall beyond the codes 
of a given sign system” (ibid). It is by this excess that creative practices can be 
said to be productive rather than merely interpretive, but also ambiguous. Barrett 
draws on the work of Julia Kristeva to explain the mechanisms of experience-in-
practice, noting her view that “creativity as material process…involves a 
disruption of the established codes of language that allow new objects of thought 
and understanding to emerge” (Barrett 2012, 64). Helene Cixous refers, likewise, 
to the sudden encounter with that which arises from a sort of blindfolded advance 
in writing and drawing: “These (writing and drawing) are often the twin 
adventures, which depart to seek in the dark, which do not find, do not find and 
as a result of not finding and not understanding, help the secret beneath their feet 
to shoot forth” (Cixous 2005, 21). Further on she reasserts the marvelous danger 
of the creative adventure with “our mistakes are our leaps in the night…I 
advance error by error with erring steps, by the force of error” (2005, 22). Error, 
I understand in terms of its Latin roots, errare, to stray, where the connotations 
of a movement away from that which is right, is replaced by a movement away 
from that which is given.  
 
Tim Ingold describes this notion, powerfully evoking the unique adventure that is 
“the integration of knowledge along a path of travel” (Ingold 2007, 88). He 
contrasts the array of perceptions and changing horizons by which the wayfarer 
makes a journey, to the journey that is mapped out in advance, where points of 
arrival and departure are clearly defined, and the contingencies of weather, 
terrain and encounters on the way are mere obstacles to be overcome. The 
analogy of the journey can be contextualised for the creative practice. We can 
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easily identify the model of the second type of traveler in the project approach to 
creative practice that Barbara Bolt cautioned against: the means-ends approach. 
The first, however, requires attention to the particularities of the practice – the 
environment, the routines, the peripheries. Just as it would be impossible for the 
wayfarer to provide a model of her journey – any account would have to include 
precisely what arose, the map fitting the territory – so it is necessary, in a 
methodological account of my research, to consider the particulars, bringing 
together the what and the how of the practice into a single account. To do this 
thoroughly would be impractical and yield little insight. Thus any account must 
be understood as a selection of processes, influences, and rhythms of practice, 
thus enfolding method with meaning.  
 
1.1.2 Working methods and environment 
There is a peculiarly intricate account of a day’s work in Pia Gottschaller’s study 
into the relationship between Lucio Fontana’s working method and his 
philosophical framework (Gottschaller 2012). The thesis in Gottschaller’s 
research is that the connection between these is such that they demand parallel 
attention. In describing Fontana’s work on the Tagli, the cut canvases that he 
made between 1958 and 1968, she includes details of where, and at which stage 
of his working day he took his lunch, when he took his siesta, and the fact that 
before making the cut, Fontana “would wet his moustache with his tongue…and 
shape it with his fingers while concentrating” (Gottschaller 2012, 72).3 What is 
																																																								
3	Gotschaller’s	endnote	tells	us	that	the	photographer,	Ugo	Mulas	photographed	Fontana’s	
moustache	for	a	book	of	photographs.	Mulas	had,	in	fact,	wanted	to	photograph	“every	part	
of	the	artist’s	body	that	played	a	part	in	the	creative	process,	to	which	Fontana	responded	
that	the	whole	body	worked	together	and	participated	in	the	work	(Gotschaller,	2012,	
p.131).	It	is	impressive	that	Mulas	was	so	aware	of	the	insights	that	could	be	gained	by	the	
enterprise	he	proposed.	
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the purpose of such details in describing a working method? Clearly, in the 
gestures and habits that accompany the mechanics of the making processes, an 
affective dimension is revealed, a cartography of thought and matter. This detail 
affords us a sense of Fontana’s thinking beyond that which he articulates in his 
interviews and writing: that in the approach to his encounter with the infinite, of 
which he saw these works to be representative, his hand turned self-ward to that 
little, personal gesture of intimacy. The insight poses a question as to the 
relationship between this harmless vanity and the incursion into infinte space. To 
outline method is to choose what is important and what is peripheral. In 
Gottschaller’s account, such details are necessary in understanding how method 
was situated in both the habitus and finer gestures of the artist, eliciting a rhythm 
of practice by which we can enter into the “sense”, and those excesses of 
meaning that avoid interpretation, as well as the mechanics of his creative work 
and life. 
 
I do not intend to go into such detail here, merely to point out that method is 
always given as a valued extraction of details, and generally in accordance with 
an articulated aim. The rhythms of my practice are not to be compared with the 
formal regularities of Fontana’s method. How to avoid a diaristic account, whilst 
nonetheless acknowledging the nuances of practice is problematic. Henri 
Lefebvre’s Rhythmanalysis, (2004), which examines the rhythms of urban spaces 
and their effects upon the inhabitants, provides an interesting tool for examining 
the smaller realm of an individual practice. Lefebvre suggests “instead of going 
from concrete to abstract, one starts with full consciousness of abstract in order 
to arrive at the concrete” (2004, 5). In other words, he suggests, instead of 
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beginning with case studies and extracting general principles, we begin with the 
principle of rhythm, as a real force, and move toward a material account for 
invisible forces. Le Febvre writes: “Everywhere where there is an interaction 
between a place, a time and an expenditure of energy, there is rhythm”. He states 
that the events implied in this model, provide a “framework for analyses of the 
particular” (Lefebvre 2004, 15. My italics). Thus I will incorporate into a 
description of my studio environment, and those environments with which it 
connects, a sense of the rhythms that define and bind them, and in relevant ways, 
constitute my movements within them. 
 
Figure 2. View of South Moreton Bay island cluster, (Russell Island – my home –centre 
left) from the SW side of Minjerribah. (Photograph, Sharon Jewell) 
 
The island on which I live and work is one of four in the South Moreton Bay 
Island group. The effect of tides on these islands is to reveal wide stretches of 
mud, stippled and strung with mangrove roots, twice a day, at the ebb, and twice 
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a day to cover the littoral, up to the low banks. The movement between these 
markers is almost visible in the narrow passages between the islands. Island life 
means one’s movements to and from the mainland are bound by the ferry times. 
One cannot just get up and go at any moment, and as such, there is always an 
awareness of the perimeter, pushing back, containing, defining an edge to things. 
There is a topological folding to island life, to the extent that what happens, 
happens within a given set of terms, with only conditional change exerted from 
beyond its shores. This open-closed system is reflected in but also open to the 
studio environment, where materials and tools inhabit the space with the fluid 
give and take of native species. Thus my working rhythms are mapped, threaded 
by the electric buzz of cicadas, the deep, distant constancy of ocean, and raucous 
yet predictable chorus of diurnal and nocturnal bird life. In the rhythmic 
perpetuity of this outward environment, I sense my movements entering an 
already motivated pattern, a method of things, already in motion and rhythm, 
already with purpose. I am constantly aware of the environment holding and 
directing me, like an ordinance, while I endeavour to hold the world around me 
by way of understanding it, not logically, but responsively, through material 
engagement.   
 
Within the studio, the distinction between outside and in is marked by a gaping 
wall that looks over a north facing slope where the garden bristles and pulses 
with life. Inside, it is all surfaces, typified by a series of horizontally and 
vertically aligned planes: floor, ceiling, table surfaces on the one hand, and walls, 
windows and doors on the other. Chairs, like people are both horizontal and 
vertical, while benches interrupt walls, in a narrow lateral band. The horizontal 
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planes tend to facilitate, work, movement, the fall and placement of things, while 
the vertical tend to mark out limits and sudden ruptures to those limits – doors 
for example. I inhabit this space as a largely vertical element whose horizontal 
movement across the floor is interposed with more oblique gestures as I negotiate 
the spaces between horizontal and vertical surfaces: an arc of difference. Where 
these aligned surfaces give way to less planar limitations, I recognise the outside 
world (Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3. Studio image, Russell Island, 2015. (Photograph, Sharon Jewell) 
The mingling of outside and in coalesce in my work in a constant vibration 
between order and errancy. There are no works that do not demonstrate this dual 
habitation in very clear terms. Rather than constituting a representation, this 
repetition of the outer world in the work can be seen as a form of empathy, 
manifesting at the level of the senses. The outside also offers abundant materials. 
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Given the non-manufactured nature of these materials – stones, sticks – my 
intentions again overlap with the intentions of these objects. Difference becomes 
unavoidable, since the objects one finds in the natural environment are marked 
by the particular – I choose this stone or stick, rather than another. When these 
particulars come together in repetition, difference becomes a palpable element. 
Value is established in the particular in a way that is irrelevant in the 
manufactured material.  
 
My choice of materials and the ways in which I collaborate with them, always 
invoke repetition and rhythms of labour. The large drawings, Tracks dissolving 
in a drift (figures 29 and 31 pp.139, 141); the series Growth without pattern or 
design (figures 26, 27, 28 pp. 135, 136); the carved panels, Half open walls 
(figures 36, 37, pp.153, 154); the stitched works (figures 6, 7, 8, pp. 56, 57): all 
these works have emerged through long hours of contact, wherein every part of 
the material is addressed with intimate and prolonged attention. My tools range 
from angle grinders and sanders to pens, sewing needles to the finest pin as an 
incisive tool. Not surprisingly, all my tools are characterised by their ability to 
delve into surfaces, or to pass lightly over them. They are excavators’ tools that, 
instead of going down, move across, though sometimes in ways that plumb the 
shallows with the most intricate scrutiny. Scarcely a thread or grain of timber is 
left unattended, or paper untouched. In keeping with the material imperative of 
the practice, I suggest that the rhythms – the pace, the size and quality of gestures 
– are initiated in the grain and texture and weave of materials themselves. The 
warp and weft of fabric suggest a stitch size in response; the grain and striations 
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of the layers of ply, the dimples and fibres of the paper, equally recommend a 
counter gesture, an appropriate exertion as much as extension.  
 
The dynamics of rhythm lie in their openness to change. Each rhythm is 
susceptible to a breach, a rupture: materials, the labouring body, repeated 
gestures. Spaces reach their limits; the body tires, or ignites with unexpected 
energy; internal thoughts mingle with external material agents both restrained 
and enlivened by architectural boundaries. These after all are just another 
rhythmic sequence. So the rhythms that are manifest in the works are really just 
an extension, an answer or counterpoint, to those that thicken and extend outward 
into the world and inward to the heartbeat, the breath, and diurnal cycles. The 
struggle, the repetition, the resistance and the fallibility, the reserve and fortitude 
of all these material-temporal things, including the layers of nested spaces by 
which these events are intimately bound reveal themselves as the space and time 
of practice.  
 
1.1.3 Indeterminacy  
The kind of thinking implied by the methodological approaches discussed so far 
may suggest a counter-methodology, a deliberate sabotage of conclusions, final 
statements and verifiable truths. The problem is that, in order to be verifiable, a 
process must be able to undergo repetition, and produce similar results. 
Philosopher and author Michel Serres admits that “inventive thinking is unstable, 
it is undetermined, it is as little singular in its function as is our hand” (1995, 34). 
In support of the hand as a tool for thought, Terry Rosenberg, arguing for 
drawing as an ideational method, writes, “(a)s much as the hand enters thinking, 
	 42
thinking can be of the hand” (Rosenberg 2008, 111). Where, in traditional 
research paradigms, objectivity is attained by replacing indeterminate tools with 
measurable ones, in this creative practice, the hand and its indeterminacies are 
central to the working method. That it does not produce predictable outcomes is 
central to the sense and therefore the meaning entailed by the work. For example, 
in the fabric and stone works the stitching of the grids in which the stones are 
contained, is necessarily done by hand, stitch by stitch, each one constituting a 
thought, decision of measure, direction, placement. The differences that arise in 
the indeterminacy that the hand brings, particularly to the striated weave of these 
works, is the means by which the grid is overtaken by the poetic. The hand is the 
tool by which affect, in the form of an excess – to the implied pattern – is able to 
find issue.  
 
The indeterminacy and uncertainty that is clearly the generative principle in these 
accounts must, of course, be matched by a deep curiosity, indeed a sense of 
wonder or the inclination of a mystery; materials giving themselves as 
unutterable questions, not to be solved so much as exposed, deepened, celebrated 
and enlivened through an interaction. The materials, with which I choose to 
engage, are characterised by qualities that already incline toward a corresponding 
quality in my own being and thus the initial incursion into their surfaces is 
matched by a deeper sense of inauguration. As Gaston Bachelard writes: “… by 
our first act of choice, the object designates us more than we designate it” (1987, 
3). Thus knowledge is not released about materials, but between them and me or, 
later, the beholder. It must be remembered that in the material account of creative 
research given here, materials are not selected to fulfill the demands of a project, 
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but out of a genuine inquiry into the qualities that arouse curiosity. Artist Silke 
Dettmers writes about both the importance and difficulty of justifying wonder as 
a welcome and necessary partner in the creative inquiry, since it “prioritizes the 
senses…is non-judgmental and non-hierarchical; wonder is a state before words 
and reason – all of which drives it to the margins of academic credibility” 
(Dettmers 2008, 41).  
 
The point of research, typically “the elimination of uncertainty and doubt” 
(Dettmers 2008, p.41) is challenged by the insistence of maintaining ambiguity at 
the heart of the inquiry. This has nothing to do with a lack of rigour, but much to 
do with the fact that materials will always offer more than can be adapted to clear 
conclusions. I believe we can name the sense of wonder, as a methodological 
expedient, or condition, that we bring to the creative inquiry: wonder, curiosity, a 
sense of attraction to one material over another already should signal the 
detection of some form of knowing that is elevated from the imagination into the 
tangible world. The fact that wonder is never fully exhausted by written 
outcomes, but continues to maintain its currency within the interested circuit of 
the creative work and its beholders, allows that the ineffable need not be 
overwritten by the exegesis. That is the great value of the practice-led research: 
to allow the work to be more than a case study that leads to certain conclusions, 
placing the work behind models extracted from it. In the practice-led approach, 
the work must be considered as a measure of is own epistemological rigour, but 
also as witness to its own resistance to analysis.  
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1.2 The Question 
The research question in this practice-led inquiry arose from, rather than prior to 
the work that led the research, as clearly indicated above and throughout the 
exegesis. The problem I faced with the question in the practice-led approach was 
how to negotiate a position of inquiry between questions of what and how. By 
“what” questions I mean those that seek to use the work as a carrier of meaning 
that illustrates or responds to something outside itself; in other words a 
representational approach to art practice. In these sorts of questions responses 
risk seconding the work to the issues they represent. Caroline Durré likewise 
recognises this problem, noting that by following methodological models from, 
for example, sociology and anthropology, “the work attempts to illustrate ‘issues’ 
bolstered by flaccid statistical research, random visual ‘evidence’, or meandering 
interviews” (Durré 2008, 38). By the same argument she continues to list the 
litany of problems encountered in situating the research in a cross disciplinary 
context.  
 
Further to this I would add that there are considerations associated with questions 
styled as “how”, by which I mean those that foreground the methodology, where 
the creative work becomes a case study from which to theorise the mechanisms 
of the practice more broadly, and simultaneously build on the practice-as-
research discourse. While both are valuable approaches, the greater part of my 
working time was carried out under the hypothesis that the work might present 
specificity in the question, whilst not fore-signing its own conclusions. Thus the 
question began to emerge through decontextualising the drawing surface – a 
move both in the practice and recognised formally in the text – and then 
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proceeding from this self imposed position of ambiguity. The question became 
specific, however, when I identified a point of congruence between the “what” – 
a surface ontology – and a “how” – care. The notion of care arose at the 
insistence of a vexed question from my supervisor: Why do you do it? “It” being 
“Art”. My vexed and possibly reactionary reply: “because I care” became the 
trigger for an unanticipated congruence of method and the particularities of the 
material interests. The key to revealing the question came in a move that 
augmented the how question with a why, thus highlighting the intimate links 
between the epistemological and ontological dimensions of the practice-led 
inquiry.  
 
For Isabelle Stengers, the close association of epistemology and ontology in the 
use of interest as a method of inquiry – the term that lies at the heart of the 
question “why do you do it?” – produces a necessary ambiguity since questions 
of interest, concern, wonder and care place the embodied subject within the 
inquiry.  Stengers admits to objections raised to this claim – “another version of 
an instrumentalist conception of knowledge, reducing it to the answers we get to 
the questions that matter for us” (Stengers 2011, 375). Instead she insists, and I 
would agree, that it is the character of interest that gives “the power to cause us 
to think, feel and wonder, the power to have us wondering how practically to 
relate to (something), how to pose relevant questions about it” (ibid).  
 
Karen Barad’s diffractive method adopts the same concerns, responding to the 
discipline based separation of fact from concern or care. Barad proposes that 
questions of fact and questions of care or concern are intermingled when we 
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scrutinise the material world for “differences that matter in their fine detail” 
(Barad quoted in Dolphijn and Tuin 2012, 49). In the fine details that arise 
through care, manifest as curiosity or wonder, new categories of knowing are 
exposed that identify real links between the beholder – whether artist or viewer – 
and the thing beheld. It is by this argument that I am able to layer the discussion 
of surface materials with subjectivity. So, upon reflection, my response to the 
question “why do you do it”, although spontaneous, or perhaps because of it, was 
precisely given. “Because I care” defines not only why I do it, but also how, 
which is a question of method. 
  
1.3 On the writing 
Wittgenstein gives a poetic and lucid image of the relationship between theory 
and practice, in his evocation of the walled swamp. As Hans Blumenberg recalls 
this eloquent allegory: “Swamp and wall – where would one ever find these two 
elements juxtaposed, for the wall cannot be identical with the border of the 
swamp” (Blumenberg 2010, 76). The wall, as we know, must stand on firm 
ground, and be read as “a sign which shows there is a swamp inside it, but not, 
that the swamp is exactly the same size as that of the surface bounded by it” 
(Wittgenstein 1975, 264). Although the creative work will always extend the 
theoretical framework by which we endeavour to explain it, that framing is, 
nevertheless a way of locating and situating, if not defining it. What Wittgenstein 
does not elaborate upon in his useful metaphor, is the particular nature of the 
wall. Is the wall to be seen as an abstract enclosure, or could we allow that it, too, 
has its own particular qualities that not only approximate the location of the 
swamp, but reflect upon it, elaborate on it and respond, in its own material way. 
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An enclosure, after all, might have its own windows and openings, that connect 
its purpose with a wider landscape, that beckon and conceal; it may reveal an 
outer coating of moss and lichen that mingles its pronouncement of limits with 
the fecundity of the world. Thus in this exegesis, I have allowed the creative 
work to inform the theoretical wall, so that, beyond bounding the work in 
explanation, definition and context – which to some extent it does – it also adopts 
the work as an invitation to speculate, and take on its own impetus. 
 
The integration, rather than separation of theory, contextual review and 
discussion of the creative practice has become a useful approach by which to 
hone the research. The works that I have made, whilst situated within the broad 
idiom of contemporary sculpture and drawing have, throughout the course of the 
theoretical and studio research, invoked a context beyond these margins, and this 
is reflected in the progressive structure of the contextual review. The inquiry into 
the being of the surface and the naming of care as a way of being – with and 
within the surface object as artwork – incline the study toward an ontological and 
phenomenological discourse, which comes through in the art works and writers I 
refer to, and the nature of my questions. Heidegger is an important point of 
reference, particularly in chapter two in relation to care, and later, in chapter 
three where I concentrate on the relations of figure and ground. Jean Luc Nancy 
is also an important reference here, where I discuss his evocation of primitive 
man “painting in the grotto” (1996). The phenomenology of giving and the gift, 
in the writing of Jean-Luc Marion, becomes helpful in talking about care as an 
action of self-giving. Marion’s phenomenology of the gift problematises the 
indebtedness built into familiar systems of giving, and establishes instead a 
	 48
structure that unifies gift and giver. The result of this, I argue, is something akin 
to reciprocal care. Reflecting upon the ontological implications of material 
valuing, my attention also turned to the poetic diffusion of being within the 
material reverie of Gaston Bachelard.  
 
There is some support for this structural organisation suggested in Grounded 
Theory, which holds that any theory must arise out of research and not precede it 
(Glaser 1992). Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss emphasise the importance of 
data collection in grounded theory, as an original source from which theory 
emerges. Placing data collection, or what we might call process in creative 
practice, before theoretical frameworks has implications for the literature and 
contextual review. Glaser justifies a contextualising that comes after the 
discoveries generated through the grounded inquiry, since it is not possible to tell 
in advance what literature will be most relevant (Glaser 2010). While I have 
approached the contextual review from this angle in the initial stages of the 
research, the integration of theory and context is intensified as the research 
progresses, particularly since the contextual review functions as a form of data 
collection. While grounded theory has much to offer in terms of regulating the 
movement between theory and practice, its application in social sciences means 
that its outcomes tend to be less inventive than revelatory.  
 
1.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have presented, firstly, a methodology of research broadly 
defined as practice-led. The implications of this approach place it in a difficult 
position with regards to conventional structures of the academic thesis. The 
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emphasis is that the research is done through the materials in the process of an 
emergent field of inquiry and emergent question. Thus creative practice as 
research demands an attentiveness to details, including nuances of the 
environment in which the practice unfolds. Both environment and materials in 
this practice-led research, I treat as collaborators. An ethical dimension is seen 
here in the agency afforded the world beyond the self, placing the inquiry within 
the discourses of new materialism, where the blurring of ontology and 
epistemology are reflected in the methods proposed by theorists such as Isabel 
Stengers and Karen Barad, for whom wonder, concern and care are integrating 
factors. On the basis of these methods we cannot assume to be entering creative 
practice with the idea of marking a neutral ground with an indelible signature. 
Within a spirit of wonder and interest, as my will intercepts with that of materials 
and environment, the outcomes of my research come in the form of 
transformations of ways of thinking about and engaging with the world. In my 
research this has manifest as a recognition of a peculiar category of objects – 
surface objects – and the actions of care that they both demand and engender. 
 
The implications for this method of research stretch to the research question and 
the relationship between the exegesis and the creative work. Inherent to material 
thinking, the question is emergent and comes in the form of observations and 
problems that arise in the active process of material collaborations. The 
relationship of this document to creative work is one of both contextualisation 
and interpretation. Also, however, in recognition of the unique substance of text, 
it is one of conjecture and speculation. The exegesis does not seek to wrap up the 
work in explanation, thereby matching or standing in for it. Instead it builds on 
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the definable insights gained through the work, whilst leaving the ineffable 
content to bear witness to its own indefinable affects. There are implications for 
the contextual review and broad exegetical structure. As the context shifts, as the 
research develops this needs to be documented. Thus the structure of the exegesis 
departs from the traditional organisation to intersperse the contextual review with 
the text relating directly to the work and the theoretical speculations. 
 
The departures that a practice-led thesis makes from the traditional models of 
academic research are upheld by the recognition of knowledge as embodied, not 
merely disciplinary. The important point to bear in mind is that the creative 
works are to be recognised as research outcomes, not merely case studies that 
uphold or illustrate an idea that overwrites the particular in practice.   
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CHAPTER 2  
CARE AS A MODE OF BEING  
 
2.1 The emergence of a dialectic of care in the art work 
The commencement of this study coincided for me with an entry into island life, 
after the construction, there, of a house. When I began identifying the questions 
that both arose from and motivated my practice, I had been living for one year in 
a house that I had been instrumental in building. My involvement was 
thoroughly practical, so that I now know my new house in the greatest intimacy. 
In the way that one takes care of a dwelling, by maintaining it in good order, we 
took care with every inch of this complex structure, took seriously its every 
need, honoured its material strengths and frailties, beginning with its 
foundational relationship with the ground, for every building has its feet in the 
dark, damp earth, amidst roots and worms, ants and slaters. For the earth is, as 
Hans Blumenberg observes, “the unnoticed reliability of what is self evident" 
(Blumenberg, 2010, 75).  
 
The telluric inheritance of the dwelling appears to dissipate as it rises upward 
and inward, but the expectations of reliability are invested largely in the stability 
of the ground. To the extent that the ground holds the downward force of the 
house, that it does not shift or shake or wash away, the ground can be said to 
care for the house, to hold and maintain it. Likewise, to the extent that the house 
covers and protects us, warms and offers solace, comfort, and secrecy, supports 
our weight and awaits our returns from absence, we can surely say that the house 
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cares for us. Here, care is understood not as a sentiment, but as a necessity, as an 
answer to a question in the form an exigency, and as always reciprocal.  
 
The relevance of these reflections concerning the notion of care in relation to the 
dwelling, find a coincidence with the way I have come to consider not only my 
approach to creative work, but with a way of understanding the many relations 
that define art in its genetic processes and in the life the artwork lives after the 
making. These relations, which I will refer to often in the exegesis, include the 
relation of materials within their aggregate form, most particularly concerning 
the interactions of marks and surfaces in drawing – largely the subject of the 
following chapter; the relation of the drawing to the world; the artist to the work 
in process, and the special alliance between viewer or beholder and artwork, well 
beyond the making. By referring these relations to an act of care, I am 
suggesting a new way of thinking an ethics of art practice that finds a place in 
some ways within what has broadly come to be defined as a new materialism4.  
																																																								
4	New	materialism	in	the	creative	arts	refers	to	a	post	critical	fascination	with	materials	as	
possessing	 their	own	agentive	 forces,	and	as	such	“the	anthropocentric	narrative	 that	has	
underpinned	our	view	of	humans‐in‐the‐world	since	 the	enlightenment”	 (Bolt	 in	Bolt	and	
Barrett,	2012,	p.	2)	 is	brought	 to	question,	contributing	to	 the	merging	of	epistemological	
and	 ontological	 frameworks	 of	 understanding.	 In	 philosophy,	 it	 represents	 a	 diverse	
collection	of	ideas	that	share	a	concern	for	the	integration	of	meaning	and	matter.	Manuel	
de	Landa,	Rosi	Braidotti,	Karen	Barad	and	Quentin	Meillassoux	are	several	of	 its	principle	
voices.	
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Figure 4. The house on Russell Island with long tree shadows, 2013. Photograph, Sharon Jewell) 
It is important to note that the literature that comes under this banner has run an 
interested though independent course to the artists who seem to express this 
zeitgeist in their own terms. Within this ethos, materials or matter or things are 
seen to be agentive, rather than merely available for use, always defined by their 
interactivity with human agents. Into this discourse I introduce the terms of care, 
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as a particular kind of responsiveness, that lives on in the artefacts regardless of 
severance from their maker. In this speculative proposition, the care that inheres 
within the work then becomes available to the beholder who cares in attention. 
The work, that is to say, cares back. I do not wish to claim that this is the way all 
artworks function. But where care in the making is directed not to a cause, image 
or idea external to the work, but precisely to the work itself, in singular attention, 
then the care abides fully within the material body of the work itself. I discuss 
this further toward the end of this chapter, where I give it the name intransitive 
care and connect it to the phenomenology of giving.  
 
In my studio work over the course of the study I note an increasingly singular 
approach where questions directed toward the meaning, form or function of the 
work, dissolved into the extended moment of making. Rather than asking what 
else I could do with a work, I was more interested in asking how long I could 
sustain an interaction, often in the form of a rhythmic pattern (Figure 5). As 
works increased, maintaining these patterns, they also became different, not just 
bigger. The increasing weight of the stone blanket meant a changing relationship 
to the body, whose presence it implied. In the end, it became almost too heavy to 
lift, whilst at the same time the watery quality of the fabric flowed more 
liberally. The mesh (figure 5, top and middle) began from a single centre, yet, 
almost without my direction, developed into multiple centres, thus expanding 
not only outward, but also declaring new points of convergence, arriving at no 
particular edge. All the works, in different ways, determined by the material, the 
tools and temporal constraints developed within a commitment directed solely 
toward the work as an emergent proposition.  
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Figure 5. Samples of works in detail, 2012-2014. Rhythm, repetition, and extension, wherein, for 
each, difference emerges over time. 
 
In all the stitched works, the sequential, rhythmic patterns of the objects wove 
together past and future, for rhythm always anticipates its future pattern in the 
present action. Care was directed no longer at an idea or meaning externally 
located but toward this present sequence, these singular weights and material 
qualities, as they augmented and intensified in presence. It thus seems to me to 
be no coincidence that of all the objects I have made throughout this inquiry, the 
ones that most fully entailed care in the making, and thus best manifest the 
outward proffering of care, also resemble objects whose usual purpose it is to 
provide comfort and protection: that is, the blanket, the curtain and the tent-
cradle (figures 6, 7, 8). 
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Figure 6. Sharon Jewell, 2013-2015. Mineral Down. Organza, stones, cotton. 300 X 145cm. 
(Photograph by Sharon Jewell). 
 
 
Figure 7. Sharon Jewell, 2014. Curtain. Detail Organza, stones, cotton. 560 X 200cm 
(Photograph by Sharon Jewell). 
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Figure 8. Sharon Jewell, 2014. Tent cradle. Organza, stones, cotton, wood, 210 X 49 X 232 cm. 
(Photograph by Sharon Jewell) 
 
As a way of describing an approach in work, or quality of action, or the 
expression of a causal relation – when the parts of the work seem to be mutually 
supportive or mutually giving of expressive access – care has emerged both as an 
ethics and functional expediency in the multiple relations that are enacted in this 
art practice. In this reading, care sometimes appears as causality, sometimes 
interest or inclination, a holding of attention; sometimes it appears in the labour 
or enactment of a skill; sometimes it arises in the more familiar actions of 
tending something with both determination and restraint. In one way or another 
all these manifestations of care are brought forth, I observe, in the course of my 
art making, and if I am to call them all care, then I understand them to be 
participating in a single idea, manifest diversely.  
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It is true that these reflections on the nature of care might be adapted to an 
examination of a vast range of art works and their making, regardless of their 
hardiness or ephemerality.  It also should be pointed out that care, as a mode of 
being within an art practice, has been explored discretely through a number of 
important contemporary works. Janine Antoni, in 1993, produced the 
performance work, Loving care, in which she famously mopped the gallery floor 
with her long ink soaked hair, driving out the attendant audience as she pushed 
toward the boundaries of the room. Robert Enright and Meeka Walsh point out 
that Antoni’s work frequently addresses the simultaneity of danger and defiance 
(Enright and Walsh 2010, 40), suggesting something akin to what I have 
identified as a dialectic structure of care. In another work, Coddle (1998), Antoni 
adopted a Madonna and Child pose, but cradling, instead, her own leg in a 
gesture of loving and tender intimacy.  
 
Sophie Calle addressed the theme of self care in 2007, with her work, Take care 
of yourself, for which she invited 107 women to help her interpret a break-up 
email, using the skills of their particular professions to do so. Barbara Bolt 
remarks of this work: “Each respondent and each response offered a different 
way of looking at, thinking about and responding to an extraordinary event in an 
ordinary life” (Bolt, 2011, 19). The work was Calle’s way of taking care of 
herself in a situation that seemed beyond calculation. Finally, Dominique 
Mazeaud’s project, The great cleansing of the Rio Grande developed into a 
monthly “art/life pilgrimage” between 1987 and 1994 (Greenmuseum, n.d.), 
where the care of the river became a response solely to the demands of a 
location, in need of attention. The critical resistance to this work, Suzi Gablik 
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argues, with justifiable cynicism, was due to the fact that “real-life actions can 
sometimes be art but only as long as they are not useful and serve no purpose” 
(Gablik 1991, 134). Gablik’s comment is a criticism based on the limitations of 
authenticity required in the sanctioning of a work of art.  
 
What I want to show through the above examples, is that care has become a topic 
of some urgency, particularly in the work of a number of female artists, in 
response to both environmental and feminist concerns and is most often 
expressed through performative and ritual based practices. What the above works 
recognise is that care is essentially an action, not a theory or an idea; it is 
something that happens, that makes a difference. I mention these as a way of 
contextualising my own work and locating the differences. I am interested in 
revealing care at all levels of the practice, and into the long or brief life of the 
object created. What I argue is that the art object is not by nature an inert relic, 
but capable of continuing to perform in the spirit with which it was generated. As 
I have previously mentioned, the materials I have chosen to work with – paper, 
board, fabric – have several very particular features that make of their place in 
the discussion of care more than useful examples.  
 
Surface materials are suggestive of care because of the broad face they present to 
the world, which makes them both vulnerable and generous. Because of their 
easy penetrability, but also because of their ability to wrap and shroud, warm and 
protect, be secreted away, and raised to the weather they participate in care on 
both sides of the definition: in extension, and in reception. Such is the dialectic 
nature of care, that it is evoked in the tenuous place between the too much and 
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the not enough. To wear, for example, is to wear out. To stitch is equally to ruin, 
by puncturing, and to mend by joining. To sand a surface is to tend to its tactile 
quality, but also to grind it thin. In much of my work care and damage appeared 
to be sought in one and the same action, and thus care came to assume a dialectic 
form.  
 
2.2 Care in Heidegger and Hyginus: toward the reciprocity of care  
Heidegger is the philosopher most singularly associated with the notion of care 
as an ontic touchstone. Heidegger qualifies this assignation through Dasein’s, 
necessary dispersal, as being-there, in the world5; that by being-in-the-world, 
“Dasein must deal with that world” (Mulhall 2005, 113). Stephen Mulhall 
qualifies that it is not as though Dasein is always involved in considerate or 
sympathetic care, but merely that in the concomitance of world and being, there 
is no thinking one without the other. Heidegger lists the ways in which care or 
concern might come to be enacted:  
 
having to do with something, producing something, attending to 
something and looking after it, making use of something, giving 
something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, 
evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining. . . . 
(Heidegger, 1962, 56).   
 
Given this wide ranging expression of care – essentially everything that is 
considered, or thought through, or that entertains a dialogue with and within the 
																																																								
5	Dasein	is	Heidegger’s	term	for	a	subject’s	being.	Literally	it	means	“being	there”,	by	which	
Heidegger	means	that	to	be	is	to	be	somewhere.	There	is	no	independence	from	worldly	
context.	
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world, either thoroughly or weakly – it is not difficult to see how it is implicated 
in creative practice. My contention is that these relations happen between 
materials as much as they do between people and things. As for myself, the way I 
comport my body in the studio, and beyond, the materials I choose, how I 
procure and then engage with them, the inside and outside environments through 
which both thought and feeling and work arise, all involve me in an enactment of 
care. The dealings we have with the world, in care, give rise to our 
understandings of it. As Barbara Bolt writes, “[u]nderstanding is the ‘care’ that 
comes from handling, of being thrown into the world and dealing with things” 
(Bolt 2011, 24). As we consider the world through our actions within it, we come 
to understand ourselves as much as we understand that into and by which we are 
given. Care and understanding are intimately bound. Following this, I would 
suggest that as the earth, in all its large and small material affordances, supports 
us, as does the house, it too can be said to function within terms of care.  
 
Here I see care not as a sentiment, but as an involvement, a responsiveness, an 
interest manifest in the form of an action. I only really understand the fineness of 
a material, or its resistance if I involve myself with it attentively, not imagining it 
serving the purpose of some other form, but working to elicit its qualities, to give 
them rein, through the qualities and means that I am able to employ. And, in so 
doing, I elicit qualities inherent to my own being, am familiarised with my 
strengths and frailties, and the blurred borderlands of my limitations. As such, 
material interactions map my being in new ways. Likewise, ink reveals itself in 
particular ways when it encounters paper as opposed to water; different interests 
or concerns are manifest. Ink and paper enjoy a conversation that is different to 
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the intimate discourse when the two liquids come together. When I am held by 
an artwork, as a beholder, I am one of two objects. It is as though that other one 
responds to an exigency within my presence; that there exists a kind of 
understanding or an interest, on the part of the object, that draws forth concealed 
elements of my own subjectivity.  
 
Philosopher, Ian Bogost addresses this, I believe, when he writes “Objects try to 
make sense of each other through the qualities and logics they possess…by the 
means they know internally but in relation to the qualities in which they bathe” 
(Bogost 2012, 66). The consciousness we possess as humans is, therefore, one 
such quality, but not the precondition for meaningful encounter. These ideas 
regarding consciousness and responsiveness lead logically to Heidegger, who 
Graham Harman criticises for his separation of humans from all other things, on 
ontological grounds. For example, he notes that Heidegger, for all his 
phenomenological insight regarding Dasein, “does not see the collision of 
inanimate things as philosophically meaningful” (Harman 2005, 33). This 
introduces a contention that I also will take up but from a critique of Heidegger’s 
assignation of care to human subjects alone. Where Heidegger talks about 
Dasein, he is only interested in the human as Dasein. There is no place here for 
the inorganic, the inanimate, or the being of other living things. So, in order to 
proceed with a theory in which the artwork participates in care and reciprocity, it 
is necessary to depart from this core Heideggarian rationale. I intend to do this, 
however, by the same means that Heidegger singles out humans as the special 
inheritors of Dasein; that is, by way of the curious and poetic fable, penned by 
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the Roman scholar, Hyginus, in which Heidegger found his model for the 
personification of care in the being of Dasein.  
 
In the fable, Care, or Cura, crosses a river, sees some clay and takes hold of a 
portion, giving it an unspecified shape. As Care contemplates her creation, 
Jupiter arrives and Care asks him to give the new form spirit, which he does. 
Care announces that she would give this work her name, but Jupiter insists that 
the creation should bear his. In the course of the ensuing dispute, Tellus, Earth, 
arrives and insists that, as her own matter inheres in the form, her name should 
be used. They decide to invite Saturn as arbiter, and he proclaims the following 
solution: 
 
You, Jupiter, because you have given the spirit, should get it back upon 
death; you Tellus, because you have given the body, should receive 
again the body; Care, however, because she first thought of this shape, 
should possess it as long as it lives. But since the fight now concerns the 
name, it should be called “homo,” because it has been made from the 
“humus” (Blumenberg, 2010, 140). 
 
While this myth is mentioned in numerous sources that examine Heideggarian 
care, (for example, Boff 2008; Groth 1987; Hyland 1997), Hans Blumenberg, 
alone takes license to ask two questions that seem so obvious, once asked: why 
does Care cross the river when, with greater ease, she could have gathered the 
clay from the bank? And, the second question, which turns out to be not 
unrelated: from what does Care take the form that she fashions? Blumenberg sees 
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the omission of explanation of these details as lacunae in the telling that suggest 
the myth’s source in Gnosticism, wherein founding narratives frequently make 
recourse to mirroring (Blumenberg 2010, 141). With these considerations he 
concludes that Care crosses the river, and in so doing, observes her reflection, 
projected onto the clay bank of the river, which gives impetus to her action.  
 
Blumenberg offers some credible reasons for this omission, though I feel he does 
not fully pursue their significance. First, we can understand that the act of shaping 
the clay, is neither arbitrary nor designed, but incidental to an interaction in the 
world. Care wanders, like Tim Ingold’s errant traveler (2007, 75-76), extracting 
meaning in the course of way making.  But in this way making Care observes, 
suggesting Care is not always aimed, but has a general way of being that makes 
her receptive. Second, and Blumenberg does conclude this, is the fact that Care 
gets to keep her creation not because she invented the human, “but rather because 
the human was made in her image and likeness, and thus partakes in her being” 
(Blumenberg 2010, 141).  
 
The myth is dizzyingly cyclical, in a cause and effect way. What I believe can be 
inferred from this, however, is simply that Care begets Care. That is, care is not 
only the means by which something gets done, but it enters the made thing as a 
quality by which it proceeds to make its way in the world, keeping in mind that 
care is maintained only through enacting, not by appearance or intent. Thus I 
would conjecture that Heidegger’s reluctance to ascribe care to the being of 
things, as much as to humans, was based on the privileging of the receptive and 
responsive mediator of consciousness as a precondition of care, rather than care a 
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condition of Being, if that being be conceived in care. 
 
Of course, I have no way of proving or validating these readings, in the way one 
tests and verifies fact from fallacy in quantifiable questions. Neither myth nor 
philosophy can be of use to prove anything, but corroboration with experience 
makes the interpretation more or less reliable. What is this sense by which I am 
seized in spending time with the works I make? I wrap up time in the care I give, 
and it returns this finite labour in something infinite in that it offers itself in 
indeterminacy, beyond signification, and irreducible to the work given. No matter 
how much I put in, this thing that occurs is always more. My being is augmented 
in the rapture I feel when immersed in and then regarding the completed work; 
that sudden change of feeling one experiences when the giving, in the labour, 
turns into an eventful object, fully in charge of and charged with its own being, 
full of the care, I would suggest, with which it has been fashioned. And, replete 
with that care and temporality made infinite, it is available not only to me, but to 
anyone who cares to behold it, and thus to be held by it. Also supporting this 
reciprocal notion of care is the sense of nurture I receive from the works I care to 
behold and spend time with. I am buoyed, assured; in beholding I am held. In my 
reckoning, this is care. As the Hyginus myth shows, under Blumenberg’s 
enlightened interrogation, Care not only gives considered form, but Care begets 
Care.  
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2.3 A dialectic of care and a review of works  
At the outset of this investigation, I had asked what was, primarily, a question of 
foundations: Is the world the grounds for expression, and if so, how does the 
world get in – into the mind, the soul, the body – in order to get out in expressive 
form? As this initial curiosity was taking shape I was engaged in a series of 
drawings that evoked, it could be imagined, the tangle and chaos of complex 
systems, wild gardens perhaps, with patterns falling in and out of coherence and 
a sense both of growth and decay. What of the world triggered these formless yet 
purposeful studies? How had the world “got in” and what process of translation 
ordered it to “get out” in this way? Figures 9 and 10 reveal the incidental 
congruence between the drawings and the garden beyond my studio door. What 
is curious here, however, is that the garden, in the form shown, developed after 
the drawings, complicating the order of world and expression.  
 
Jean-Luc-Nancy offers a credible response to the question of the movement of 
expression between world and artist, in writing of art, that it is “a double 
topology of presence coming into sense and sense coming into presence” 
(Nancy, 1997, 134); a reciprocity that seemed to echo, in some ways, the 
responsiveness of dwelling, described at the beginning of this chapter. While the 
idea of sense is critical to the apprehension of the world, care suggests a 
responsiveness, a handling of things in empathic awareness, which does not 
immediately suggest a gentle hand, rather a hand sensitive to the qualities of 
what it is addressing. And since care is particular, not general, then to be 
effective, not just theoretical, it must also imply action, and in action, things 
become different. Thus I suggest, in addition to Nancy’s formula, art might also 
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be thought of as a double topology of care coming into presence and presence 
coming into care.  
 
If the sound construction of the house can be said to emerge in the enterprise and 
active engagement of care, returned by the house to its makers, then perhaps this 
formula can be applied to the art practice as well. If the act of making begins 
with a choice of materials, of an object, of a way of handling, then care is 
immediately implied; it is there at the outset: I choose because I care just as I 
care to choose, bringing to mind Gaston Bachelard’s commitment to the 
imagination of qualities. For Bachelard, the qualities or objects that one dwells 
upon, particularly in oneiric contemplation are assignations of being. “Imagining 
a quality means giving it a value that either goes beyond or contradicts the 
sensory value” (Bachelard, 2011, 60). If this designation exists at the initial 
choice, then in art practice, it must continue throughout the process, and beyond 
the turbulence of making. For every moment in the creative process involves a 
choice, a designation, so that if we are to pursue Bachelard’s claim, then the 
artwork in the making continues to designate the becoming-self through choices 
made. In this reciprocity of making – the work becomes as I become – care is 
manifest in receptivity and an impartiality that forestalls external references, 
with every action taken. The material activity and qualities unfolding in the work 
rub up against the awakening and maturing self, similarly buffing the materials 
into a new consciousness: a friction of two worlds, topologically intertwined, 
informing and tending each other.  
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Figure 9. Sharon Jewell, 2012. Growth without pattern or design. Detail. Pen and ink on paper. 
150 X 100cm full size. (Photograph by Sharon Jewell) 
 
 
 
Figure 10. The garden at Russell Island, 2013. (Photograph by Sharon Jewell) 
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Just as one cannot live a life without incurring a unique imprint of the world, 
neither is it likely for matter of any kind to present a profile devoid of worldly 
excursion. In working with materials that are receptive to the physical 
conversations that happen in art practice, both work and artist imprint each other, 
absorbing and returning the care given in mutual attentiveness. Materials and 
artist are entwined in a mutually informing reflexivity, in each, drawing forth 
rather than constructing, otherwise concealed profiles and qualities. It is in this 
system that the dialectic terms of care – the too much and not enough – become 
the currency of exchange. For example, at what point, and by what indications 
does the sensitivity and mutual responsiveness become dominated by the will of 
one actor alone, and how is this moment suspended?  When is the paper ruined, 
rather than enlivened? (Figure 11). When does the stitch begin to weaken rather 
than strengthen the fabric, but also, when does this weakening become a new 
strength? (Figure 12). Surface materials are especially open to these 
considerations, because they are not backed or supported by internal structures or 
depths.  
 
The durability of cloth, as anthropologist Warren D’Azevedo points out, is 
dependent on human intervention “as people variously attend to its preservation 
or destruction” (D’Azevedo quoted in Schneider and Weiner 1986, 179). The 
symbolic weight of cloth in many tribal communities and traditions, for which 
cloth is a mediator between the physical and spiritual is given by the “temporal 
dimension” where labour congeals within its substance (Biebleman quoted in 
Schneider and Weiman, 179).  
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Figure 11. Sharon Jewell, 2013. Abrasion, 3. Detail. Tracing paper. 100 X 100 cm full size. 
(Photograph by Leah King-Smith) 
 
 
Figure 12. Sharon Jewell. Curtain (work in progress). Organza and stones. 
 
Nevertheless, cautions Biebelman, “cloth is also susceptible to rotting, fraying 
and decay” (ibid). Human care or absence of it is immediately registered in cloth, 
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which cannot conceal its ailments in depths. When, in all their roles of covering 
and closing, concealing and holding, fabrics begin to tear or fall away, they are a 
reminder of the insubstantiality of the division that they appear to enact: the 
secreted other side of the curtain is only a fold away; the safety I feel beneath the 
blanket is not proportional to the tenuous weave of that familiar cover, though it 
gives me an inside that feels complete and inviolable. Surface materials, then, 
stretch in a thin place that is capable of designating two worlds. I would note, 
furthermore, that while other more rigid objects also are vulnerable to breaking, 
weakening or aging – the leg of a chair begins to give way; the motor in a tool 
splutters; a stone wall crumbles, the body grows frail – only cloth can come 
undone. Only cloth reverses the order of time in its return to thread. When 
Penelope wanted to draw out the weaving of the shroud, in order to waylay her 
suitors, she repeatedly undid a portion of her day’s work. In undoing, as opposed 
to breaking, time is reversed, or stabilised. Undoing takes back, returns surface to 
line. If weaving maps the passing day, unweaving must reclaim it. For Penelope, 
a dialectic of care demanding equal attention to the making and unmaking of her 
time piece suspended the awaiting menace.  
 
Contemporary artist, Elana Herzog, makes works that bring Penelope to mind, 
for these extraordinary pieces function clearly within the dialectics of care, 
where their mystique and enchantment lie in the meeting of ruin and redemption.  
(Figure 13). The difference is that in Herzog’s work, the ruin and the making 
happen in the same direction, rather than in the forward and reverse of 
Penelope’s weaving. Herzog describes her process in this way:  
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For the past ten years I’ve been making work in which I staple found 
textiles to the walls using thousands of metal staples. Parts of the 
fabric and the staples are then removed and sometimes reapplied, 
leaving a residue of shredded fabric and perforated wall surface in 
some areas, and densely stapled and built-up areas elsewhere (in 
Schmerler 2006). 
 
The fabrics she uses often include old chenille bedspreads, a fabric manufactured 
as an imitation of (caterpillar) fur, and thus characterised by a deliberate “faux” 
quality. Only in their undoing, does the authenticity and ravishing beauty, of 
these objects come forth, as if, in their mint state, they were veils that concealed 
their own seduction. One senses that the fabric is dissolving under the repeated 
insistence of the staples. In parts, the one-time presence of fabric is indicated by 
no more than residual holes where staples once pinched. Fabric, suggestive rather 
than revealing, appears to have merged with the wall that both supports and 
reclaims, suspending dissolution in the grounded stability of the room. The cloth 
derives its articulacy equally from its absences and its material remains. Modest 
chenille takes on a value not generally associated with this homely rag, and 
appears to me to have reached a poetic intensity, on the cusp of its complete 
fragmentation. The wall surface moves both forward of the cloth, where it 
appears to have devoured or dissolved it, and behind it, throwing the residual 
patterns forward and suggesting their completion in vacant surfaces. Figure and 
ground wrap around each other in a vibratory, sensual  push and pull. 
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Alberto Burri’s Sacchi are similarly given to the negotiation between ruin and 
repair (figure 13), as suggestions of wound and stitch run through so many of his 
works. Despite Burri’s protestations that the works are nothing more than “form 
and space” (Hamilton 2008, 31), it is impossible to ignore the presence of the 
surgeon’s trade and the allusion to flesh and wound. There is the visceral quality 
of the materials he has used – melted plastics push through burlap, stitches line 
up like urgent sutures – and no less importantly, his own professional beginnings 
as a surgeon in the Italian army during the Second World War, which seem to 
confirm the suspicion that there is more going on here than a formalist rhetoric. 
Burri’s familiar biography needs just a mention, since it is impossible to wrench 
all that followed in his artistic life from its beginnings in an American prisoner of 
war camp during the conflict. Here he began painting on the rough sack cloth 
known as burlap, a material he continued to use particularly throughout the 
1950s when he produced hundreds of works collectively known as Sacchi 
(Hamilton 2008, 32). These works are broadly characterised by abstract 
compositions of irregular grids, made by suturing together the torn and 
reassembled burlap sacks.  
 
Jaimey Hamilton cites Lorenzo Trucchi who observed that Burri’s paintings were 
like “membranes” whereon “sensuality and nihilism are fused to the point of 
becoming a confusion of sensations, conflicts [and] nightmares” (Hamilton 2008, 
33). Trucchi’s interpretation of the work as “a skin of traumatic memory” (as 
Trucchi quoted in Hamilton 2008, 33), is the first reading in an unfolding 
sequence of interconnected traumas and reparations that, according to Hamilton, 
the works play out. Beyond a legacy of war traumas, Hamilton identifies a 
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“psychosocial suturing of the wounds of modernist painting, which was seen to 
be in crisis” (Hamilton 2008, 34). The Sacchi, according to this reading, bring 
together modernism’s statutory grid with the abjection of “poor” materials and a 
wound that refused to be healed. As Hamilton writes of the insufficiently mended 
gashes in the stretched burlap: “Stitches are placed in the wound’s context but 
refuse to sew it up, accentuating the need for reparation, rather than suggesting 
its happy conclusion” (ibid., 39). Hamilton also provides compelling evidence 
that the works in fact were a response to the Italian post war economy where a 
period of dependency on the US for food contributions – shipped in burlap sacks 
– led to a humiliating cultural dominance (ibid., 48). As long as the skins, 
implied by the Sacchi, remained independent of body, and therefore 
uncommitted to any single corresponding narrative, their language remained 
topologically mutable.  
 
Burri’s silence on the works, coupled with their astonishing articulacy make for 
an intriguing study of the relationship between artist and work. What I want to 
take from this brief study however, concerns the importance of surface materials 
in the morphing narrative, and their investment in a dialectic of care. The latter 
scarcely need be restated, for it is an inherent quality in Burri’s oeuvre: materials 
are honoured in their ruin, while repair, always evident, refuses to close the 
wound completely. Pathos is sustained precisely because the healing is never 
complete. Jaimie Hamilton observes from a studio photograph that he “seems to 
be tentatively tearing at the burlap with the intention of not scarring its surface 
more than he must – a cut ultimately made for the greater good of the ‘patient’” 
(Hamilton 2008, 42). The isolation of metaphorical skin from body, allowed 
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Burri to maintain his spare formalist rhetoric, whilst creating works that could 
take on the form of a range of decisive social, political and personal moments. As 
long as they remained undetermined by subcutaneous definition, they would 
always perform in excess of signification.  
 
 
Figure 13. Elana Herzog, 2007. No title given. From the exhibition W(e)ave, 2007, Aldrich 
Museum of Contemporary Art, Ridgefield, Connecticut. (Photograph by Christian Saltas). 
http://www.designboom.com/art/motion-blur-american-craft/ (accessed February 24, 2015). 
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Figure 14. Alberto Burri, 1952. Sacco. Detail. Burlap, stitching. From: Helen Molesworth, 2005. Part 
sculpture, part object. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University. P.67. 
 
However we may read their work for meaning, both Elana Herzog and Alberto 
Burri appear, in their use of fabric, to invoke the skin at a psychological register: 
the skin turned outward, detached from the body. For Herzog, the skin becomes 
an assemblage of wall, fabric and staples. As she says, “In these ‘drawings’ 
staples act as mark and material, penetrating, distressing, and ornamenting the 
skin of the wall.” (Herzog n.d.). Both artists evoke care in a dialectic way 
through simultaneous destruction and restraint, where restraint does not come at 
the end of the process, but throughout. For Herzog the too much and too little 
meet each other half way. As the staples accumulate, the fibres disintegrate and 
are pulled away. The more thoroughly they are held to the wall, the more they 
begin to disappear beneath this deliberate attention to their endurance.  
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Gaston Bachelard writes about the poetics of this dual operation of restraint and 
surfeit, referring to literary poetics in his example, but it is readily applicable to 
Herzog and Burri. He observes that certain poets are “great sensitizers of the 
imagination,” in their ability to “set excess (the too much) alongside 
insufficiency (the not enough) in a way that makes each the borderland of the 
other” (Bachelard 2011, 65). For Bachelard, such a dialectic is necessary if 
readers (beholders) are to participate in the impressions described (ibid). It is 
interesting that Bachelard recognises the active dialectic, rather than the 
resolution of a work, as that which gives access to a reader / viewer, and enables 
participation. In this definition, the poetic structure has much in common with 
what I have claimed for care in the event of the art work. To recognise 
participation, as opposed to understanding, suggests that there is a reciprocation 
of sensibility between the artwork and the beholder, that as I immerse myself in 
the concerns of the work, those concerns become mine also. The following 
section concerns how these considerations arose in a series of paper works which 
I have collectively called Abrasions. 
 
2.4 Skin abrasions: Studio works 
Abrasions is a series of six works I made during 2013 for which the above 
analysis provides an appropriate context (see figures 11 and 15 ). These fragile 
pages were made by stretching tracing paper over a square frame, and into this 
tight, drum-like skin, scratching repeatedly with a long pin, each tear releasing a 
little more tension from the taut surface. In the tear the surface was both ruptured 
and revealed, enlivened as it was destroyed, its frailty given by the same violence 
as its authority. As the paper began to slacken in the frame, tearing became 
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harder to control. As long as the surface was tightened, the pin met its resistance 
with equal force. Incisions were clear, sharp and controlled. In the loosening of 
the chafed skin, an absence of resistance, a depleted interest, made the pin, 
likewise, an inadequate tool, one that slipped across the surface of its target in 
druggy imprecision. As the tears began to overlap, the paper stretched and 
opened, buckled and heaved.  
 
An analogous form is to be found in the overwritten page, where in repeated 
inscriptions, in the insistence of the message, sense dissolves into a ground of 
expressive intensity, such as in Emma Hauck’s wrenching letters.6 In these pages 
overwriting dissolves into the paper surface, to a point at which the grief of the 
writer, seems to be overtaken by a growing interest between paper and 
inscription. The markings into the paper reach a kind of saturation, where, as in 
the Abrasions, tears run into tears, and the paper hangs between an expressive 
transformation and exhaustion. These markings, coupled with creases and folds, 
inflect the totality of the page, define its limits, its capacity, resembling what 
Michel Serres has called noise, or ichnography, “the ensemble of all possible 
profiles…what is possible, or knowable or producible” (Serres 1995, 19). For 
Serres the ichnography, or noise, is the reduction of the figure and ground to pure 
ground (1995, 20).  
 
The saturated page is its own grounds by which mark and paper hold each other 
in an urgent and mutual interest. Like the skin at the end of a life, the page has 
																																																								
6	Emma	Hauck	was	admitted	into	a	psychiatric	hospital	in	1909,	where	she	soon	began	
writing	layered	letters	to	her	husband.	Translated	as	“Darling	come”	the	letters	are	so	
densely	layered	that	grey	tonal	columns	of	blurred	and	scrambled	text	is	all	we	see.	
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taken time into its fabric, not in any sequence, but in a simultaneity that alters the 
qualitative nature of the substance. When pinned to the wall, the paper slumps 
and folds like weary cloth. Yet in this draping, it also becomes a voluminous 
object, where space is contained in the breath of folds, and where it floats from 
the wall, at the ends of long specimen pins. The paper is a specimen, a frail skin 
discarded, as delicate as an insect wing, both abject and precious, ancient and 
renewed. The paper, once blind and passive, at the service of inscription, has 
emerged as the full extent of its marks, no longer available for use. To ruin is to 
give issue to the qualities of a thing, until that point of saturation, and there the 
object remains, poised between these two poles of expression and ruin.  
 
Figure 15. Sharon Jewell, 2013. Abrasion 3. Tracing paper, car backing. 100 X 100cm. 
(Photograph by Leah King-Smith). 
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2.5  The phenomenology of care 
2.5.1 The intransitive being of care and the gift 
In the final section of this chapter I wish to address the problem of ascribing care, 
specifically reciprocal care, to non-sentience. In the previous section I developed 
a logical argument for the continuation of care in objects made through care’s 
dialectic form. However, it remains to be clear how this care comes to touch the 
beholder; how it remains active. The art object reciprocates, but, not being of 
human consciousness, it cannot be said to sense care in the same way. If we 
associate care, when properly coupled with action, with a sentiment of human 
obligation, tenderness, emotional investment then we are saying that care is the 
mindfulness with which a thing is done, and not the action itself, regardless of 
the sense faculties with which a thing performs. However, if we eliminate the 
need for sense from a definition of care what avenues does that open up to argue 
for reciprocation?  
 
Throughout this thesis, I have maintained the conviction that care is something 
inherently active, not reducible to sentiment or theory. That is to say, while it is 
possible to develop a theory of care, it is not possible to care theoretically. If an 
impulse to care is not enacted, then it must be thought otherwise, thus implying a 
connection, a proximity, even an intimacy between the actors of care. On the 
other hand, to care about a thing suggests a responsive act that does not 
necessarily make any single thing the target of an action, as it would in caring 
for. This attention to prepositions is not pedantry. For the about in care does not 
set a definitive radius, but a wide field that makes its object no single nameable 
thing. Caring about might give order to a way of behaving in the world, and it is 
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through concern for a way of behaving or mode of being, specifically as an artist, 
that I direct the inquiry toward the theme of care. Caring for, a far more direct 
and focused care, finds its expression in a defined space, the intimacy of the 
garden, the love of another, the protection of a frail painting in the skilled hands 
of the conservator or the wellbeing of aged cloth. Yet there is another way of 
thinking care that somehow comes prior to the will, or the responsive impulse 
generated in contact with an object or field of need. This care is an intransitive, 
taking no particular object or field of concern, but none the less, expressed 
entirely through the particular. The impulse to care, that generates action, is, I 
suggest, that which purposes my creative practice and working method. It is 
intransitive, because it comes prior to any object, issue, idea or demand. It is 
particular because every choice, every value, every attention is given in care, to 
the revealing of matter at hand.  
 
This, I would argue, explains the intricacy that characterises my working method. 
Care begets patience, because the satisfaction of completion is waylaid by the 
response to a need that is self-generating. As long as the work is in the process of 
being made, the work is its making that happens in care. There is no model, no 
external reality to which it defers in a representational sense that can be said to 
be a primary object of care. In this sense intransitive care, it seems, is a condition 
of the soul as it projects through the body, much as we say of the instinct to 
nurture, prior to any object that drives that urge.  
 
In what follows, I explore this idea of care as both intransitive and reciprocal. In 
the absence of any substantial theory relating to care on its own or as a reciprocal 
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action in the creative event and art object, I draw on Jean-Luc Marion’s 
phenomenology of the gift, which I believe lends considerable charge to a 
nascent theory of care. Marion’s phenomenology examines the notion of self-
giving where particular phenomena are “saturated”. By this, he recognises 
phenomena that are no longer signifying and are therefore ungrounded – they are 
not given by any other representation or reason but themselves. Marion places art 
in the category of saturated phenomena which are revealed through a process 
where artist and phenomena come together in what I would call a mutual 
holding, or what Marion calls resistance (2002b). The reciprocation that happens 
in this situation is intersubjective, immediate and mutual, between artist and 
work and beholder and work.  
 
Marion’s theory effectively offers a critique of the gift as a cycle of indebtedness 
problematised earlier by, amongst others, Derrida (1992) and Godelier (1999). 
While it has been argued that Marion’s saturated phenomena, by which he 
explains self-giving, is better developed through Martin Buber’s I-Thou and I-It 
relationships (see Harding 2012), I feel Marion’s account is most relevant in its 
analogous connection to the actions of care, for which I intend to account here. 
Marion’s theory shows the artwork as agentive and that this agency is enacted as 
self-giving. Likewise, reciprocal care I see as a self-generating exchange, arising 
in the extension of a moment that shimmers with a shared attentiveness, between 
two subjects, both of which are giver and recipient, and where the gift is the 
unquantifiable intransitive care to attend. That this action works not only on the 
beholder, but also the art work, is eloquently observed by Jean-Luc Nancy when 
he writes: 
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The image touches me, and, thus touched and drawn by it and into it, I 
get involved, not to say mixed up in it. There is no image without my 
too being in its image, but also without passing into it, as long as I 
look at it, that is, as long as I show it consideration, maintain my 
regard for it (Nancy 2005, 7). 
 
In the following section I will examine the mechanisms by which Marion’s 
phenomenology comes to explain the intuition that Nancy articulates, and the 
mutual holding to which I have referred.  
 
2.5.2 Jean-Luc Marion and saturated phenomena 
In the third book of his trilogy, In excess: studies of saturated phenomena 
(2002b) Jean-Luc Marion asks the question: “…how can a phenomena claim to 
be deployed by itself and in itself if a transcendental I constitutes it as an object, 
placed at one’s disposal for and by the thought that governs it exhaustively?” 
(2002b, 30). Marion seeks an explanation for phenomena that are given not by 
but to consciousness, in what Marion calls a “gift of appearance”. He reasons 
that if “a phenomenon shows itself, we would have to be able to recognise in it a 
self, such that it takes the initiative of its manifestation” (ibid). Marion’s response 
proceeds from the recognition that, in order to show itself, it first must give itself. 
(ibid). He then asks, what sort of phenomena would manifest a self of givenness? 
What phenomena retain a trace of their givenness, as they show themselves? He 
answers his own question with the hypothesis that it is the phenomenon of the 
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event (2002b, 31). By this, Marion intends “that which does not result from a 
production, which would deliver it as a product, decided and foreseen” (ibid).  
 
What appears in the event, “escapes all constitution” for it “shows itself from 
itself” (2002b, 33). Marion writes that the event “produces us, in giving itself to 
us” (ibid., 34). In this, we are introduced to the possibility of a simultaneous 
reciprocity in so far as a mutual presencing is implied. The gift, formally seen as 
an object that creates indebtedness is here seen as pure reciprocity in mutual self-
giving. Marion differentiates the event from other phenomena on the basis of 
three levels of reduction premised on their intuitive content. By intuition, Marion 
means that which is prior to intentionality or signification; that which, in other 
words, is ‘originally giving’ (James 2012, 31).  
 
The first reduction constitutes those phenomena that are ‘poor’ in intuition, such 
as formulae and abstract ideas, where the concept outweighs the affective or 
sensible intuition; the second reduction is in ‘common-law phenomena’, found in 
objects made according to design or formula, where intention precedes 
phenomenal presencing (James 2012, 31). To these most frequently occurring 
phenomena, Marion asks “can’t we oppose a phenomenon saturated with 
intuition?...why wouldn’t there correspond the possibility of a phenomenon 
where intuition would give more, indeed immeasurably more, than the intention 
would ever have aimed at or foreseen?” (Marion 2002a, 197). Such is the event, 
equivalent to the third reduction which “are so saturated with given intuitions 
that significations and corresponding noeses are lacking” (Marion 2002b, 51). 
For Marion, such phenomena must fulfill three conditions: they must not be 
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reproducible; the saturated phenomenon is without cause or “exhaustive 
explanation, and it cannot be foreseen” (Marion 2002b, 36). Thus on one side it 
opens out to its histories and reasons, while on the other, as it shows itself to me, 
it is intensified within the inexhaustible terms of its “occurrence” (ibid., 37). 
Marion calls these saturated phenomena. 
 
Ian James writes of this third reduction: “The saturated phenomenon gives itself, 
as it were, absolutely and free from any conditioning by or analogy with already 
understood, lived experience” (James 2012, 32). In effect, then, the event is 
without grounds and must therefore be its own grounding, cannot be given and 
therefore must give of itself. In this sense the event looks remarkably like Being, 
in a Heideggarian sense, for whom Being, “[p]recisely because it is groundlike, 
groundgiving, it cannot need a ground” (Heidegger 1985, 170). Linking this to 
the previous section where I likened the groundlessness of Serres’ ichnography 
to the paper works Abrasions, these can now be seen to constitute what Marion is 
referring to as the event that is self-giving, in that, as ground, it cannot be given 
by any other thing, reason or cause. Two things remain to be expanded upon. 
One is, how can art participate in the revealing givenness, or saturated 
phenomena? The other is how can this astonishing potential of art be equivalent 
to care?  
 
The implication of consciousness (which Marion refers to as l’adonné) with 
saturated phenomena, comes, curiously, in the form of resistance, or an obstacle 
to phenomena. “L’adonné phenomenalizes in receiving the given, precisely 
because it is an obstacle to it” (Marion 2002b, 50). Here we can see why Marion 
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refers to this third reduction as an event, that simultaneously strikes l’adonné and 
the phenomenal object. Marion writes, as if in response to Nancy’s observation 
above:  
 
The given is therefore revealed to l’adonné in revealing l’adonné to 
itself. Each is phenomenalized in the mode of the revealed, which is 
characterized by this essential phenomenal reciprocity, where to see 
implies the modification of the seeing by the seen, as much as the 
modification of the seen by the viewer (Marion 2002b, 50). 
 
Marion uses the wonderfully incisive analogy of an electric current to make this 
process clear. Saturation is equivalent to the resistance in an electric circuit, that 
occasions light or heat to reveal the otherwise invisible current. He says that an 
artist acts as just such a resistor, but a resistor to the flow of given phenomena, to 
the point at which the given shows itself, “in a phenomenon accessible to all” 
(ibid). In other words, the work of art holds the event of its givenness, prior to 
intentionality or signification. The analogy of resistance can be further deployed 
to reveal the relevance of “to behold” in caring. For there is, in being held, both a 
resistance – a restraint – and an affordance in the care that it designates. To be 
held and simultaneously to hold, in this sense, is to become effulgent and to bring 
about the effulgence of the beheld. A mutual holding between one phenomenon 
and the other – artist or beholder and work. So why not simply say that beholder 
and beheld – designations that are fluid between the two parts of the encounter – 
occur to each other as the event of the gift, as Marion defines it? Why now call 
this encounter one of care?  
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There are two principle reasons for this. The first is in response to the 
reassignment of care, as in Heidegger’s reckoning of Dasein, to Being generally, 
discussed above. Having already established that we might say care defines 
encounters of all sorts in the world, Marion’s theory of the gift, particularly as he 
explains it through the analogy of resistance, seems to me to provide a perfect 
means for showing the way in which care, particularly reciprocal care, operates. 
The second reason I defend the use of Marion’s theory of the gift, is that it takes 
the fixed terms (nouns) of which giving is typically comprised – giver, gift, 
recipient – and renders them active and reciprocal: the gift is a reciprocal 
revealing of each term, as if one were polishing the other into a kind of receptive 
luminosity. My beholding does not simply carve an agreeable nook of aesthetic 
pleasure in the landscape of my subjectivity, but, in a way warms and buffs the 
surface of subjectivity to reveal itself to me.  In Marion’s theory, this works the 
other way too, for, as he has said in the above citation, “to see implies the 
modification of the seeing by the seen, as much as the modification of the seen 
by the viewer” (Marion 2002b, 50). It is the self-giving, active and reciprocal 
nature of the gift that most effectively speaks for the nature of care as I am 
arguing it in this thesis.  
 
2.5.3 Givenness and care in the creative work  
Can these observations and convictions be applicable to the working processes 
and completed works that have formed the basis of this thesis? What is at stake 
in this question is whether the theoretical outcomes have arisen authentically 
through the practice. In this section I will review some of the works and 
processes that, particularly toward the end of the making, began to suggest these 
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notions of care and givenness. One question that Marion does not appear to 
address is how, in the resistance that gives visibility to phenomena, an art 
process is implicated. Marion’s comments come to address the drama of 
resistance that makes visible the phenomena, the art work in its completion, as a 
visible transformation of  the event. It does not make sense that the phenomena 
only attain visibility in the completed work. Marion writes that “the excess of 
givenness [transmutes] into a monstration of equal extent, that is to say, 
unmeasured” (Marion 2002b, 51). En route to the final monstration, then, is the 
work finite, in which case, the infinite in the finished work would present the 
aporia of a finite constitution? It is surely beyond the scope of this paper to 
address this question toward any resolution. However, its nagging presence is 
enough to cause me to reflect on process, suggesting that it may well be said to 
constitute, in its intricate series of events, the immeasurable. 
 
While the materials I have worked with are diverse, my approach to them has 
been consistently delivered with an intricacy and intimacy of attention, that 
brings me close to their surfaces, measure by measure, moment by moment. In 
the fabric works, as the needle incrementally studies an acre of organza, stitch by 
stitch, it leaves its inchlings behind as expositors of the smallest meetings of 
warp and weft. Although I make the stitch, it nonetheless reveals itself as a 
singular event, unrepeatable, utterly distinct from the one that is to follow or that 
came before. Is this right? Can I say so? That which qualifies the event is that 
which is beyond signification, is unrepeatable and without measure. Such is the 
(hand) stitch, in its singular measure; unique, not in spite but because of the very 
illusion of repetition.  
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The touching of materials in close attention reveals not only those materials but 
my own hand, my own sensibilities, now entwined with the qualities possessed 
by those substances – organza, stones, wood, paper. Their particular qualities are 
mediated not through the categorical knowledge contained within their nominal 
designation, but through my emergent sensibilities that are buffed by analogous 
qualities in the materials from the moment I am drawn to them, in the immediacy 
of true valuation. The event of care requires the particular to precede any broader 
designation. I care for the material at hand, in this moment, not for paper or 
fabric in general, for how can the immediacy of care and its reciprocation extend 
to the abstract? It is in encountering matter prior to its categorical assignment, 
that it might be, simultaneously, skin, earth, blanket, wall, or that being might be 
wall, shroud or door, as Bachelard allowed. The intimacy of care, then, both 
hones the object of attention, and unites a broader world in the unique 
sensibilities of the hand in its translation of being.  
 
When asked why I do this, why I make art at all – a confronting and seemingly 
provocative question –  and I responded, because I care, I had not in mind an 
object of care. This care I felt was intransitive, a way of being that precedes 
objects but is none the less a condition of being in the world. This care intercepts 
particular events in the world – the event that is paper, fabric, stone, wood – and 
in so doing, phenomenalises them. This care manifests as a valuation that takes 
its measure from an analogous relation to subjectivity.  
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2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have established a basis for the notion of care as a dialectic 
relation that maintains an ever adjusting position between inattentiveness and 
ruin, but that ultimately gives access to expression. In highlighting care as a way 
of being, I have examined briefly a number of art works that address the notion 
of care in performative and ritualistic ways. While situating my thesis within the 
same field of interest, I have sought to identify care as active at various levels 
and moments in the making process, within the artwork itself, throughout and 
after the making. I presented my argument through a speculative extemporisation 
on the on the Hyginus myth of Cura to which Heidegger refers the notion of care 
or concern in defining a key signature of Dasein. Through a rereading of the 
myth, I suggested that care might be said of Being more generally, since, in the 
story, Care makes her creation in her own image, thus implying that care begets 
care. In the interactions of an art practice, materials and artist mutually inform 
each other, eliciting qualities,  otherwise concealed. A dialectic enactment of care 
means that this exchange broadens the terms by which each player is  enlivened, 
but short of the determination of a single will.  
 
I have shown this dialectic exchange, in the works of Elana Herzog and Alberto 
Burri, each using fabric as the material that undergoes the push and pull of care, 
and in my own works, using paper and repeated incisive markings. In this 
exhaustive rendering, figure and ground are reduced to ground alone. This final 
congruence of mark and that which is marked, can be thought as a form of care, 
where the negotiation between mark and surface allows each to attain the fullest 
expressive possibility, with the result of a new emergent ground. In the final 
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section of the chapter, I scrutinised the phenomenology of care, by relating it to 
Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology of the gift and giving, and his notion of 
saturated phenomena. I argued for the relevance of this reference, on the grounds 
that the intransitive and reciprocal nature of care, as well as the mutual 
expressive access given in the encounter, had much in common with Marion’s 
self-giving. 
 
While this final section explores in some depth, the means by which an encounter 
with phenomena can be seen to happen within the terms of care, it remains to be 
seen how the parts of the artwork find mutual access by the same means, that is, 
through care. In the introduction I wrote that care is the mode of being both with 
and within the artwork. I referred specifically to the drawing where the action of 
figure and ground is the problematic structure that I addressed at the outset of the 
studio work. The action of figure and ground, therefore, becomes the subject of 
the following chapter. I begin by documenting how this presumption of drawing 
developed, for me, into different ways of thinking material relations, specifically 
tracing the emergence of the surface in drawing as articulate and motivated. 
While some of the experiences that I recount are taken from my past, for 
example, as a student new to drawing many years ago, it is in the persistence and 
rethinking of these memories that I defend them as significant points of reference 
in the current study.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RAISING THE GROUND: STEPS TOWARD SURFACES OF CARE 
In this chapter, tracing the foundations for the research, I show how the 
questioning of the figure-ground relation in drawing was the problematic trigger 
for a shift in thinking my drawing practice. I highlight that this recognition 
emerged through early experiences of the discomfort of ineptitude. From this, I 
explore the assumption that, in reading a drawing, it is the marks that carry the 
meaning, despite the material presence of the surface or ground, whose 
invisibility is assured by its immediate masking as pictorial space. I develop this 
theme with reference to Alain Badiou, and Jean-Luc Nancy, whose readings of 
the drawing surface, nonetheless, tend to maintain a figure and ground 
distinction. I counter this through reference to a number of salient examples from 
within the contemporary and modern fields of drawing, specifically Kiki Smith, 
Dorothea Rockburne and Lucio Fontana. I also bring in references to the written, 
or inscribed surface, where the page is read as an articulate body. Through these 
references, I introduce the proposition that a dialogue of care can be said to break 
down the differences within the binary function of figure-ground, and counter 
this to Heidegger’s notion of conflict as the dynamic determination that defines 
the work of art.  
 
3.1 Drawing: Mal-a-droit (bad right > left)  
The first part of this section takes the form of three separate anecdotes each of 
which alludes to the way in which the ground in drawing pushes to the surface in 
moments of awkwardness and uncertainty. While these accounts do not address 
directly the theme of care, they lead the discussion toward the notion of  figure 
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and ground as dialogical, the first step in naming care as the mode in which this 
dialogue emerges. 
 
First reflection: Before I ever made a drawing in the academy studio long ago, I 
knew very well what was expected. Nobody had to explain and no one asked 
what was intended by standing before a white, vertical field, a grey-black 
implement in hand, and a figure contained within a stage, before the hesitant 
inquisition of the collective gaze. To charge the empty page, to make meaning 
within the void: nobody needed to explain this; the imperative preceded both 
thought and action, and came from an authority beyond either page or model. In 
the early days when my handling lacked the precision required to reel the world 
in with confidence, my whole body was aware of the drawing act. I felt my stance 
as somehow implicated in every inaccuracy, my hand as heavy and 
unsympathetic, and my species, an example of which stood naked before me, as 
alien and mocking.  
 
As I gained more expertise, confidence and authority over the enterprise of 
drawing from the world, this awareness subsided. Experience gave me levity and 
freed me from the jeers that would ricochet off the surface and back to the 
apologetic hand.  The act of drawing no longer existed. It was from then on a 
matter of this drawing, the one at hand, not the whole great, mysterious, foreign 
business to which I had recently felt so alien. The ground had vanished. As a 
novice, the paper shone before my eyes, the one thing in the room that was 
perfect, right, already replete with the endless possibilities of what the drawing 
could be, until I began to mark it with the limitations of what it was to be. Prior 
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to the mark, the paper seemed to issue forth the light by which the object was 
perceived, and as the object began to take over the page, the glare diminished, 
overshadowed by the shadowy figure.  
 
Second reflection: A step back: The surface, the pristine ground, and source of 
illumination: A friend came to stay, when I lived in an old place amid towering 
bunya pines, and began to paint one such tree at twilight in December. In the 
approaching gloom, the image became a cloaked Balzac, blotting out the sun, 
and inclining with all its shadowy weight, against the internal edge of the 
canvas. As the evening moved in, the shadow bloated into grotesque parody, 
while the painter laboured to maintain a hold on the form as it was engulfed by 
the night. There was a moment, though, before the complete fall of darkness, 
when what remained of the canvas ground seemed to shine forth, around the 
edges of the gluttonous silhouette. In that brief minute, the whole purpose, from 
my bystander angle at least, seemed to be this luminous halo, with the struggle 
now centred on sustaining the diminishing glow, a struggle lost as the pine 
completely dissolved into the liquid night.  
 
To mark a surface is to make a claim against the assertion of the ground. It is to 
exile the ground to the hushed nether region of props and supports. Graham 
Harman acknowledges such a world where the essential asides that make the 
immediate function are rendered invisible (2010, 97). Paper, as drawing support, 
is just such an object. This story of my friend and his exasperating painting, that 
mild mid-Summer evening, could be given as a tale of shifting grounds. The tree, 
one moment a background element of the landscape, is brought to the 
	 95
foreground, its waywardness as an image-function, producing frustrations in my 
melancholy friend. The darkening evening, at one moment a translucent wash 
over the day, becomes the background for the cosmic inflections of stars. The 
canvas, disappearing beneath the Mars black smears and swirls of oil paint, at 
some moment malfunctions as a context for these gestures, which gutter into the 
viscous background of the night, and reasserts itself as a brilliant ring of light. 
Then, it all glides away: canvas, gesture, tree, and all the world that slipped 
between them to parade their differences. No more a ground than a figure; yet 
my friend remains there, plying on the dark stuff, not to be disturbed in his 
unraveling of some other saturnine dream.  
 
The give and take of active figure and supine ground plays out differently for the 
expert and for the maladroit. When hands and eyes become adept, their concerns 
– charcoal, tree, model, surface – disappear into the handling, their strangeness 
conquered; an answer for every challenge. The marks left behind tell a new story, 
to which the world answers only as testimony. For the maladroit, however, the 
ground beneath the image keeps peering through: the paper becomes worn with 
too much over-drawing or too much erasure, the movement of the model is 
vexing, not just because we think this makes our judgments impossible, but 
because it brings him too much into presence: “an upsurge of bulky presence” as 
Harman, following Heidegger, would say of the sudden appearance of an object 
when it ceases to function in the expected way (2010, 97). The drawing meets the 
edges of the paper, like impassable frontiers, too soon, and suddenly the paper 
asserts itself over the marks.  
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For the maladroit, the ground is always rising up to deliver something more than 
what one expects. As a left-handed child learning to write, the page insisted on 
the direction of my script – right to left. As long as I had to train myself to form 
my letters from left to right, the page remained a mighty presence, exerting a 
lateral gravitational force upon my hand. While for the right handed, the page 
disappeared politely behind the words, for me it was the enemy of words. And 
when I did master the directional imperative, ink and graphite smeared under the 
drag of the hand, pushing the text back into the paper and imprinting the wad of 
flesh on the clenched side of the fist. Words were mere incidental blemishes, 
between hand and paper. Perhaps that was the attraction of drawing: it had no 
directional requirement, a freedom that correlated to the non-aligned world of 
things. Maladroit: badly skillful, gauche, or left.  
*** 
Third reflection: An early memory of drawing – perhaps most novice artists or 
students, still learning to fit the world into a frame, have encountered it – is that 
of the lost limb. In drawing the upright figure, the vertical capacity of the 
standard page gives the dimensions of around two thirds of the figure, after 
which the lower limbs, if you have not planned for it, will taper off or simply be 
truncated at the bottom edge of the paper. One way of dealing with this problem, 
without having the figure float like a specimen in the broad expanse of the page, 
is to disregard proportion and taper the figure as it approaches the edges, 
creating a monstrous, top-heavy aberration. Or, as an enlightened teacher once 
memorably advised me, just add on another piece of paper. Literally, surgically 
fit a prosthetic limb. Maladroit, things become different, decisions are drastic, 
and nothing is simply given. Maladroit, the ground becomes active, because the 
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hand is too clumsy to keep it down. Short of the expertise that would come later, 
the prosthetic solution made of the life drawing an internal dialogue between 
surface as a material fact, and marks, and no longer between marks and referent, 
or marks and illusory space. No longer a context for the drawing, the paper, 
including its marks, was now an object open to the contingencies of the world. If 
it was possible to add one extension, then it was possible to add again and again. 
The world might be mapped in lines and marks, but also in the planes that cover 
it and match it, acre for acre.  
 
I recall my wonder and amusement at this thing that was not quite a drawing, but 
not quite not a drawing: a drawing, it could be said, in discussion with itself. The 
unequivocal purpose of graphic rendering, with its familiar order of things – 
marks on paper – had undergone a subtle disruption. The thing revealed was the 
surface itself, projected outward, into the open, but into an open that was the 
object of the drawing itself. Jean-Luc Nancy’s assertion of art’s genetic potential 
describes this aptly when he writes:   
 
art is there every time to open the world, to open the world to itself, 
to its possibility of world…And it is also for this reason that we 
always say that each artist has a world, or one could almost say that 
each artist is a world (Nancy 2010, 93. My italics). 
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I love the necessary sense of contradiction that Nancy pulls out of this familiar 
Heideggarian formulation.7 Both these terms, world and possibility, register 
clearly in my experience of art making. One term assumes a basis, the world in 
which I find myself; the other, possibility, invites the work that in turn, reveals a 
world: a cyclical process where world and possibility are mutually generating 
terms. Paul Carter recognised this too, I would suggest, for when he ascribed 
“disclosure” to the act of invention, (Carter 2010, 15) he did not mean disclosure 
of extants, but of possibility. So, I return again to the prosthetic drawing in order 
to show the cohabitation of world and possibility with a very simple, though 
supple example. For while the intention in those early drawing classes was, if you 
will, to open the world under observation – in the case at hand, the studio model – 
a recognition of the materials at hand, allowed something else to emerge, that was 
neither representation nor fantasy, but possibility. This drawing was not the extent 
of its marks, but the outward dimensions of its estate. Rather than finding the 
composition of the drawing within the frame of its support, the composition was 
now, firstly, the organisation of the surface itself.  
 
These reflections have emerged through the course of this research, reflections 
on an event that resurfaced as a question regarding the space between, or the 
shared space of figure and ground. The decisive moment in which the sanctity of 
this binary structure began to falter, was, I suggest, one of care, not for the model 
out there, not even for the responsibility of the marks, but for this object, this 
papery tissue, this abstracted skin. As it fails to contain the rendering, surface is 
extended with a new limb; the paper reveals itself as a substance, with particular 
																																																								
7	In	The	origin	of	the	work	of	art,	Heidegger	writes:	“Art	is	the	origin	of	the	artwork	and	the	
artist”	(Heidegger,	2002,	p.182).		
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properties, creased and somewhat frail under the smeared tape that fulfills its 
surgical purpose. Because of, rather than despite this ungainly scar, for the 
brevity of its life thereafter, this humble and rather awkward work is testimony to 
an act of care, of fixing, holding, making better, but in so doing, opening up the 
meaning of the act and object of drawing. 
 
3.2 Figuring the ground 
The link between the figurative usage and the material fact of ground lies in a 
traditional conception of drawing, where the surface or support provides the 
ground against which the figure – whether abstract, gestural or representational – 
is able to move, be visible, lurch forward and generally find context. It is 
particularly salient in drawing, because the ground is frequently seen in the 
presence of the raw surface material, such as the whitish paper, whilst at the 
same time, representing an otherworldly space. As Jonathan Harris has pointed 
out, “figure / ground relations are matters of both literal and depicted space or 
depth” (Harris 2006, 115), suggesting that they have no stakes in worldly matter.  
 
It is a small move from this order of things, in the drawing, to the perception of 
the way things arise in the world. Alain Badiou recognises in this structure the 
configuration for the spatial jurisdiction of the drawing. He explains: “A thing 
exists more or less, and the intensity has no relation to being, but only with the 
concrete world in which the thing appears. In Drawing, the world is symbolized 
by the background, pages, screen or wall” (Badiou 2011. My italics). Badiou 
makes the assertion that a work of art is a “description without place” (ibid), by 
which I understand that it is sealed within its own world, that of the ground, the 
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support or surface on which it is given. He makes it clear that the surface will not 
be caught out, voicing its claims in the world of things, since it is required at the 
invisible servitude of the marks: “in a true drawing…the marks, the traces, the 
lines, are not closeted in the background. On the contrary, [they] create the 
background as an open space” (Badiou 2011). 
 
Like Badiou, Jean Luc Nancy recognises the drawing from the point of view of 
the applied marks, which open the ground as an imagined space. He writes of the 
ground as “the dark side of the picture, its underside, its undesirable and 
backside, or even its weave or its subjectile” (Nancy 2005, 94). In his book The 
muses (1996), Nancy speculates on the origins of painting, where he imagines the 
solitary figure in the cave whose wall, no longer the hardened, coruscated 
substance of rock, “makes itself merely spacious” (Nancy 1996, 74). It is no 
longer lived space but “a spacing in which to let come” (ibid.). While the 
evocations of this “opening” of which Nancy loves to speak, are consistent with 
the drawing act, in this originary speculation of the being of the image, it seems 
strange that Nancy should so readily relinquish the ontology of the cave, 
forsaking rock for abstracted ground, in the way the picture plane stands in for 
the paper as substance. It may seem impertinent to subject Nancy’s poetic image 
to anthropological scrutiny, but the evidence from early European cave paintings 
is compelling, if we agree that origins are important to this discussion, as indeed, 
Nancy does.  
 
In their study of European rock art, Christopher Chippindale and George Nash 
(2002) highlight the inadequacy of documenting only the linear traces of rock 
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and cave drawings. They caution: “By omitting landscape and, in particular, 
rock-art as place, one is only looking at subjectivity and ignoring media” 
(Chippindale and Nash 2002, 19). They suggest that on visiting these sites one 
not only records the sequence and nature of the figures on the rocks, but, in one 
direction, the larger landscape of the site and in the other, the intimate nature of 
the surface, including the environmental changes that it undergoes. For example, 
certain fissures and cracks in the rocks may be the reason for both the placement 
and form of the drawing. They admit that key information about these drawings 
would surely have been omitted over years of contemplating their printed 
reproductions away from places that form the primary content of their 
inscriptions (ibid., 21). This insight reverses the agency that Nancy suggests, as 
the isolated human reaches out and marks the wall with his subjectivity. In what 
Chippindale and Nash find, the site reaches out to the artist, acting, as Alphonso 
Lingis would say, as an Imperative (1998). There is no reducing the surface to a 
screen or page. The drawing, it could be said, is a reciprocal act between 
mutually motivated artist and surface. 
 
It is curious, therefore, that in his endeavour to locate the being of the image 
Nancy effectively stages its dematerialisation. In The Ground of the Image 
(2005), however, he draws a connection between the idea of distinction that 
raises the figure or image, with the word, “stigma” – “a branding mark, a 
pinprick or puncture, an incision, a tattoo” (2005, 2) – bringing both mark and 
surface into mutual presence. The violence of distinction gives a different sense 
not only of marks but also of surface, to that defined, for example, by Kandinsky 
and his formalist legacy for which the marks are formal arrangements, hovering 
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before their background like actors moving in front of scenery. Take for example 
this evocation: “The point digs itself into the plane and asserts itself for all time” 
(Kandinsky 1979, 32). Clearly Nancy relates the stigmatic markings and their 
surface to the skin, which experiences the sharp heat of the incisive, probing tool, 
and by which mark and skin become complicated. Not only does the point assert 
itself but equally the skin comes into presence. Steven Connor notes that the 
transgressive nature of this alliance between skin and mark – or similarly, surface 
and inscription – is evoked by the phonetic closeness of the words, tattoo and 
taboo (Connor 2004, 94). Given the hegemony of the mark, the taboo might be 
imagined as the advance of surface into visibility.  
 
3.3  Surface ontology  
By recognising surface as an active participant in inscriptive acts, be they writing 
or drawing, I suggest a disclosure of the kind that Heidegger develops in The 
origin of the work of art. Heidegger refers to “the uncovering of beings”, and 
signals this as the artist’s particular role (Heidegger 1971, 57). In this disclosure, 
argues Heidegger, the artist reveals the truth of things, not in resolution, but in 
the maintenance of the dialectic act of revelation. Truth, writes Heidegger, is “the 
conflict between lighting and concealing in the opposition of world and earth” 
(Heidegger 1971, 60). This distinction, extended to the work of art posits figure 
and ground, or form and matter, as disjunctive, but disjunction as a mutually 
revelatory conflict. In this formulation, earth is given as the background to the 
emergence of worlds of meaning, the immediate matter from which things are 
formed, or which, like the drawing surface, gives context whilst variously 
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implicating and asserting itself. Heidegger writes: “The world grounds itself in 
the earth and the earth juts through the world” (Heidegger 1971, 49). 
 
Heidegger casts truth as willful and irrepressible, manifest in the oscillation 
between world and earth, for he writes: “Truth wills to be established in the work 
as this conflict of world and earth” (Heidegger 1971, 60. My italics). He makes it 
clear however that this conflict does not find resolution in agreement but in the 
maintenance of “strife”, explaining the sense, as mentioned earlier, of the 
drawing being in dialogue with itself, a dialogue that is maintained through 
difference. Barbara Bolt draws attention to the disruptive nature of this strife, 
writing that it is the “unsettling of preconceived or established ways of thinking 
that art enables” (Bolt 2011, 182).  
 
The active quality of truth, rather than its resolution of conflict is important to its 
definition. Truth is neither recumbent nor final; it is not something that is, but 
something that happens as world and earth enfold. Iain Thompson observes, that 
the earth “provides that combination of ‘recalcitrance and support’” (Thompson 
2011, 90) that allows for an abundance of possibilities. Likewise, Jean-Luc 
Nancy writes of the combination of compliance and resistance of surface and 
imprint, together producing a force (Nancy 2005, 7). In this definition, Earth – or 
ground – is a sensitive, yet firm provider indeed, as it “both informs and sustains 
[the] meaningful world and also resists being interpretively exhausted by it” 
(ibid.). The resistance to interpretation is, for Heidegger, not only a condition of 
the work of art, but also an essential ontological one.  
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For the remainder of this chapter, I will examine a range of works and contexts 
that acknowledge in different ways the dynamic relationship between figure and 
ground. Through these, I will conclude that the struggle that Heidegger perceives 
as the activity of truth, might be thought otherwise. Still maintaining the binary 
terms of earth and world, the activity might be considered, instead, as the 
responsiveness that comes with care. This, as has already been suggested, is not a 
care that is interested in preservation, but in expressive access, and a dynamic 
material empathy.  
 
3.4 Surfaces and marks: dissolution, betrayal and care 
In researching the poetic inscriptions of the Japanese Heian calligraphers, 
Thomas Lamarre found paper and script to be almost indistinguishable, 
prompting him to assert: “The surface for inscription is never neutral” (2002, 
149). This claim is echoed in Tim Ingold’s observation, “it is not enough to 
regard the surface as a taken-for-granted backdrop for the lines that are inscribed 
upon it” (Ingold 2007, 39). The various fibres used to construct these 
“paperscapes”, as Lamarre calls the Heian poetic documents, “result in papers 
that differ greatly in texture, that absorb ink differently, that affect the style and 
allure of the brushwork” (Lamarre 2012, 149). The differences that particularise 
each paperscape thus make the papers more than decorative substrates. Rather 
they are agents, even instigators, in the poetic inventions. The grounds here are 
active, vibrant and directive. The paper can no longer be seen as a unified, 
asignifying ground, rather it is already a multiple, an aggregate with its own 
internal references, though they speak of the same concerns voiced in the 
calligraphic inscriptions. The words mimic the paper where the themes often 
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evoke the inflected particles of the natural world. Or is it that the paper mimics 
the words? “[I]t becomes difficult to determine” admits Lamarre (2002, 151). 
“Petals flutter, rivers flow, autumn leaves scatter, bugs chirp and 
surrurate…moons wax and wane” (ibid., 150). The words that make up the 
poetic assemblage borrow from and lend themselves to the dynamic generative 
forces of the paper. The twin becoming of the paperscapes – “marked and 
unmarked, inscribed or uninscribed” produces an elevation of the poetic 
assemblage, “always a depth that rises to the surface” (ibid., 154). 
 
The interweaving of text and paper is further developed in the palimpsest that 
arises in the reuse of previously inscribed papers, to “return text to texture”, 
creating an “art of text [that] emerges from an art of patchwork” (Lamarre 2002, 
151). Previous inscriptions are erased by soaking; ink words returning to fluid, 
while dyes are used to cover the remains of calligraphic marks on the paper. 
Elsewhere, scraps, remnants and discards are assembled into whole new sheets, 
or whole sheets shredded and reconstituted (ibid). Text, here, is the aggregate of 
paper and inscriptions, where there is no conflict between matter and meaning, 
but a sharing of sense, an empathy and a mutual augmentation of being. Each 
assists the emergence of the other, and each intensifies the articulacy of the other. 
So that figure and ground become a single vibrating ground. 
 
In Lamarre’s account, the assertion of the page has positive connotations, for the 
internal dialogue of textual parts becomes endlessly dynamic. This augmentation, 
or intensification of sense and receptivity manifests a mutual and immediate 
reciprocity between parts. What can be said, then, when the surface’s 
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assertiveness appears to be in conflict with the marks in either a drawing or text, 
when matter seems to prevail against intended meaning? This affliction arises as 
a concern in Jacques Derrida’s inquiry into Antonin Artaud’s use of the term 
“subjectile” to refer to what appears to be the surface of the drawing and text 
(Derrida 1998). Precisely what sparks Derrida’s fascination is a sentence in a 
letter that Artaud wrote in 1932: “Herewith a bad drawing in which what is 
called the subjectile betrayed me” (Artaud quoted in Derrida, 1998, 61). Derrida 
is intrigued by this obscure term – subjectile – and becomes the arch sleuth as he 
picks up the clues that lead him back to the surface, as if the culprit were always 
there in the room. Derrida finds that the subjectile, “does not constitute an object 
of any knowing [that] does not come when it is called, or come[s] before even 
being called” (ibid., 63), evoking an image of menacing disobedience, disdainful 
of the author’s wishes. 
 
Derrida writes of this curious object that it is “everything distinct from form, as 
well as from meaning and representation. On the other hand, it is a permeable or 
porous body that is capable of engorging rather than supporting the drawing” 
(Derrida 1994, 156). In this reckoning, there is a shift in perception, from 
thinking surface as neutral, to casting it as a powerful protagonist, rising up to 
claim authorship. Its qualities are far from disinterested, for they can absorb, tear, 
crease and fold, taking in shadows along with inscribed lines. Derrida goes on to 
catalogue a range of materials as subjectile, subdivided by their tendencies either 
to absorb or resist. He thus contrasts “plasters, mortar, wood, cardboard, textiles, 
paper” with the non-porous, such as metals, “which permit no passage” (1994, 
158). It seems that the broad membership that the subjectile invites, presents the 
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opportunity to introduce the drawing into a lively and diversely inhabited field, 
where, because the surface becomes an object of acute interest, as well as being 
acutely interested, the possibility of maintaining a concise rapport between figure 
and ground is no longer tenable or useful.  
 
Derrida does not build on the categorical proposition here, though he entertains 
the possibility in a later work, Paper Machine (2005) where he recognises a 
reducible schema for surface structures, suggesting, in the form of a question, a 
typological congruence: “Behind these specific determinations (the support made 
of skin, or the paper, or other ones too), beyond or before them, might there be a 
sort of general, even quasi-transcendental structure?” (2005, 52). He asks 
whether, when we designate “paper” we are naming that material specifically, or 
alluding to this “quasi-transcendental” type “whose function could be guaranteed 
by any other ‘body’ or ‘surface,’ provided that it shared some characteristics with 
‘paper’…(corporeality, extension in space, the capacity to receive impressions, 
and so on)?” (2005, 52). Derrida’s proposition that paper and the landscape of 
the mind – the quasi-transcendental structure – might be categorically related, 
draws attention to the significance of the abstraction of surfaces from bodies. For 
rather than equating the self with depths, we might begin to consider the 
operations of surfaces as indicative of subjectivity, whose various abilities to 
absorb, hold and resist typify their relations with and within the world. 
 
The treachery that Artaud ascribes to the subjectile, is the treachery of Earth in 
conflict with world, that is, the materials overtaking his intention. Why he does 
not tolerate it is perhaps more mysterious than the subjectile itself, except to 
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acknowledge that with the disruption of figure and ground, the order of the world 
and subjective authority are thrown into disarray. Yet surely, if we are to 
understand, through Derrida’s inquiry, that the subjectile is the subject-object of 
the drawing as surface matter, because of its power of assertion as well as its 
function of support, then betrayal might become, instead, shared agency. Such is 
the relationship, I would argue, between marks and paper in Kiki Smith’s series 
of four drawings, Born  from 2001.  
 
These works are made with drawing ink and Nepal paper, pieced together in 
patches, forming an outer perimeter that escapes the formal rigidity of 
manufactured sheets. The naked female figure, in three of these, emerges 
alarmed, though yielding to life, from the birth canal of a delicate doe. The 
woman is drawn lightly, across the lower third of the horizontal patchwork, the 
under contour of her body opening to rather than on the skin-like paper.  Or, I 
could say, the paper is the skin. For while the doe is quite isolated, floating 
distinct from the surface – a tattoo – the human figure emerges in the continuity 
of creases, joins and wrinkles. The three objects together form a cycle of 
connectivity, where the parent figure, the doe, is an emblem on the skin of the 
woman-neonate, who, in turn, emerges from this emblem into her own skin. This 
skin-paper asserts its binding power over the whole assemblage, reflecting the 
artist’s view that “everything is related to everything else” (Becker 2001, 32).  
 
The fourth drawing shows only the woman, pushing up to the limits of the frame, 
facing us and floating in a soft, upward, horizontal arc in direct proportion to the 
paper (figure 16). Yet while the figure curves upwards, pressing the extremities 
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into the top corners, the paper itself arcs firmly the other way, exerting a 
counterforce that makes it quite clear this paper is no passive support, no 
invisible background. The impressive scale of these works – between two and a 
half and three metres long – suggests that this skin / paper, could more than 
adequately be mapped onto an uncommonly large adult. The open lines of the 
figure, the skin-like quality of the paper and the format of the drawing object, 
together form an assemblage between whose parts there is no clear definition.  
 
 
Figure 16. Kiki Smith, 2001. Born. Ink on Nepal paper. From: Reinhardt (Ed.) 2001.Kiki Smith. 
Ostfildern Ruit: Hatje Cantz. P.78 
 
In What is Philosophy? Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari identify a zone of 
indiscernibility or indetermination as “something passing from one to 
another…as if things, beasts, and persons endlessly reach that point that 
immediately precedes their natural differentiation” (1994, 173). This, they assert, 
is “an affect” (ibid). Drawing on this notion of a zone of indiscernibility, I 
suggest it is the approach between ink figure and paper figure – their near 
difference and their near unity – that helps explains the affective presence of 
Smith’s drawings. The drawings open those affective reaches, where one thing 
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passes into another, human into animal, and material into sensation. I suggest, 
however, that the interchangeability of ground and figure in these works affords 
not an antagonism or tension between one and the other, but a dimension of 
support and concern. Fluid and indefinable as the parts of an embrace, ground 
and figure express and exchange their action through a gesture of mutual or 
reciprocal care. Thus where Heidegger has defined conflict as the condition of 
truth, through Kiki Smith’s drawings, we might hazard the claim that care 
assumes that status. If the term seems too agentive, too emotionally invested to 
have any traction with the non-sentient objects under discussion, we might just as 
soon consider the same liberties at play with Heidegger’s use of conflict. If it is 
possible to imagine the two-part system of earth and world endlessly playing out 
within the tension of conflict, equally it is possible to imagine them developing 
mutual visibility through an analogy of care, support or empathy.  
 
3.5 The expanded field of drawing 
To a great extent the expanding field of drawing in the 20th and 21st centuries was 
addressed towards the constraints of surface, limiting the spectacular gestural 
possibilities of line. The 2010 MoMA drawing survey exhibition, On Line 
convincingly demonstrates how in the twentieth century drawing made a logical 
break with surface altogether, particularly during the 1960s, to move into a fully 
spatial context with artists such as Richard Tuttle, Gego, Karel Malich and more 
recently Zilvanas Kempinas, producing exceptional line drawings in space. In her 
catalogue essay Catherine de Zegher identifies a moment when “leaving the 
surface and thus escaping surface tension” (de Zegher 2010, 34), line was freed 
to make an extension it had long craved. As de Zegher points out, extension takes 
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its meaning from ex-tension (ibid), thus associating this move with a fortuitous 
growth spurt and easing of restrictions. Equally, the exhibition included 
examples from contemporary dance, notably Ann Teresa de Keersmaeker (in de 
Zegher 2010, 90, 91) and Trisha Brown (ibid., 192, 193). The works represented 
by these two veterans of choreographic innovation, demonstrate the inclination 
of the curators to define drawing by its gesture and its trace. The suggestion 
pervading the exhibition is that anything foregrounding line can be designated as 
drawing. While this generous acknowledgement expands the field almost beyond 
definition, surface has tended to remain, for the most part, the silent partner, if 
not the enemy of drawing’s expansion; that from which line takes flight, or 
against which it performs.  
 
3.5.1 Dorothea Rockburne: the transference of thought 
There are significant exceptions to this. Issuing from the “optical flatness” of 
expressionist painting (see Joselit, 2000, 22), minimalist and post-minimalist 
drawing began to pare back the marks and pigment to reveal the surface material. 
By the 1960s, the painting and drawing substrate had begun a dizzying ascent, 
away from not only spatial depth, but from supportive obscurity, to the place 
where mark and surface mingle. In the 1970s Dorothea Rockburne produced 
works, still identifiable as drawings, that are a reminder of a profoundly different 
set of tensions, gestures and ontological assumptions, by treating surface not as 
something to be overcome, but as something to be regarded as a wellspring 
(figure 17). In her series Locus (1972) there is a mutual revealing of line and 
paper, an informing of one through the other such that, like Smith’s drawings, 
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though in a more geometrically idiomatic way, creates a reciprocal holding, since 
there is a precise balance and interdependence between lines and surface.  
 
In 1974, Rockburne articulated a series of questions and propositions that set out 
to explore this fascination. Of these, one proposed to “[c]onstruct an 
investigation of drawing which is based on information contained within the 
paper and not on any other information” and another, indicating the synthesis of 
the mark and the marked in the drawing, suggested that “[i]t seems reasonable 
that paper acting upon itself through subject imposed translations could become a 
subject-object” (Rockburne quoted in Lovatt 2007, 39, 40). Rockburne’s thesis 
regarding information and thought parallels my own, concerning care. For 
Rockburne, thought gets into the drawing as information, which thereafter 
becomes that by which the drawing gives of itself. Bruce Boice has interpreted 
Rockburne’s information transference theory in this way: “The information 
contained in a work by its being a product of the artist’s thought and intention, is 
retrieved from the work by experiencing ‘the evidence of intention’” (Boice, 
1973). My point is that the words “information” “thought” and “intention” could 
be replaced by “care” to arrive at the exchange of empathic interest between 
artist, work and beholder, in the way that thought and information are exchanged 
for Rockburne.  
 
For Rockburne, information is that by which the drawing gives of itself, because 
it is information by which it has been given (Boice, 1973), similar to the way in 
which I have argued that the work gives of itself as the care that has entered the 
work in the making. Beginning in 1971 and developed under the title Drawing 
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which makes itself (ibid.), Rockburne’s work generated  a mutual “givingness” 
between the terms of the drawing. Lovatt alludes to this, referring to Rockburne’s 
carbon paper works, in recognising that “the traditionally passive surface of the 
paper thus acted upon the customarily active pencil, producing the line, which it 
then received” (Lovatt, 2007, 41).  
 
Figure 17. Dorothea Rockburne, 1972. Locus. Series of 6, etching, aquatint, folded paper. Each 
one 101 X 76.4cm. Available from CaiLun.info, 2008. http://cailun.info/archives/314-MoMA-
Sightings-Part3.html. Accessed March 12, 2014 
 
3.5.2 Lucio Fontana: canvas surface and the finite infinite 
Once surface folds or crumples, and shimmies forth as an object of substance, its 
boundedness to the wall maintains, nevertheless, an invisible and a visible side, 
so that this other side, the shadow side, becomes a question or a problem in 
considering the ontology of the surface object. Lucio Fontana’s Tagli paintings 
of which he made no less that 1512 in the decade between 1958 and 1968 
(Gottschaller 2012, 58) most emphatically bring the two sides into play through 
the idiosyncratic slashes that he made, either singularly or in series, into the taut 
drum of the stretched canvas. Fontana used the canvas surface as a penetrable 
membrane, slashing and puncturing it, rendering line and point as direct effects 
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of surface tension. Contrary to this material functioning of the works, Fontana 
intended his Concetti Spaziale  as a “way of making the viewer look beyond the 
physical fact of the painting to what [he] was to call ‘free space’” (Whitfield 
1999, 14). Fontana claimed the gashes and holes in the paintings, or, as he liked 
to call them, spatial concepts, “introduced a dimension beyond the painting 
itself” (Fontana quoted in Whitfield, 1999, 122).  
 
 
Figure 18. Lucio Fontana, having made a Taglio. 1965 (Photo, Ugo Mulas. In Gotschaller, 2012, 
p.73) 
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The semiotic reading that Whitfield and Fontana give to the cut, that it “stands 
for the idea of a space without physical boundaries” (Whitfield 1999, 14) 
undermines, I believe, the actual effect of these physical blows in raising the 
surface to attention, and subtly alluding to the twin sides of this elegantly 
yielding object. It also effectively avoids the subjective revelation that the twin 
sides reveal, as I shall discuss in a moment. The works seem to be less about 
space, and more about the material substance of the surface object, in its 
perpetual state of both tension and release. Indeed Fontana went to some lengths 
and great care to achieve the sense of the infinite space that so intrigued him. In 
most of the Tagli, Fontana finished the work by applying a strip of black gauze to 
the reverse of the cut, effectively firming the gash, so that it would not slacken, 
but also to close the visual access to the wall beyond and fabricate a sense of the 
“imaginary Infinite” (Gottschaller 2012, 87). The reverse faces of these works 
appear even more intriguing when we learn that, from 1959 onwards, Fontana 
would often inscribe them with both his signature at the top, and various phrases 
“sometimes playful, sometimes banal” (Gottschaller 2012, 89). They would 
include mentions of “friends, visitors, his dog Blek, trips to embark on, political 
events, chores to do or expressions of sentiment” (ibid).  
 
Compare these day-to-day musings with the stated intention of his works: “to 
bring, filtered through consciousness, the dark void of infinite space” 
(Gotschaller 2012, 19). Elsewhere we read that the works signaled “an existential 
sense of possibility and expectation in the present moment: the moment as an 
ontological opening into the spaciousness of Being” (ibid., 60), echoing the 
notions of disclosure and possibility discussed above. The quotidian and 
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reflective, the human and the mystical seem to be attributable to one side and the 
other of the canvas, so that we must ask what it was that Fontana meant by this. 
If there is a pulse in these works, it is that which moves between the 
contemplated and the lived, world and earth, outward surface and concealed. 
Fontana, in his keenly fastidious approach, would never allow the day-to-day to 
fall into the work. Instead, it plays out on the other side, as if to say, this is not an 
infinite space at all, rather it is that which is here and now, amid the cares and 
concerns of life lived.  
 
In writing about these works – the Hein manuscripts, as revealed through 
Lamarre’s study, Smith’s and Rockburne’s drawings that eliminate the figure-
ground distinction, though in very different ways, Fontana’s twin occupancy of 
the finite and infinite, and Artaud’s gnawing sense of betrayal by the surface of a 
drawing – I have concentrated on the ways in which marks are implicated with 
their substrate, suggesting the use value of surface is given over to a mutual 
holding, between surface and marks. While the notion of care may seem, again, 
too agentive to ascribe to the relations between materials, or parts of a work of 
art, I have suggested that it is no more so than the idea of conflict, in the way 
Heidegger assigns it to the struggle that sustains the dynamics of truth in matter, 
or the way in which Rockburne regards the activation of thought and information 
in the drawing. They are not so very different, but they interpret the relation 
differently. Where conflict is the struggle to assert, care is the relation that gives 
mutual access, that affords an elaborated presence. In the light of this study of 
surface materials and their special affordances of care and mediation, in the 
following section I wish to relate these observations to the self, and, with the 
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support of Michel Serres’ and Gaston Bachelard’s material metaphors, suggest a 
surface ontology to the human subject. In keeping with the notion of the 
particular, this section is divided between the actions of soft and hard surfaces. 
 
3.6   Speculations on a surface ontology  
3.6.1  The special case of cloth 
In Michel Serres’ book The Five Senses (2008), fabric is likened to a skin, but 
with topological autonomy from the depths of the body. Sense comes alive when 
“skin tissue folds upon itself. By itself the skin takes on consciousness” (Serres 
2008, 155). Here is an opening onto a recognition of the shared ontology of the 
self and surface objects, in this case, fabric. I would also suggest that when the 
skin / fabric is held in check, for instance, by way of a rigid frame, as in 
Fontana’s works, then this possibility of folding is inhibited and the lateral 
partitioning prevails. It provokes me to suggest that for Fontana, the canvas 
stretcher served not only as a convenient and familiar support, but behaved 
perfectly to maintain the partition between the infinite and the finite imperatives 
of his own consciousness.  
 
Like Michel Serres, Gilles Deleuze uses the image of fabric to show, in his 
analysis of Leibniz in The fold (1991), how innate knowledge responds to the 
demands of matter, sending “vibrations or oscillations” into the cloth of the soul: 
“a darkened compartment or study, furnished only with a stretched cloth 
‘diversified by folds,’ like the bottom layer of skin exposed” (ibid., 228). Like 
the tribal cloth that mediates heaven and earth, as we saw in Schneider and 
Weiner (1986), and in Serres’ earlier reference to cloth as an image of 
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communication, Deleuze recognises in the bridging membrane, special mediating 
qualities, in ripples and folds, positioned within the strange architecture of the 
Leibnezian soul. 
 
I wish to complete the contextual review in this exegesis with a reference to 
works by artist Judith Kentish, which exemplify the notion of surface material, 
specifically fabric, as analogous with the self. Although I am thinking mainly of 
her cloth works, a quote from Elizabeth Ruinard’s (1997) catalogue essay for 
Kentish’s exhibition, Blindfolds, establishes a concise link to the ideas and 
speculations discussed above. Observing in Kentish’s drawings a submerging of 
the body into space, she suggests that “the subject slipping out of form and its 
vertigo might also be a point from which we might capture a glimpse of the soul” 
(Ruinard, 1997). It is the skin, freed from determination, its draping formal-
formlessness, that produces this sense in the cloth works also. The skin without 
body delivers the self from the identifications of form, to take on the qualities of 
“as-if”. As if the self, in its ability to take in the world, and give it out as 
expression, were the ever moving folds of cloth. Corroborating Ruinard’s 
interpretation, Michele Helmrich states without hesitation the shared genealogy 
of surface object and the self: “The cloth, the parchment, the page, becomes or 
stands for the psyche, the self” (Helmrich, 2007), echoing Derrida’s earlier 
contention that a quasi-transcendental object precedes the material 
determinations of paper. This seems apt, whether in reference to the series Dark 
sacs (2005) or the stained, worn shrouds that are the earthy skins of the series 
Mappa (2006).  
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Figure 19. Judith Kentish, 2006. Parchment #7. Natural dyes, cotton voile, bleach, 110 X 260cm. 
(Photograph by Carl Warner). From the exhibition “Judith Kentish: Mappa II”, University of 
Queensland Art Museum, August 25 – September 23, 2007. Available from 
http://judithkentish.com/mappa-ii/parchment-7. Accessed May 20, 2015. 
 
These last works achieve, it seems, a synthesis of earth and body, suggesting the 
topological fluidity of the skin disencumbered from the determinations of form. 
It is significant that the colouration Kentish brings to these skin / cloth objects, is 
applied through lengthy processes of dying. For it is in the dying, that new depths 
are found in the seemingly thin body of the cloth. Gaston Bachelard recognises 
the interiority that dyes seek out, applied to receptive surfaces: “We immediately 
sense that colour is surface’s seduction while dye is the truth of the depths” 
(2011, 25). As dye penetrates, it seeks out the qualities of a material, expresses 
itself in a will to know, to reach into and to be thoroughly held. Neither lingering 
on the surface nor falling rapidly through, dye, like care, does its work in time, 
with a sort of interest in its host fabric, that in turn shows interest by holding, 
spreading and keeping the dye within its fibre. In these works, the natural dyes 
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are given weeks to find their way into the depths of the cotton voile, steeping 
long days and nights in an iron pot (Helmrich, 2007), while “[t]he artist ‘tends’ 
the brew, without contriving the results” (ibid). Beyond the dying, the works that 
make up the Mappa II, of which Parchment #7 (figure 19) is representative, have 
further undergone the inquiry of bleach, as the artist applies it in small dots, and 
allows it to do its work “at the structural level of the fibre” (Kentish cited from 
telephone conversation, May 24, 2015). 
 
The “proof of time and being” that Kentish says of her work (UQ Art Museum, 
2007) is as much in the meticulous touching of the surface as it is in the body 
that has laboured in touching. Of the intricate stitching in the works comprising 
Comforter – long pillow-like objects, covered in fine dark bands of meticulous 
hand stitching and filled compactly with human hair – Daniel Mafé writes: 
“Patient, involved, endless in repetition of minute difference. Each moment 
registered. Each moment touched, by the hand” (Mafé, 2010). Proof of time and 
being happens in this reciprocity of touch between hand onto fabric, fabric onto 
hand. Beyond the temporal rhythms of stitching and marking and the temporal 
duration of steeping – as in the natural pigment dyes - Kentish has considered 
these fabric works, speaking specifically of the Mappa series, as swathing the 
lifespan: “Swaddling cloths bind the new born; winding sheets wrap the body for 
burial” (Helmrich, 2007). As I behold these works, I am aware of their calm 
imperative to perform the skin’s work, on the skin’s behalf. 
 
The cloth works are both testament and index of the touching touched, of the 
folding together of planes of matter and consciousness, of the moving stillness of 
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time, whose greatest offspring is the minutiae of difference. The fold, and its 
topological fluidity between interior and exterior, the absorbency that finds 
depths in the extent rather than the bulk of a thing, define the being of cloth as 
the being of the subject. This subject does not stand opposed to or outside the 
world, but enfolds with it, and absorbs, integrates, regards the patterns of time, 
rather than wears them like decorations on the surface of a disinterested skin. If 
the self can be read in terms of the surface object of cloth, what of the surface 
object that does not fold, but none the less maintains twin sides, such as walls 
and doors? Do these differ only by degrees of fluidity, or are they ontologically 
dissimilar? What are the mediating principles of these more rigid structures that 
can be said of subjectivity.  
 
3.6.2  A special case of walls and doors 
“The fall of walls, the bursting of doors, the dissolution of the skin’s walls, the 
dissipation of bars, this is what the loving-beloved brings us” (Cixous 2005, 98). 
In Cixous’ evocation, the familial ties between walls and skin are resoundingly 
clear. The surface that is shattered falls complicit with, not in opposition to the 
affirmation of life and love that bridges the too much and the not enough, the 
dialectic signature of care. Walls fall and break not just to open a space, but for 
the very joy of bursting the doors, letting cracks relieve the secrets and silence of 
mortar, letting skin fall free of determination. The loving-beloved that breeches 
these thresholds, might also be given as the artist-beholder.  
 
Walls, doors, ceilings and floors avail themselves to the structure of the human 
cosmos in ways that suggest more than a functional correspondence between the 
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house and its inhabitant. To this extent, their narrow substance, and their 
dialectic purpose of interiorising and exteriorising as well as their ability to open 
and close are key points of congruence. It is not that walls forever exclude, but 
that they are necessary to the hinging of doors and windows, intermittently 
allowing issue, and thus, variously open and closed: the respiratory rhythm of 
surfaces, elevated from the ground. As Joseph Amato has observed of the 
surrounding walls of old cities and towns: “Walls were the epidermis of a city – 
the living and respiring skin of an organism breathing in and out” (Amato 2013, 
81). In their capacity to bear up to the elements, they also transport and translate 
weather, so that rain on a roof is not the same substance as rain on the porous 
ground; heat is absorbed into the shallow body of the wall and restrained 
between ceiling and roof. Like the skin of a drum, these surfaces mediate through 
a combination of resistance and absorption, deflecting the impact outward and 
inward, transporting to the inside a world not so much explained as poeticized.  
 
The double articulation of the wall – mediating the elements through a poetic 
filter – forms the basis for an intricate puzzle of openings and closures that 
Gaston Bachelard attributes to being (human). While Bachelard does not refer to 
walls explicitly, it is clearly implied throughout his Poetics of space, where the 
imagination draws upon architectural form in the figuring of self. He writes:  
 
The phenomenology of the poetic imagination allows us to explore 
the being of man [sic] considered as the being of a surface, of the 
surface that separates the region of the same from the region of the 
other…Then, on the surface of being, in that region where being 
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wants to be both visible and hidden, the movements of opening and 
closing are so numerous, so frequently inverted, and so charged with 
hesitation, that we could conclude the following formula: man is 
half-open being. (Bachelard 1994, 222)  
 
Through this image of being that is not only likened to an architectural 
counterpart, but takes on its essential structure, the human subject can be seen to 
dwell in and as a dialectic of the open and closed, without the need to resolve any 
ambiguity. For Bachelard, resolution of opposites is not achieved in synthesis, 
but in the vibratory expression of difference “in which ambiguous being 
expresses itself as ambiguous being, as the being that has dual expression” 
(Bachelard, 2011, 61). The simultaneity that charges the open and closed surface, 
of interior and exterior, is the ambiguity that makes being active rather than 
caught in the stasis of identity. Relevant to this discussion, is George Kalamaras’ 
observation that paradox “possesses this peculiar capacity to make ‘everything 
come alive’ not by establishing experience as contradictory; rather through the 
use of apparent contradiction, it conjures a condition of reciprocity” (Kalamaras 
1994, 153). 
 
3.7    Implications and conclusion 
In his book, Paper machine, Derrida dismisses the idea of paper as “an inert 
surface laid out beneath some markings, a substratum meant for sustaining them, 
for ensuring their survival or subsistence.” (2005, 42). His criticism appears to 
have its ethical foundations in the equation of the paper with the human subject: 
If the paper is merely substratum, beneath, submissive and subject to, then it 
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would have to be said of subjectivity in general (ibid., 43). The tendency to 
regard the page in this way has been documented in this chapter, largely by 
reviewing works that, I have argued, make a claim to the contrary.  However, the 
legacy of Kandinsky, for whom the picture plane mirrored a tabula rasa 
perception of the human subject, still has traction. Kandinsky saw the picture 
plane existing “as a blank autonomous reality, like a living being” (Henry and 
Davidson 2009, 58). The seventeenth century figure of John Locke comes closest 
to suggesting a coincidence between the paper surface, as a drawing support, and 
human consciousness with the notion of tabula rasa: “Let us then suppose the 
mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters…” (Locke 1836, 51). 
This abiding image of consciousness, as much as this image of text, or the 
drawing, or, more generally, of the relationship of foundations with that which is 
founded, relies upon a profound disinterest between the two terms. Dependence, 
yes, but interest or concern, decidedly not.  
 
Nevertheless, when surfaces are allowed to respond to and participate in their 
inscriptions and markings, as in the crumpled skins of Kiki Smith’s Born 
drawings, the creases in Rockburne’s Locus series, the dyes in Kentish’s Mappa, 
– admittedly, just several examples out of many –  I suggest that the dialogue 
between the terms alters significantly, to become one of reciprocation. Heidegger 
provides the premise for considering the relationship between earth and world as 
one of interest. However, where Heidegger sees this interest, or what he calls 
truth, as something arising in conflict, I have considered it as a condition of care. 
Meaning arises as the mutual and reciprocal interest between materials: the dye 
seeks out the depths of fabric, while fabric receives and holds the dye.  The 
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creases of the page have no argument with the lines that define a figure, but 
meaning emerges as each reaches toward the other. The reference to care in these 
terms suggests that what we might generally think of as care, has much to do 
with the responsive faculties we possess, and the triggers that compel us to act. If 
there is a mutual affordance, access or what I would call interest between the 
terms, then care as a dialectic and reciprocal action not only holds the parts 
together but enlivens them. 
 
In this chapter I began with a background context for the study, linking it to my 
own education in traditional methods of drawing and a sense of awkwardness 
experienced in that situation. In moments of awkwardness or ineptitude, the 
“ground”, otherwise unnoticed as it functions merely as support, rises up to assert 
itself as active. While awkwardness was overcome with practice and increasing 
control, the early malfunction of the hand and eye opened up other possibilities. 
For the purposes of this research, the object that opened up, that became different 
and suggested other possibilities, was the drawing surface, reasserting itself as an 
agentive and articulate object. From the recognition of the drawing surface as an 
affective agent, I explored the figure-ground assemblage, mostly in terms of 
drawing but also relating it to a broader ontological discourse, referring to Martin 
Heidegger and Jean-Luc Nancy.  
 
Care was seen to inhere between the parts of the work as well as being that which 
circulates between artist, work and viewer. I showed the functioning of this in 
drawings by Kiki Smith, Dorothea Rockburne and Lucio Fontana. In works by 
Judith Kentish the objects themselves, in their references to the body as binding 
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cloths, evoked even more specifically a sense of tenderness and care. The use of 
dyes within this context was seen to produce an internal interest between the 
parts of the work – dye and cloth and stitch and mark. Finally, in this chapter, I 
have situated the terms of the research within an ontological framework, 
suggesting that the surface provides an analogous structure for subjectivity. 
Gaston Bachelard has been a key referent here. Bachelard posits the subject as a 
surface that operates within the dialectic of the open and closed. Rather than 
creating limitations through possible paradox, the dialectic structure, even the 
ambiguous structure of being,  maintains the necessary dynamics for reciprocity.  
In the following chapter I will begin to document the ways in which the studio 
practice contributed to these speculations regarding the actions of care and their 
implications with surface materials. While many of the final creative resolutions, 
those that respond to the question most purposefully, make, as I have indicated, a 
departure from drawing, the key moments, observations and changes in the 
drawing practice require documenting here.  
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CHAPTER 4  
THE CREATIVE WORKS: FROM MARK ON SURFACE  
TO SURFACE AS MARK  
The creative work that gave impetus and meaning to the arguments and 
speculations presented in the previous two chapters issued from a practice that 
adopted a deliberately singular starting point: exploring increasingly small marks 
on increasingly large paper. While I have no intention to document here all the 
works and processes that pushed toward the outcomes that are – for the most part 
– presented in the exhibition, The murmur of surfaces, the methodological 
approach to this research means that neither processes nor beginnings are distinct 
from artefacts and endpoints. Thus I will examine and discuss the links from 
marks on paper to folds in space showing a credible translation that issues from 
questions concerned with the drawing as a substantial object. The first section 
takes a close lens to the incidental gestures of the practice, the asides where, in 
notebooks and on scraps of paper, I became aware of a different interaction 
between surfaces and marks. The extended appendix will form a relevant 
accompaniment to this chapter, particularly 1 and 4, though I do not refer to their 
pages specifically.  
4.1 Griffics > gardens > map and land 
The word griffic may be more descriptive than doodle, in naming those small 
inscriptions conceived in a state of disinterested rapture, or even by accident 
(figure 16). The French word “griffe”, meaning both a scratching – by claw for 
instance – and a signature, brings together two contrary intentions that the doodle 
fails to register. For example, to scratch or to claw suggests an impulse to 
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remove, whilst the signature is a singular testimony to presence. So I am 
referring here to drawings and inscriptions whose familiar traces appear to invite 
reading, while in every other way they withdraw from sense: words get invented; 
images collapse into marks; ink leeches through the shallow surface of a page, 
delivering unintended messages to the other side (figures 17, 18). Griffics 
breathe through the medium of a surface, both held and dispersed by the page. 
But also they are defined and conjured forth by the page that links in proximity, 
apparently alien thoughts and inventions, compelling them to mutual 
consideration or interest.  
 
Figure 20. Sharon Jewell, 2011. Griffics on the back of a notebook.  
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Figure 21. Sharon Jewell, 2014. Drawings on the recto, provide the imprecise information for 
drawings on the verso. 
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Figure 22. Sharon Jewell, 2014. Another verso drawing 
 
Unlike the drawing that begins with good clean paper and, with the first mark, 
establishes the role of the ground against which the figure is animated, the griffic 
assumes the qualitative presence of the ground. This, also, characterises the 
chattering voices of the notebooks that were a constant source of invention, 
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disclosure, reminder, experiment and collaboration. Ideas are allowed a freedom 
of association in notebooks that is unacceptable in the formal text, and yet to 
translate their murmurings – native to the surfaces where they generate – is to 
exchange sense for reason (see figure 19. The list-like form of short phrases, free 
to wander without being overly anchored by prepositions, suggestiveness rather 
than explication, freedom of association, weeds as well as cultivated species, is 
what typifies the notebook.). In the notebook the pages both contain and are their 
content, generated by proximity of localised, isolated thoughts, caught like 
crazed moths in the ambit of an incandescent light. A notebook is an 
incandescent light, drawing in fragments of coherence, torn away from the steady 
flow of a logical world. Together, they make rather than find their own patterns 
and partners in reason.  
 
Figure 23. Sharon Jewell, 2013. Notebook page. 
Through the notebooks, it is possible to trace the tenacity of particular 
fascinations, and the redundancy of others. When I go through my notebooks, I 
scan them like scenery. One arbitrary passage haunting another, I hear them 
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whispering in grey graphite dialect, from the yellow folds of thin paper. I feel the 
cramped conditions of words, pushing up against page edges like crowds gathered 
on precipitous rims. The notebook is a machine that produces certain conditions 
for thinking. My tendency to often use a very pale graphite, means that the 
rubbing together of pages sometimes clouds the marks, smears words to almost 
audible slurs, conspiratorially creating ambiguity and uncertainty. Such ambiguity 
becomes a fertile soil for the generation of new species, and at some point, lacing 
through the terrain of pages, like some form of elaborate punctuation outweighing 
the words it seeks to inflect, the Bowen knot emerges. (figures 20, 21).  
 
The Bowen knot is a square whose corners are looped but left open at one end to 
connect with the next and the next. Germinated in the notebooks, I give them free 
reign on larger paper, where they rotate into spirals, squash into concertina-like 
folds, and eventually fracture into atomised particles that swarm amid the wider 
cast of large looped nets (figures 22, 23, 24). My Bowen knots stretch and 
collapse, cartwheel and careen off in uncontained abandon, until they meet the 
borders of the page. There is no organising principle by which these works 
emerge, no critical strategy to ensure a compositional logic. Like forest vegetation 
the drawing grows where it can: it strangles and struggles, collaborates when 
inclined, sends out, sends up, buds and spawns. These drawings do not proceed 
by codes, but by cadences, each one a record of a momentary topological 
organisation in a changing field.   
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Figures 24, 25. Sharon Jewell. Notebooks, 2012. Bowen knots 
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In photographing these works, I find that the details maintained this dynamic 
intensity, whilst in the image of the whole work, resolution and containment 
become the dominant forces. This can be explained by the boundaries of the page, 
a reminder that the world contained therein is an imagined one, and that pictorial 
space and paper are not involved in the same game. Yet as I work my way across 
them, I am not aware of this treachery. For I draw up close, myopically close, so 
that rather than prefiguring the trajectory of lines on my page, or the layout of 
shapes, my narrow visual field moves as the marks move. Every mark is 
localised, every line inscribes its own locale and its own value; even where they 
intersect a cloud of atomised marks, the lines move in their own current, their 
own stream. The drawing is this bustling of self-interested growth. The drawing is 
simultaneously an unwieldy sheet of heavy, cream-white paper, exerting a 
palpable force away from the wall at the fastened corners and edges: light, 
disorderly and multiple on the level of the marks; heavy, muscular and singular, 
at the level of the paper. These two properties, I find, are irreconcilable in a way 
that was never a problem when the griffics populated the lowly digs of notebooks 
and napkins.  
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Figure 26. Sharon Jewell, 2012. Growth without pattern or design 5 (detail). Pen and ink on 
Fabriano paper. 150 X 100cm 
 
 
 
Figure 27. Sharon Jewell, 2012. Growth without pattern or design 4 (detail). Pen and ink on 
Fabriano paper. 150 X 100cm 
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Figure 28. Sharon Jewell, 2012. Growth without pattern or design 3. 150 X 100cm 
 
While material bulk and weight of the paper is one way of recognising the 
demands of the surface object, the other is scale. Why is it that, with an increase 
in scale – increased to dimensions against which I am able to move, to traverse, to 
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be far from the edges – an accompanying diminution in the marks seems 
inevitable? The surface can never be large enough, because any possibility of 
continuity will always be betrayed by four edges. The marks can never be small 
enough because, beyond the length of a comma, a dust particle, an apostrophe, 
they want to describe, to assert some influence, give directions. The signature 
variety of the Growth without pattern or design drawings thus dissolves, to be 
overtaken by two terms only: that which is, though barely and small; and that 
which is not, though large and total (figure 25). Marks now reduce to the textural 
hum of the paper, and the lines become a memory, ghosts of structure, as though 
roots have been pulled from the ground and left their trace, or the tunnels of 
worms have been exposed. In the wake of line, surface murmurs through. The 
lines are the memory of a movement without a clear recollection of the thing that 
moved.  
 
If the garden drawings were myopic, these larger, smaller ones are doubly so. My 
whole body becomes a symptom of shortsightedness, with the pen feeling out 
both ridge and grain of the paper. I bend and lean into the drawing, perch atop a 
ladder, squat low on a cushion, and travel at snail’s pace across this surface that 
both appears and disappears beneath the marks. It is not these marks, however, 
these little gnats and microbes, that beckon, and that represent the labour. Just as 
gardeners do not principally toil with plants, but work the earth, the imperative in 
these drawings comes from the surface: a very particular soil, demanding a 
particular approach. On close inspection, ground is not the singular, unified 
whole beneath the active and multiple marks or vigour and variety of growth, but 
is charged with its own internal differences. Likewise recognising the agency of 
ground, Matthew Tiessen (2007) proposes that the earth is the motivating force 
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in the making of desire lines. He suggests “desire lines are the product of an earth 
– a natural environment – that desires us”, reversing the agency of the inscriptive 
act. He then establishes the partnership between surface and maker in this way: 
“To trace a line, then, is to respond to an invitation, to accept that a particular 
trajectory has been revealed” (ibid, par. 2). The revealing rather than marking of 
the map, is to recognise the prior motivation of a ground from which the traveler 
takes up the suggestion. 
 
The sprawl of paper lays out its commands as I stand before it. Taking my 
directives from this authority, the authority of the ground, I move in close, and in 
this way the drawing avoids being reduced to the perimeter, taken merely as a 
dictate for composition, but maintains its material presence at every stroke so that 
from time to time, I am surprised to come up against an edge. In its minutiae, the 
surface expands exponentially; in the smallness of its parts, it is the shimmer of 
snow or sand, when these surfaces are seen to be countless glistening particles, 
and not at all a single blanket of whiteness.  
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4.2        The horizontal surface 
As long as the drawing clings to the wall, we share the same axial determinants, 
and thus remain parallel, rather than intersecting. The hand and arm form a 
movable bridge between the drawing and the body but this only serves to 
highlight the rift. Furthermore to this symmetry of limitations, the wall of the 
studio to which the drawing is attached, renders it complicit in the act of 
enclosure. In sum, as long as this drawing remains wall bound, I will come up 
against it as a boundary, and as bounded. So, as I remove the staples, one by one 
and the paper yields to its own internal memory, it flings from the wall with all 
the drama of a sail broken from its mast, and flops about me with alarming 
presence, all its silent flatness now erupting into noisy and imposing folds. I 
struggle to keep it aloft of the dusty floor, and guide it awkwardly to the table 
(figure 30) where it finds an  earthy repose, well suited to its weight. Here its 
edges can curl slightly away from the table surface, lifting upward with a 
muscular ease, as the ponderous table pulls ever downward (figures 31, 48).  
 
Figure 30. The muscle and weight of paper, 2014. (Photograph by Mark Weiss) 
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Figure 31. Sharon Jewell, 2012. Tracks dissolving in a drift, 2, detail. Pen on paper. 229 X 147cm. 
studio table (Photograph by Sharon Jewell). 
 
Once orientated horizontally, landscape becomes land, co-extensive with the 
world of things, where a complex of air currents, sounds, dust and cat move 
seamlessly between drawing surface and the ground that laps at its edges. Life 
passes across the horizontal, where it tends to slip off the vertical. Furthermore, 
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the axial determination that is fundamental to the vertical, bears no relevance in 
this reorientation. Although no longer aligned with my vertical body, the drawing 
is, however, now aligned with the movement of that body across the floor. On 
the horizontal, my mobility is increased, and thus the mobility of the drawing. 
Moving around, sitting within, leaning across, placing upon, gaining a 
topographical advantage only from a limited distance above and across a 
perspectival plane given in real space, demands a process of constant adjustment, 
where interest or care, are manifest through an active material, bodily 
relationship with the drawing, in addition to a concern for the marks that come to 
inhabit it. With this interaction comes a sense that I am dealing not with 
imaginary, diagrammatic or metaphorical space, but with real space, on account 
of and within which, things can happen.  
 
In her practice based dance research, Kim Vincs discovers a similar alteration of 
possibility in shifting the active axis from the vertical (standing body) to the 
horizontal (body prone). In the horizontal position, she observes: “Any part of 
my body can initiate. Any part can take over” (Vincs 2010, 107).  Rebecca Solnit 
has likewise recognised the important difference between the alternate axial 
determinations. In recent landscape photography she notes the tendency to 
incline the camera landward “to the earth, describing not the inhabitable space of 
landscape but the surfaces coextensive with the picture plane, land on its own 
terms” (Solnit 2003, 159).  Perhaps the difference can best be described as a 
move from a subjective view of the land to empathic engagement and concern, 
less mediated by human stature and expectations. A similar randomness and 
topological flexibility opened for me in the drawings, once orientated parallel 
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with the ground. The axial shift not only produces possibility, but redirects the 
interest in the thing perceived.  
 
How do surfaces change when they are horizontally aligned, at, for example, the 
height of a table? Raising or lowering the drawing on the wall alters the 
phenomenological encounter, making the drawing more or less accessible, in 
relation to one’s own body height and visual acuity, but the relationship is of the 
same order: two aligned verticals facing across a gap. Horizontal surfaces imply 
an interaction, dependent on the lay of that surface. For example, floor and table 
each suggest specific types of active encounter and interplay. James Gibson 
stresses the relational qualities of affordances, whereby discrete environmental 
features give of themselves as particular functions to an inhabitant, determined 
largely by scale, and engendering a range of possible behaviours (Gibson 1979, 
127). So it could be said that the surface attached to the wall affords visual 
scanning and contemplation, while the surface inclined to the table, affords a 
different sort of interaction, including perambulation, rather than stasis. With no 
fixed viewing address, the act of looking also becomes an act of making 
meaning, not just conceptually but bodily too. The table, already an object in the 
world, becomes unavoidably present in the work, in a way from which the wall, 
as an inherently background object, withdraws. Parading outward into the room, 
the table offers itself both as an affordance and an obstacle in the viewing and the 
negotiation of the space. And perhaps most importantly, as a horizontal 
proposition, the drawing now presents itself as a place, a contingent field, given 
to the weather and the messiness of things.  
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In the reorientation of the drawing as document / map / object, a question of care 
arises. The surface that looked after itself on the wall, pushed into the still 
peripheries of the space, now is exposed to a litany of dangers: scratches and 
marks from cat paw, the gathering of dust, the spill of liquid or bleaching from 
the sun or lifting by the wind, all of which come down upon it with interested 
appetites. These hazards impose themselves directly upon the paper, which, 
regardless of the graphic marks, inscriptions or gestures, regardless of its value, 
remains a body with a range of allergies, preconditions and sensitivities. Thus in 
the horizontal state, whilst animating its audience, and maintaining a lively axial 
indetermination, it pays for this assertion of agency with the full catalogue of 
ailments and vulnerabilities of any living thing. The drawing in the world, 
solicits an imperative to care. The response to this imperative, however, does not 
remain one of preservation. Possibility becomes convoluted with exigencies. 
Exiled from the wall, the paper moves freely under and into the hand. It has 
certain demands, but its demands are more to do with the release of its multiple 
qualities and possibilities, than the maintenance of a singular one. In the course 
of the creative practice, this simple shift in axis altered everything and set in 
motion the layered considerations of the dialectic functions of care.  
 
4.3 Motivated ground: Cartography and pale-ontology 
Scrunching, crumpling, pleating, twisting and delving into paper produces a 
mutual interest between the two sides of the page, and thus the marks made with, 
rather than on the surface are interested, are invested in the being of the surface 
object. The large Map works were made by joining squares of tracing paper 
along a thin edge, to create a nine square gridded plane (figures 28, 29). Working 
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on the floor, and seated in the midst of the paper, accidental tears were countered 
with deliberate ones that became white line scars in the mending. Sometimes 
islands formed; sometimes rift lines, contours and creases and pleats left as traces 
of curiosity. Working my way across the plane with sharp pleats and easy 
ruptures, the paper became an abstracted land, a geosophical artefact where the 
residual lines of force became delicate seams, flows, fractures and streams, 
witnessed from a great distance, from where, like the distant view of earth, 
torment appears as delicate as lace.  
 
If the Maps were suggestive of the cartographer in the act of revealing the land, 
then the small series of works, Holding page, was suggestive of the 
paleontologist, though effectively producing rather than exposing the very relics 
of her search. And if ontology seeks to understand the nature of being, 
paleontology > pale-ontology, it might be suggested, in a speculative 
interpretation of the word, seeks the being of spectres. For these works, I sanded 
into a heavy paper stock, gently reducing the robust surface to a tissue-like 
fineness, endeavouring to stop short of its complete return to pulp and dust. I 
found, however, pressed between the firm table and the upper surface of the 
paper, small things were leaving their traces, raising the surface very slightly 
where they lay, and offering themselves to the sander’s orbit (figure 30). These 
works, then, sought out the holding capacity of the shallow body of the paper, 
and as the page became increasingly frail and translucent, it acquired depth and 
complexity, on account of these curious fossils. First it was fortuitous, but slowly 
I added a range of slender things –  leaves, grasses, lace, feathers. Shearing back 
a thin layer of paper, not quite to the other side, measured the capacity of this 
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body by the objects that now appeared to inhabit it, like fossils preserved in 
limestone.  
 
Figure 32. Sharon Jewell, 2013. Map: The long island with sun. Tracing paper, felt.210 X 
210cm. (Photograph, Sharon Jewell). 
 
The exchange between objects and paper, of identifying qualities – that is, 
objects taking on the qualities of paper, paper taking the form of the objects – 
harks back to Heidegger’s earth world conflict. But here there is neither assertion 
nor withdrawal of matter in its mingling with form. The ghostly relic in the paper 
is also of the paper, and thus becomes a kind of consciousness that inhabits the 
surface. The dreams of matter are in matter’s ability not to be overwritten, 
reformed or brought into the service of ideas, but to find an understanding of the 
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world against which it presses, upon which it comes to rest. In this rethinking of 
the earth world conflict, each part of the enterprise is simultaneously earth and 
world, or figure and ground, exercising mutual interest, concern, or care. In the 
dialectics of care, further removal of the paper would turn care – interest – into 
destruction. The difference is very fine indeed.  
 
While the body of paper is precariously shallow, yet somehow deepened in the 
complex traces and holding capacity revealed in its excavation, then the same 
can be said of walls, boards, thin and rigid sheets. In the previous chapter, I 
referred to Gaston Bachelard’s ontology of the half open, suggesting that the 
human subject is, like the door, a half open surface that checks and mediates the 
flows between out and in. But what is the expressive capacity of this surface, 
before it breaks through to the other side? What can be asked of the wall itself, 
independently of the worlds that it apparently divides? In the following section I 
will focus on a series of works that continued to delve into the shallow reaches of 
the surface object, this time rigid wood panels. 
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Figure 33. Sharon Jewell, 2013. Map: surface wrinkles.. Tracing paper, card. 210 X 210cm. 
(Photograph, Sharon Jewell). 
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Figure 34. Sharon Jewell, 2013. Holding surface 1. Fabriano paper. 142 X 76cm (Photograph, 
Sharon Jewell) 
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4.4 Surfaces of many openings 
Half-open walls, (figures 31-34) is a series of seven plywood panels, gouged, 
carved and lacerated to the extent that the rigidity of the material begins to give 
way to a more pliable body. The panels, with repeated incisions and holes have 
been made light-weight and, in the thinning of their slender depths, they slump 
against walls, while the floor based ones lift in long arcs, bowing upward from 
the ground. Because their raw material is the same stock and area – though 
slightly denser – that were used to clad the interior of the house and studio, I tend 
to associate them with walls, though much transformed. As a surface material, 
plywood is unique for its stratified composition. Its multiple layers, each one 
turned to cross the grain of the previous, restate surface at each level. Regardless 
of its density, depth in this substance yields only further surfaces, so that to dig 
down is to arrive again at a surface.  
 
The plywood I used for these panels is constituted of five layers. Alternate layers 
are a darker wood, so that when an oblique gouge is made in this material, the 
striated layers are revealed as broad alternating bands that become complicated 
in the repeated gestures that intersect, dispelling any design, direction, pattern or 
order. Thus the panels reveal, across a single surface, two contrasting orders: the 
striated organisation of the panel composition, and the thoroughly smooth space 
regained through its excavation. Recall here that smooth does not refer to texture, 
but to the move toward entropy in the surface’s distribution and organisation. In 
these works, smooth space accompanies an increase in texture and surface area.  
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Figure 35. Sharon Jewell. 2014. Lifting ground (arc). Plywood, sticks. 2400 X 1200. 
(Photograph, Sharon Jewell, studio) 
 
As I delve into and across the panel, the shallow rises and falls present openings 
to the outside from within the sealed wood: the buried strata are exteriorised in 
rhythmic ripples and intersections. They move in and out of presence, as if, 
instead of being layered in an orderly way, they were knotted, tangled together, 
showing equal interest in release and concealment. In some of the works more 
than others, the passage to the other side is swift and repeated, the holes offering 
a release from the drama of this tussle between order and chaos, such that these 
surfaces are half-open, half closed (see figure 32). In some, the meeting of two 
equally robust gouges, is held by nothing more than a splintery, tenuous 
membrane.  
 
Where a calm continuity and disinterested stillness lulled the uncut surface, the 
shallow though thorough excavation shows the riot concealed beneath. The 
buried layers are awakened in the repeated and intersecting gashes made by the 
incisive tool, where the turmoil is both revealed by and produced on account of 
the forces wrought upon it. The dialectic of care, as discussed in chapter 2, is the 
animating force in these works, where a negotiation of the too much and not yet 
enough is delivered in the lacing of ruptures and gouges, where the full 
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expressive potential of the wood is negotiated. The self reflexivity of these works 
– they refer to no external source and they are not reproducible – conforms to 
Jean-Luc Marion’s givenness, in the event, also discussed in chapter two. It 
could be said that these works give of themselves, through the attention and care 
that has been administered in the making. In the making, I also find my limits, 
and the limits of the tools I use. Together we form an interested assemblage both 
wearing into each other’s surfaces and enlivening each other’s qualities, in 
rhythmic patterns of reciprocation. This interest and reciprocation, I suggest, are 
essential terms of care that push both artwork and artist into the open, and into 
new registers of sense. These works, like the drawings, confirm once more the 
insufficiency of design in the business of mutual giving, or reciprocal care, and 
suggest instead the immediacy of responsiveness.  
 
So far I have examined the expressive affordances of paper and board, as I have 
come to know them, and as I have come to understand myself through them. I 
have shown how they engender the notion of care as a dialectic of extent in 
working within the limits of their material strata, and of their reciprocal relations 
with me, as artist and beholder. I have also shown how care can refer to the 
internal dialogue of parts within a work. In the following section I will look at 
the kinds of qualities released in the works involving soft, folding surface 
materials, specifically fabrics, and the three major works that issued from these 
interactions.  
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Figure 36. Sharon Jewell, 2014. Half open wall, 3. Plywood. 2400 X 1200mm (Photograph, 
Sharon Jewell, studio). 
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Figure 37. Sharon Jewell, 2013. Half open wall, 2. Plywood. 2400 X 1200mm (Photograph, 
Sharon Jewell, studio) 
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Figure 38. Sharon Jewell, 2014. Lifting ground (breath). Plywood, paper, pumice. 240 X 120cm. 
(Photograph, Sharon Jewell, studio). 
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4.5 Muslin, organza and mineral: touch sense / dream sense. 
 
Figure 39. Lengths of Muslin laid out on the studio table.  
My first inquiry into fabric involved twelve metres of white muslin. Reasons for 
the choice of this fabric, when no particular design guided the selection, might be 
sought in an early memory of mosquito nets, when once, from beneath a light 
drape of muslin, a sfumato impression of the room gave ghostly form to half  
familiar shapes. Thus muslin served as protection from the very phantoms it 
produced. Later in life, I used muslin to drain whey from curd in rudimentary 
cheese making, but it is too light and too disinterested in defined edges to 
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facilitate more fastidious design. It is, in any case a fabric that mediates, due to 
its translucency and its porosity, qualities given in its characteristically loose 
weave. Threads catch easily and when they pull, the fabric responds quickly by 
puckering around the wayward yarn. I had made a choice to explore fabric as 
part of this investigation into surface materials. But when it came to the 
selection, I was reminded that there is no single thing that is fabric. One must 
choose, and in choosing, when there is no object external to the choice 
demanding certain qualities, the choice is more important than all that follows. 
To reiterate Bachelard, “… by our first act of choice, the object designates us 
more than we designate it” (1987, 3). Although each fabric is rolled into a tidy 
bolt, and these stand like sentinels around the fabric store, they are not at all of 
the same order. I have found that selection of a fabric is not a matter of choosing 
between one or another, but about finding the one that the hands can already feel, 
that is already draped about the body. The trade in fabrics, is a trade in skins.  
 
Figure 40. Sharon Jewell, 2012. Muslin pulled and crumpled. 
The work I performed on the muslin became a sort of text. I found I could 
“write” its surface into various distortions, simply by pulling the warp and weft 
threads at different intervals, and tying them off, so that while the surface 
became increasingly expressive, increasingly determined by decisions enacted 
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upon it, it also became considerably shorter (figure 35). Twelve metres 
contracted to around eight by the time I put it aside. But it could have continued, 
could it not, to contract, for with every draw of a thread, another area revealed 
itself as not-yet-drawn? Thus the striated weave of the cloth, became striated a 
second time: a double layer of gridding crossed once and crossed again. The 
cloth itself gestured toward the unattended parts, as surely as the unwoven warp 
invokes the weft.  
 
It became clear that to follow this provocation, would be to lose all trace of the 
cloth’s extent to the intensive contraction of its weave. From plane to volume, 
the cloth began to consume itself through an excess of self-information, turning 
ever inwards, finding opacity in translucency, in an extraction of its own infinite 
profiles. What, then, intervenes, to say “enough”? No demand from an external 
agent will chime in. No rule of form, no objective interest. There is no definitive 
answer but what I want to conjecture is this: to over invest a material with its 
self-interest, is, eventually, to limit the interest it can return. I lost interest – 
another way of saying that I no longer could engage in the material collaboration 
– because the thing, under my labour, had turned all its concern inward. Is this 
not true of an over-polished surface, a surface so self-assured that at first attracts 
then, with nothing left of which to be informed or to inform, pushes back? 
 
When I first began to acquire organza I was attracted by its secret life as glass. 
The evocation of its name, glass organza, was enough to fill the imagination 
with wonder for this unlikely double life. The name is decisive: this fabric is not 
like glass; rather it shares enough of the being of glass to be familiarly related. 
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Thus glass and fabric come together to make of this substance something fragile 
and icy, tinkling in glinting needles of sound, yet simultaneously fluid, folding 
and soft. The contradiction that lies at the heart of the poetic image is of central 
importance for Bachelard, for whom the poetic instant is a “harmonic relation 
between opposites” and “the holding of the plurality of contradictory events 
within a single moment” (Kearney 2008, 38).  
 
By whom and under what spell this fabric was named is unclear. Following 
Bachelard, however, it quickly becomes apparent that glass gives not only a 
description of quality, but more precisely, a value. Bachelard writes: “Quality 
should not be sought in the object’s totality, as the deep sign of substance; it 
should instead be sought in the total adherence of a subject who is deeply 
committed to what he or she is imagining” (Bachelard 2011, 59). The excess and 
contradiction that an imagined quality affords is the first step toward a poetics of 
substances. Again, Bachelard is clear on this: “Imagining a quality means giving 
it a value that either goes beyond or contradicts the sensory value, the real value” 
(ibid., 60). Thus to know a substance through the reverie of imagination, is not 
the same as knowing it technically, or scientifically. It is not about accessing the 
use value of the material, or of explaining away its strange appeal, but the 
limitless, unnamable value that arises as a reciprocation of subject and matter in 
oneric contemplation. The oneric value of a substance supposes a reciprocation 
with the subject who dreams or imagines. Such is the abiding connection I have 
with this material that the conversations I have established with it are equally 
subjective and objective. This connection I suggest is one deeply connected to 
intransitive care, where the terms of the relation are mutually self-giving. 
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Figure 41. Sharon Jewell, 2013-2015, Mineral down. Organza, stones. 300 X 145cm 
Already, it is possible to see the deficit in my dealing with the muslin through 
this tiny portal of insight. For where I sought to know the muslin through its 
inherent material qualities, I stopped short, despite the immanence of certain 
childhood Summer nights amongst its folds, of knowing it poetically. To seek out 
or research a material is to put it to the test of the imagination. So despite the 
intriguingly altered surface of the muslin as I sought to extract the strands of its 
self knowing, I failed to establish with it an oneiric value. The glass organza 
came with this, in the high pitched hum and tinkling of its glassiness, extracted 
from the shimmering ripples within its weave. And to this contradiction of 
qualities I brought another, in the form of literally thousands of variously sized 
and coloured iron “balls”; stones that you can skid on if inattentive, scattered in 
patches across the island where I live. So together, glass organza and earthy iron 
made for a ponderous lightness, mineral earth pulling at and disdaining glassy 
lightness, reflecting a poetic intuition of care’s dialectic action. They made for a 
veil of earth, revealed first in the work Mineral down, as if feathers had been 
given the weight of sleep (figure 36).  
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The three works, Mineral down, Tent cradle, and Curtain,  (figures 36, 37, 38) 
all involving the glass organza and stones, form a central nexus for this thesis. It 
is in these materials and forms that the relationship between surface objects and 
the outward extension of care, is most apparent. The surface object in each of 
these works is manifest as, respectively, a blanket – Mineral down; a veil – 
Curtain; and an abode – Tent cradle. That each of these objects strongly invokes 
the enactment of care is indicative of a final conviction to acknowledge this as a 
principle that runs through my working methods and extends to a mode of being 
in the world. In recognising care as a key value, the importance of hand stitching 
becomes clear, as it brings my attention to every small inch of the large expanses 
of fabric, over hundreds of hours. The stones sewn into little pockets throughout 
these works, restate this enfolding, holding quality of fabric. They also create a 
poetic contradiction of lightness and mass, so that the overall effect is one of 
sheer weight. 
 
Figure 42. Sharon Jewell, 2014. Curtain. Organza, rocks. 560 X 200cm. Image courtesy of 
Caboolture Regional Gallery. Photograph by Al Sim. 
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Figure 43. Sharon Jewell, 2014. Tent cradle. Organza, stones, wood. 210 X 232 X 49cm. 
Photograph by Sharon Jewell. 
 
The gathering of stones emerged as a valuing of difference; again, an 
attentiveness. The valuing that comes with the collection is of a kind that does 
not cosset as precious, but celebrates as divergent. As Rebecca Solnit has 
observed: “The collection shifts emphasis from the object as emblematic to the 
object as divergent…Alone the object is foregrounded, but in accumulation, it 
becomes part of the background or a field” (Solnit 2003, 169). Perhaps “field” or 
“ground” is better than “background” in this context, because it seems what has 
happened is a merging of figure – the emblematic – and ground. In the collection, 
there is no more grounding, separate to the active elements, for they are their 
own ground, and as such they are able to fold and weave their differences. The 
collecting of stones also brought me down close to the ground, so close that it 
ceased to be a background, but the source of those miraculous little minerals, 
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spherical as marbles, red oxide, yellow ochre, and lustrous black and round as 
shot (figures 39, 40). The ground had spat these things out, and in all likelihood, 
still had a belly full. The ground as background disappears, when you put eye or 
ear to it, and once that background is gone, it seems clear that it was only ever 
there “as if”. Like the wall in Elana Herzog’s works, the ground first throws 
everything into relief then enfolds it, drops back, moves forward announcing its 
affinity in the same gesture that both consumes and holds. 
 
Figures 44. Minerals found on Russell Island (photograph, Sharon Jewell) 
I recall a work I made in 2013, whilst on a residency for the Lines in the Sand art 
and environment festival, North Stradbroke Island (Minjerribah), in which I 
explicitly embarked on an impossible task of care. Mending the holes in cotton 
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tree leaves, I made on site at the narrow entry to the precipitous South Gorge on 
Stradbroke Island (Minjerribah) (figure 37). For this work, I stitched, in red 
cotton, directly into dozens of leaves as they hung on the tree, across countless 
holes that were the work of the ravenous cotton bug. I quickly realised the 
insurmountable nature of the task, but pressed on despite this. Care became not 
so much an act of fixing, but an intensive engagement, a giving of self, in 
endurance, patience and close attention. While it could be argued that this act of 
care was more symbolic than real, more futile than effective, it nonetheless 
pushed the leaves forward, to the scrutiny of passersby, who were alternately 
moved and confused by this insurmountable and seemingly pointless gesture of 
mending. As with the enormous task set by the tiny stitches into the organza, care 
emerges firstly as a way of being in the world, and therefore, the practicality of a 
task is hardly a gauge as to whether an urge should or should not be pursued. I 
suggest that the willingness to take up the insurmountable task is a recognition of 
excess to reason with which Being manifests itself in the world.  
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Figure 45. Sharon Jewell, 2013. Mending holes in cotton tree leaves. (Minjerribah) 
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4.6 Mesh 
 
Figure 46. Sharon Jewell. 2012. Mesh. Sticks, fabric, wire 
A final word must be given to the large mesh work to which I dedicated several 
months in the first year of the research. It is constructed from hundreds of small 
sticks, wrapped in many different fabrics. These fabrics were donations from a 
number of women, both friends and family, whose fine silk or silk like garments 
became entwined in this net that expanded outward, with no set destiny. There is 
no prescribed pattern to the mesh work. While it may have begun that way – at a 
centre now lost – the irregularities in stick length and curve, guaranteed that the 
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pattern altered very quickly, finding new ways, new intrigues, new relations. Of 
all the works made in the course of this research, this one most emphatically 
moved outward in search of its perimeter – or in a determination never to resolve 
one – widening as it travelled away from a centre, re-establishing new ones and 
growing away once again.  
 
The mesh is a singular sort of surface material, flexible like cloth, but 
topologically different, in that it can pass through itself. The twin sidedness of 
other surface materials becomes difficult to follow in the mesh, particularly this 
Mesh, since the short lines that constitute it, transition to rather than define an 
other side. Where one face ends and another begins is a matter of estimation, and 
always ambiguous. Furthermore, and of relevance to the theme of ground that 
has moved through this research, Hans Blumenberg has pointed out, of nets – a 
species of mesh work – that they “require a medium and no longer a ground”. 
(p.73). Here he is acknowledging their dual participation in line and plane. In 
suggesting a medium, one imagines the skillful throw of the fishing net, hovering 
against sky and sinking into the water: alive in an open medium, but bereft and 
spent, on solid ground. The strangeness of the mesh led to other questions that 
began to move away from the central themes of this research – though the 
intensive care of labour was always there in the making – and which will, in 
time, be resumed in a further body of work. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have traced my creative practice, over the course of this 
research, from the idiosyncratic behaviour of notebooks and griffics, where pages 
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drive meaning, often through ambiguity, as much as inscriptions, to the more 
substantial works through which the notion of care, as a mode of engagement 
with the art work, emerged. The account given has not followed a strict 
chronology but instead addressed the action of care and processes specific to 
three kinds of materials: Paper, wood panel, and fabric. The separation of these 
materials in the discussion acknowledges the particularities of matter, and the 
impossibility of always referring to the practice and the emergent theories, 
abstracted from the material matrix. Various qualities of fragility, structure and 
pliability have given rise to different ways of thinking care in the practice, as 
well as different associations with the substantial world. For example, paper, as it 
has been discussed here, evokes the earth’s surface, in the kinds of ruptures and 
rifts through which this material expresses its qualities. The panels evoked both 
walls and the depth that is revealed even in shallow excavation. The fabric works 
evoked the protective affordances of blankets, veils and tents, as well as the 
obsessive attentiveness to the minute within the large, difference within the 
collection.  
 
The qualities that emerged in all the interactions described here derive from the 
terms of “limits”. All the works emerge from an engagement that pushes up to 
the border of the too much and not enough: the point at which the material 
reaches full expressive potential, a saturation prior to exhaustion. I have also 
suggested that it is within these terms that I, in my collaborative role with these 
materials, am also enlivened. Limits are reached for, in the repetition of a gesture 
in the work, falling short of the exhaustion by which the enlivening of the soul 
begins to falter. Care, in all these instances, becomes a negotiation of this region, 
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and is given in a reciprocal exchange between material and body: as the work 
becomes, so I become. Care is thus an attentiveness, an understanding, but an 
understanding that goes beyond a physics of material knowledge. This was raised 
in the section about muslin and organza where I defined a poetics of materiality, 
in the oneric contemplation of matter. In this discussion I referred to Gaston 
Bachelard’s understanding of substance as given in poetic form, where ambiguity 
arises between the fact of matter, and matter as it is inflected through subjective 
contemplation. In this rendering, matter is augmented, and enters the definition 
of the beholder / artist as much as the beholder / artist inflects the material. I refer 
again to the words of Dennis Slattery, cited in the introduction, writing on 
Bachelard’s poetic imagination of matter: “the material imagination, whose 
function is to imagine beneath images of form…is called upon to discover deep 
aspects of the unconscious” (Slattery 2012, 117).  
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CHAPTER 5 
THE MURMUR OF SURFACES 
 
Figure 47. Sharon Jewell, 2015. The murmur of surfaces. Caboolture Regional Gallery, May – 
June, 2015. Image courtesy of Caboolture Regional Gallery. Photograph by Al Sim.  
 
This final brief chapter comes toward the end, not because it is an aside, or a 
coda, but because its topic, the exhibition The Murmur of Surfaces, came 
together and opened after I had completed the previous chapters. The works, 
having been discussed in isolation, now need to be considered in the context of 
this exhibition – where the gathering of works becomes a new object – and in 
light of what has been written above, on the theme of care. Particularly, the 
exhibition of works relates to the mutual holding that was discussed as the 
relation between work and beholder. The gallery, isolating the works from the 
scene of production, places them within a liminal zone, a space set aside for 
contemplation that invites a particular passage or trajectory between works, that 
establishes a particular tempo and proximity for that contemplation. In the 
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gallery, space also becomes charged in relation to the works, so that, rather than 
saying “between works” it may be more appropriate to consider the impossibility 
of defining where the shores of one work end, like an island whose littoral zones 
are not clearly defined, and those of another begin.  
 
All the works, including the drawings, have a spatial presence, that is, the space 
of the beholder and that of the work is shared rather than bordered off. The long 
Curtain cutting obliquely across the southern end of the gallery takes charge of 
the space because of its scale, whilst dissolving within a glassy haze on account 
of its translucency, its spill of shadow onto the wall behind and its undefined 
edges, that fold and drape and fray. Yet this curtain does not divide two spaces 
marked for difference, and therefore attention is drawn to the object that typically 
withdraws into its partitioning role. The space of the gallery flows beneath, 
above and through this object, which, for that reason, serves instead to hold the 
space together, and create a sense rather than a designation of here and there, 
without driving a wedge through things. As the space that traverses the curtain is 
also that which is shared by the beholder, it might be said that, equally without 
strict borders, the beholder also flows and folds through the stone weighted 
fabric. Moving in toward the work, as its little stones invite, the breath can pass 
through the curtain, on account of its filtering weave and fissures and tears, thus 
mingling further, the beholder with the substance of the work.  
 
The Mineral down and Tent cradle, with their liquid-like spills of weighted 
fabric onto the floor similarly make for indistinct borders and edges. The bed-
like support over which Mineral down drapes, conjures rest or repose: the weight 
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of sleep with the lightness of dreams, its easy disarray suggesting or 
recommending habitation. Tent cradle, the more formal of the three stone-fabric 
works, meanwhile lingers in the periphery of the bed and curtain, alluding, it 
seems to me, to both the fancy and difficult passage of sleep and dreams. 
Together these three works form a cycle of mediation, where to linger is to 
respond to an ordinance on the part of the materials and their suggestiveness as 
sites of transition. In the gallery, as opposed to the studio, these transitions do not 
alight on the props and tools of manufacture, but on the connecting tide that links 
one island with another.  
 
Figure 48. Sharon Jewell, 2015. The murmur of surfaces. Caboolture Regional Gallery, May – 
June, 2015. Image courtesy of Caboolture Regional Gallery. Photograph by Al Sim.  
 
Each of the floor based panel works also resists definitive placement and 
perimeter, largely on account of the paper loops in one and the sticks that lift the 
obliquely opposed corners of the other. Without plinths beneath them, they glide 
across the floor like flotsam. Plinths have the effect of isolating and thus 
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separating works. By that definition, walls are like plinths in their tendency to 
separate, to place the work in a distinctly different place, visually though not 
physically accessible to the beholder. For this reason, the slumped forms of the 
standing panels bridge those two realms, casually dipping into the wide room, 
their commanding scale leaning down toward a common eye level, softening 
from their rigid origins to the body that moves toward them. From an affordance 
of enclosure, as the wall-like plywood panels once suggested, they now afford 
access: stepping out to meet the beholder, softening to the human subject, 
perforations offering access to the other side where their even softer shadows 
speckle the wall.  
 
Figure 49. Sharon Jewell, 2015. The murmur of surfaces. Caboolture Regional Gallery, May – 
June, 2015. Image courtesy of Caboolture Regional Gallery. Photograph by Al Sim.  
 
Similarly extending beyond the plinth and wall, the drawing, Tracks dissolving in 
a drift 2, laid out like a map to be surveyed on the cartographer’s table invites a 
trajectory, like that described in chapter three where in viewing this work, one 
needs to lean not just towards it, but into it and over it. It does not meet at eye 
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level, but at the level of interaction, where the hands can easily grasp a table 
edge, and where one assumes the position of a surveyor. A similar drawing hung 
on the opposing wall does not extend the same invitation, so that it presents a 
more visual rather than fully kinetic encounter. Several visitors to the gallery, 
however, noted that, in moving toward the wall mounted drawing, patterns and 
marks revealed themselves gradually, so that what was tone at a distance, became 
texture on closer scrutiny. 
 
In this exhibition the works that occupy plinths are those that were made prior to 
this research, works intended to be understood as belonging to a different time 
and therefore space. Those linear sculptures performing their writhing, knotted 
maneuvres over the black plinths, were made between 2008 and 2010. They are 
included in this exhibition, largely because the Caboolture Regional Gallery 
curators had wanted to present what they have called an “artist in perspective” 
exhibition, and incorporate a number of earlier works to highlight changes over a 
period of time8. Five to seven years is not a great deal earlier, but it is long 
enough to have established some very clear developments. The plinths on which 
those earlier pieces stand, therefore, serve to place them in a distinct and 
somewhat separate temporal space, whilst the rest of the exhibition, the work 
emerging from this current research, is staged in the present. The inclusion of 
this earlier group of works helps to highlight the shift, not only in style but also 
in material thinking that lies behind style, from that time to now. In a very broad 
way, I would suggest that this can be characterised as a shift in emphasis from 
form to matter.  
																																																								
8	The	only	other	work	in	the	exhibition	from	the	past	is	the	small	suspended	figure,	
Chrysalis	framed	momentarily	in	the	doorway	of	the	tent	cradle	(figure	49).	
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Figure 50. Sharon Jewell, 2015. The murmur of surfaces. Caboolture Regional Gallery, May – 
June, 2015. Image courtesy of Caboolture Regional Gallery. Photograph by Al Sim.  
 
While those earlier sculptures should not be assessed as output from this 
research, their presence performs a role of critique, that helps establish the 
context for the current inquiry. In the earlier works, plywood serves the complex 
forms that I have wrenched from the hard material. It does its job and shelters 
behind the excessive line work, revealing its origins ambiguously, in the stripes 
that run through the cross sections, along the twisting lengths of limbs. Planar 
has been translated into linear. A conflict ensues, where meaning – form / world 
– and substance – matter / earth – struggle for assertion. In the current plywood 
works, the material serves no purpose external to its special qualities. It is not 
coaxed into new shapes. The familiar dimensions of the board remain inviolable, 
while the substance of the plywood is revealed rather than disguised, through an 
attempt to turn it inside-out. Matter and meaning find common ground, mutual 
interest. In the earlier works, we see form first and matter second. In the panels, 
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the language is that of the material, translated into an dialect that already lies 
buried within its strata.  
 
Nevertheless, the opposition that I have highlighted in this exegesis, between 
surface and depth, finds an intermediary in those linear sculptures. For, while 
these works clearly move in three dimensional space, their interiors reveal only 
the surfaces of line work. Depth comes on account of the folds and knots and 
multiple strands, not on account of a dark and impenetrable  interior. Knotted and 
reflexive, these pieces reveal a writhing self interest: relations between parts are 
what hold these little sculptures together. The opening out that occurs in the 
current body of works, turns this self interest outward and it is by this inversion 
that the works offer themselves to the beholder in the form of interest, of a gift, 
or, indeed, of care. 
 
Figure 51. Sharon Jewell, 2015. Curtain. Caboolture Regional Gallery, May – June, 2015. Image 
courtesy of Caboolture Regional Gallery. Photograph by Al Sim.  
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This exhibition of works is a distillation of all the many drawings, texts, 
sculptures, and notes made throughout the research. All these outputs are 
important to the current thesis though to write about them would be to burden 
and repeat them in less adequate ways than those by which they are able to 
represent themselves. The book that accompanies this exegesis, therefore, 
documents these works and some of the griffics and texts from the note books, 
with minimal explanation. This book of documentation produces a dialogue that 
appears as a murmur, filtering through, and through which are filtered those 
words and works that I have placed at the foreground, and merging the 
interconnected and multiple parts of the research process, into a single connected 
ground.  
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CONCLUSION 
FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The course of this research, from a reflection of past encounters with the 
motivated surface of drawing, to a reorientation of thinking and doing from the 
vertical to the horizontal, has provided the basis for the development of a theory 
of care in an art practice, the specifics of which are directly linked to surface 
materials. The praxical implications of the findings should not be construed as a 
theoretical basis for art practice. Instead, reciprocal care should firstly be seen as 
a way of being, of and with the artwork and therefore must be registered in the 
range of encounters that make all art practice collaborative: encounters between 
the parts of a work; the encounter between artist and world, between artist and 
work, and work and beholder. All these relations, I have argued, invite a mode of 
being that can be seen as one of care, also expressed in this thesis as concern, 
interest and attentiveness, the aim of which is not preservation, but an enlivening 
of the being of things.  
 
The field in which this study is situated has evolved and therefore the references 
and contexts have followed the coure of this exegesis rather than having provided 
a single immovable context. Given the conclusion that care, specifically 
reciprocal care, is a mode in which artwork, artist and beholder encircle each 
other in an ethics of self giving, the research has arrived at a place wherein it is 
impossible to wrench the ontological imperative from the epistemological. That 
is, care is both a way of being and a way of knowing. 
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The definition of reciprocal care as a material responsiveness, in which the artist 
and beholder, as well as the material components are involved, means that care is 
not to be confused with sentiment. It is for this reason that I have defended the 
notion that interest can equally express the effects of care, when that interest is 
active and directed toward the particular. That is, interest cannot be equal to care, 
when directed toward one thing, for the sake of another. Furthermore, care must 
always be active, not merely theoretical, abstract or sentimental. In this exegesis, 
I have contrasted the idea, to care about, where the radius of care is non-targeted 
but attends to a range of things interconnected in a field, with intransitive care 
which is care that is expressed through attention to the particular as, in a sort of 
chiasmus of practice, the particular arises in care. It is thus a self-giving and 
reciprocal revealing that occurs in the acute attentiveness of practice: as I attend 
to the thing that emerges on account of the attention, this care is deflected back to 
me as a revealing of consciousness. Art practice enacted within such terms 
becomes an enlivening of being. 
 
Such is the phenomena of the gift, I have argued, as Jean-Luc Marion has 
developed it, through the notion of reciprocation. In his theory, Marion shows 
how that which gives, gives of itself, prior to the intentional object, which can 
only ever arrive as a preconception, a value given before the event. For Marion, 
the gift is the event of self-giving, where the artist receives and holds phenomena 
without translating them into logical categories or terms, and gives the 
phenomena a new material access. This, I have argued, is how intransitive care 
can be explained, with the term “beholder” an appropriate way of defining the 
sense of being held, and simultaneously, of holding the object of encounter. 
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The significance of this can be read on a number of levels, from its influence on 
artistic agency, to the defense of art practice as an alternative economy where 
value circulates in the self-giving that is defined here as care. This stands in 
direct contrast to economies of exchange, where value is a quantity external and 
arbitrary to the object at hand. Self giving, in the intransitive care of art practice, 
sets value at the level of the particular, prior to categorical identification, prior to 
the assignation of a use value, and as such, has the effect of augmenting rather 
than setting limits on the experience of world and self. Thus I have described my 
materials as objects of encounter and have avoided referring to terms that relate 
to use or expediency. In my encounters with materials, decisions arose as a 
collaboration between the substance at hand and that substance as it was 
experienced in oneric contemplation, where qualities became dispersed in a 
range of categorically different substances: Fabric became skin, but also glass; 
paper also became skin; wood, carved and complicated, became an image of 
being.    
 
From these speculations and observations, I suggest that art practice, realised in 
the mode of care, lends considerable force to a contemplation of the nature of 
being in the world, while its neglect risks limiting material interactions to an 
economy of exchange, as opposed to the unconditional immediacy of 
reciprocation, proposed here. In my art practice, this has resulted in a very 
different way of critiquing, and thus engaging with creative work, since critique 
and practice are not separate. In the mode of care suggested here, critical 
judgments are not based on arbitrary or imposed aesthetic criteria, but on 
something like the right of an object to be, if it has been made or given in care. 
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Thus by the same logic, it reignites critique with a more human, as well as more 
material imperative. This does not do away with aesthetic judgment, but lends an 
ethical cast to such critique. 
*** 
Early on in the research I had queried that sense by which I am gripped, when 
facing a work of art, that acts at the affective level. It is more than a visual 
response, but a clear sense that the object of the encounter is acting upon me, 
reaching out. In Chapter 3 I discussed how Dorothea Rockburne theorized the 
movement of thought and information from herself to the artwork that is then 
able to offer that information and thought indefinitely. Likewise, in this thesis I 
have speculated that care, by which materials come to be enlivened in a work of 
art, continues to inhabit the work, which then gives of itself as care long after it 
has been completed. I have supported this speculation through Heidegger’s 
contention that being in the world is enacted through care, or concern. As I have 
contended that care, by definition, needs to be active, not merely theoretical, the 
care that arises in a work, through care, must also perform care in an active way. 
To say that art concerns itself with the world, might therefore be taken quite 
literally, as, independent of the artist, the work continues to perform in a manner 
of self-giving.  
 
Again, I have qualified this as a care defined by an attentiveness to the object and 
interaction at hand, distinguishing it from the care that is directed toward an 
external concern, for which the artwork becomes a medium. This definition 
acknowledges a material agency, that links this study with certain themes of New 
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Materialism, though its emphasis on the mode of care establishes a new way of 
thinking agency.  
 
A further claim to care that I have made concerns the relationship between figure 
and ground in drawing. I argued that a mutual interest between the parts of a 
drawing effectively raises the background from obscurity to become motivated 
and articulate, along with the marks. The mutual activation of figure with rather 
than on ground makes of the drawing an object grounded in the world, available 
to all its contingencies and risks. In the drawings of Kiki Smith I identified this 
special engagement of figure and ground. In naming it care, I countered the 
assertion that Heidegger made for the interaction between matter and meaning, in 
the idea of conflict between earth and world. The dialectic that I have called care, 
where ruin and expressive assertion are always nudging toward each other, 
became particularly clear in the works of Elana Herzog and Alberto Burri, where 
a dialogue of ruin and repair was seen to be the enlivening force of the works, 
eliciting both empathy and an augmentation of material intensity.  
 
In my own work, this dialectic was most apparent in the series Abrasions, where 
paper was scratched to within the limits of cohesion. But in most of the works, 
this dialectic was the motivating principle. For the series, Holding surface and 
the wood panels, Half open walls, 1-5, Lifting ground (arc), and Lifting ground 
(breath) the dialectic of ruin and preservation pushed the materials toward their 
limits, whilst augmenting their expressive strength or holding capacity. In the 
cloth works, care is assumed in the nature of the objects suggested – blanket, 
curtain, tent-cradle – while the dialectic nature of care emerges in the ambiguity 
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of weight and lightness, pushing each other toward a new register of sense. 
Additionally, in all these works, as well as the drawings, care as attentiveness has 
always manifest in the repetition, persistence, minute deliberation, that have 
brought me in close to the surfaces, caused me to consider the very small as 
acutely as the larger form. As I mentioned in chapter 3.1, a kind of myopia 
seemed to typify my interactions across these broad terrains of paper, cloth and 
panel.  
 
The fact that I have chosen to work with surface materials is neither incidental 
nor peripheral to the conclusions I have proposed regarding care. Surface 
materials have been central to this study, for their peculiar expansiveness in area 
and absence of depth, which make them vulnerable to the exigencies of weather, 
wear, time and accidental and deliberate forces. Care comes intuitively when 
handling such things, whether it is in stitching a leaf, delving into thin board, 
coaxing the latent qualities from mute paper, or weighting sheer fabric with 
stone. The reciprocity of care, however, does not mean preservation. As I have 
discussed particularly in chapter three, it is managing to negotiate the too much 
with the not yet enough, not in order to find synthesis, but to maintain the 
vibration of life that happens as the limits of things are reached for. This reading 
of care might mean an act of force that breaks apart the cohesiveness of a 
surface. With surface materials, however, in any act of force, no depth is struck 
or shaken, no outpouring, no concealed matter revealed, beyond the matter 
immanent to the handling. The rend or the tear, the puncture or thinning, restates 
the surface, revealing what we already suspect, but in a way that has become 
heightened or expressive and that acknowledges the shared investment of subject 
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and object. In this regard, with one of many references to Gaston Bachelard, I 
have likened surface materials to the self, linking this study with an ontological 
discourse. 
 
As a “half open being” the self variously gives and withholds access. But it is not 
necessarily the depths of self that are negotiated, so much as the self as a surface 
that suffers tears and rifts, and enjoys the touch of things, resonates with taut 
cohesion, that binds and holds, vibrates and collapses into the extravagance of 
folds. To speak of depths and surfaces is to find sense in one metaphor or 
another. Throughout the creative work the collaborations with materials chosen 
in intuitive responsiveness, and the parallel contemplation of a consciousness 
that finds itself dispersed within those materials, a study in surfaces has evolved 
equally within the terms of an ontological speculation.  
 
If I were to make a statement issuing from this designation of surface materials to 
a wider ontology, I might speculate that being is not so much deep, as vast; that it 
extends into an ever widening perimeter, that is not given prior to the event of its 
being, and that it also folds back on itself. After several months working on the 
Mineral down, I was struck by the sense that I could commit myself to this 
singular task for the span of my life, that, rather than taking up novel challenges, 
I could nominate my vocation by this object and our shared processes. I will in 
all probability, respond to this urge, trusting that extent builds intensity, as the 
shifting perimeter touches the world in different ways. The same sense of 
perpetuity struck me with the Mesh, which even more emphatically claims no 
perimeter to define a necessary conclusion. Surface materials, which extend 
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laterally, and ask nothing of depths, lend themselves to this kind of extension, 
that marks equally space and time.   
*** 
The responding, attentive subject – maker or beholder – absorbs a share of the 
forces given to and returned by the work, either in the act of making or viewing. 
How long do we attend to a work? What determines the too much and not yet 
enough? And what is it that happens when we stay with something that troubles 
or insists? While these questions could continue to form the basis of a further 
study, this present one provides an opening. Do we not already use the language 
of “holding”? The work holds the attention, the eye, the entire being. And do we 
not say that we behold something, as a way of referring to our response to 
phenomena that detain our senses? Phenomena that insist make of us a 
vulnerable surface, all depth turned outward, and perhaps prepared to tear a little.  
 
Such is the reciprocity of care: a mutual holding, a safe place to break, to open. 
Given the ways in which particular material fascinations have guided this study 
toward an ethics of encounter in an art practice, and an otology based on a 
particular deployment of matter, further studies might be directed toward other 
sorts of substances, examined with the same level of inquiry, with a similar 
methodology, based on material collaboration and indetermination, to establish 
the narratives that issue from a different constitution of matter. On the other 
hand, a study extending from this one, might take as a starting point an a priori 
recognition of care as a motivating force, to apply it to an analysis and 
application of a range of situations and materials. A question here could be, how 
might care be augmented within the world through creative practice? Such a 
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study could certainly extend beyond a studio art practice, though the challenge, 
from my point of view as an artist, is how to continue to use and develop an 
existing art practice, to engage with these broader speculations.  
 
Thus the immediate implications of the research findings are to be found in their 
application in practice. They have the possibility to respond to these questions: 
By what mode of judgment do I consider the work I do? And, as stated above, 
How am I to be with a work of art? Needless to say, the answer to these 
questions is in the mode of care. This is not as simple as determining whether or 
not I care. In effect, it is to ask to what extent and how my interactions with 
materials set in motion a space for reciprocity, where the dialectics of care work 
upon all the agents at play, including materials, artist and, later, beholder. It was 
not until I was delivered the vexing provocation, late in the research process: 
“Why do you do it?” that I began to consider. In the heated moment of my 
response, I answered tautologically “Because that’s what I do,” but later 
considered beyond this to arrive at the – almost equally tautological – Because I 
care. As it turns out, each of these answers was of considerable use in shifting 
beyond the formal hiatus I had reached. In the first answer, I identified the 
intransitive nature of practice. In the second, I recognised that what was 
intransitive, was care.  
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